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ABSTRACT
Institutions, State Capacity, and Intra-State Conflict
Evidence from a decade-long Civil War in Nepal
by
Nishant Yonzan
Co-advisors: Miles Corak, Wim P.M. Vijverberg
First, while mass armed civil conflicts predominantly occur in weak states, which are states
that lack state capacity, it is unclear why not all weak states experience mass armed civil
conflict. Second, political stability and highly unequal distribution of resources are opposing
forces that are unlikely to coexist together. However, highly unequal societies have existed
with relative stability. Indeed, cross-country literature on civil war finds little relationship
between conflict and unequal distribution of resources. This dissertation attempts to address
these issues using the Civil War in Nepal which lasted from 1996 to 2006.
Institutions are fundamental for the proper functioning of any state. Conflict within a state
can be seen as a medium of change from one institution to another. Whereas some institutions
change incrementally with little space for conflict, others change abruptly providing the
opportunity for mass armed conflict. The Kingdom of Nepal, through two-and-a-half centuries,
developed a stable socio-political order that hinged on the institution of the monarchy. The
distribution and control of land were used as a primary tool for state-building. This structure,
including the unequal distribution of land, was legitimized by a process of Sanskritization
that was dependent on the institution of the monarchy. The structure collapsed suddenly as
a result of the massacre of the king and ten other members of the royal family on June 1st,
2001. This unfortunate incident was unrelated to any national or international politics but
was due to an internal family feud. I use this exogenous shock to identify the differences in
conflict outcomes before and after the massacre. Whereas conflict was isolated and sparse in
the pre-2001 period, it escalated and spread to all parts of the country immediately following
the massacre. Relative to the trends in conflict-related deaths before the massacre, I find a
six-fold increase in conflict-related deaths after the massacre. While the loss of legitimacy
triggered the widespread conflict in Nepal, it would have been unlikely without any motive
for conflict. I find that conflict, in the post-massacre period, tripled in regions with unequal
distribution of farmland relative to more equal regions.
v
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The entire history of social improvement has been a series of transitions by which
one custom or institution after another, from being a supposed primary necessity
of social existence, has passed into the rank of a universally stigmatized injustice
and tyranny. – Mill (1895)
On June 1st, 2001, Birendra Bir Bikram Shah, the monarch of the Kingdom of Nepal,
and ten members of his family, including his successors, were killed by the Crown Prince
Dipendra. Dipendra, Birendra’s eldest son, also fatally shot himself on the same night. Why
Dipendra killed his parents, his siblings, and other members of his family that night is as
important as what the Royal Massacre, as the event became known, engendered not only for
his family but also for Nepali society at large. The answer to the former was a trivial issue
involving his marriage. The answer to the latter, more importantly, was that it fractured
the two-and-half-century old socio-political order and changed the course of history in that
country.
In this dissertation, I outline the foundations for the development of the state of the Kingdom
of Nepal. I will argue that the formation of the state and the development of its institutions,
including its collapse, was the defining factor of the Civil War in Nepal, which lasted
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from 1996 to 2006. The Kingdom lasted two-and-a-half centuries from 1769 to 2008. The
capacity of the state, which evolved over this time, was dependent on the legitimacy of the
Shah rulers. The Royal Massacre abruptly changed this. The absence of state capacity
engendered the escalation of armed conflict in the post-2001 period. This change in the
relative “price structure” was a necessary condition for mass violence as it changed the
incentives to profit from violence. In other words, it created the opportunity for conflict.
However, this opportunity was not sufficient—for changes in the incentive structures alone
seldom bring about mass violence. Wide-spread civil armed struggle requires underlying
fundamental drivers. In the case of Nepal, the land was the primary economic resource used
for state-building, and thus, the unequal distribution of land ultimately played a key role in
the escalation and the distribution of conflict.
This chapter links the events in the development and collapse of the Kingdom of Nepal to a
broader general framework of institutional development and decay. Chapter 2 discusses the
literature on civil wars through the prism of opportunity and motive for conflict. Chapter 3
provides a detailed historical outline of state formation in Nepal. Chapter 4 discusses the
identifying strategy and the empirical challenges. Chapters 5 and 6 provide the empirical
framework and results. Conclusion and discussions are provided in chapter 7.
1.1 Institutions as a source of stability and also of in-
stability
“Institutions”, as defined by North (1990), “are the rules of the game in a society or, more
formally, are the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction.” Institutions
provide the formal and informal rules that guide the actions of individuals within a society.
Institutions help facilitate social interactions, and with them, social stability; that is, they
preserve social order and reduce conflict within a society. If institutions are the source of
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social stability, then any analysis that deals with instability within a state ought to make the
study of institutions its central thesis. Indeed, societal order can be thought of as the “result
of a dense social network where people have an intimate understanding of each other”, where
“the threat of violence is a continuous force for preserving order” (North, 1990, p.39).1
For a plausible explanation of institutions as the forces of change—that is a path from stability
to instability or vice versa, one ought to (a) explain the origin of a particular institution,
(b) explain how these institutions are maintained, reinforced, and perpetuated, (c) explain
what constitutes a breakdown of these institutions, and (d) provide reasons as to why conflict
is inherent in the collapse of these institutions. It is not necessary that (c) is the natural
endpoint for all institutions. Actually, it is the contrary, for there can be various paths in
the evolution of an institution. Indeed, institutional rules are used by the players to form
organizations, which in turn can influence the institutions themselves.2 The degree to which
an institution is receptive to the organizations is what constitutes the former’s perpetuation.
The relatively rigid institutions, those that do not accommodate change, are predisposed to
collapse.3
Institutions can be political or economic. While the former usually provides the guidelines
for the latter, it is true that most political institutions are founded on economic necessities.
The path from initiation of the state to the escalation of mass violence can be traced as
follows: formation of the state –> formation of institutions –> formation of norms which
reinforce those institutions –> abrupt breakdown of the institutions –> mass social violence.
Hence, to understand the violence in the post-2001 period in Nepal, it is of utmost necessity
1See Figure 1.A.1 for a description of the levels of institutions and the time it takes for changes in each
level.
2“Institutions, together with the standard constraints of economic theory, determine the opportunities
in a society. Organizations are created to take advantage of those opportunities, and as the organizations
evolve, they alter the institutions” (North, 1990, p.7).
3Institutions that readily change have been referred to as “adaptively efficient” institutions. They are
characterized by “the willingness of a society to acquire knowledge and learning, to induce innovation, to
undertake risk and creative activity of all sorts, as well as to resolve problems and bottlenecks of the society
through time” (North, 2005, p.80).
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to first understand the events that transpired before it.
1.1.1 What was the origin of the institutions in Nepal?
The source of political institutions, that is how and why they were created, can be the
harbinger of its evolution and its adaptability. In most cases, the source of the political
institutions is congruent with the reasons for the formation of the state. This was no different
in Nepal. Political institutions were founded by the governors under the Shah kings. The
Kingdom of Nepal can be thought of as a “natural state”—a political organization with elite
personal relationships, ruled by a dominant coalition, and in which the organizations and
privileges are inaccessible to the members outside this coalition (North et al., 2009). This
coalition of elites under the Shah kings dictated the rules of the game. While most natural
states are not “perpetually lived”—that is, those that end with the demise of the leader
(North et al., 2009), the establishment of a hereditary dynasty established a multi-generational
state. A hereditary monarchy, however, did not exclude the possibility of coup d’etat by the
members of the elite, or for that matter, from any other factions within society. To overcome
this, an additional belief was interjected. In particular, the monarch, or the person of the
King, was conflated with the idea of the divinity of a Hindu God. The King came to be
seen as the embodiment of Vishnu—a member of the Hindu holy trifecta. This essentially
created a rigid hierarchy between the King and other members of society, including the elites.
Another more worldly reason also assisted in maintaining this hierarchy between the King
and the elites—the latter was rewarded for their cooperation with land, the most lucrative
economic resource in any agricultural society.
This latter relationship between the King and the elites constituted the framework for the
economic institutions. The land belonged to the King, who “leased” it out to the elites. The
elites in turn could amass economic profits from land and also subjugate the peasants. The
elites relied on the King to legitimatize the extraction of surplus resources from the peasants.
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In this way, the economic and political institutions fortified each other.
It is also important to address why the Shahs, as opposed to any other elite group, were
at the helm of this state. This can be attributed to a historical accident. Nepal before
the Shah dynasty was a loose network of small geographically isolated city-states. Adverse
geography protected these city-states from each other and from more powerful empires in the
north and the south. This however changed with the introduction of the British East India
company in the Indian subcontinent. The mix of a growing military threat from the south
and a charismatic leader brought about the consolidation of these fragmented kingdoms. The
Kingdom of Nepal was sewn from these fragmented city-states by Prithivi Narayan Shah
(PNS) in the mid-eighteenth century. The Shahs, prior to this, ruled one of the statelets,
Gorkha, which lies about sixty miles to the west of the Kathmandu Valley, the capital of
the Kingdom of Nepal. Kathmandu Valley in itself was economically lucrative and thus had
been an object desired by the kings in the surrounding states. The Valley was at the heart
of the trade route between the Indian principalities in the south and the Tibetan Kingdom
in the north. PNS’s charisma and timing meant that he, and not another leader of the
numerous city-states, would unite Nepal. The motives for the unification were the imminent
threat from the south coupled with the desire to control the only trading route between the
southern principalities of India, and the northern state of Tibet. In this way, PNS became
the patriarch of the hereditary dynasty that would rule the Kingdom of Nepal for the next
two-and-a-half centuries.
1.1.2 What purpose did the institutions serve? How were they
strengthened and perpetuated?
Institutions reduce uncertainty in the environment, and importantly, this is achieved by
the “intentionality of the players” (North, 2005). That is to say, the environment imposes
uncertainties—which can be, among other things, risks of violence, lack of information,
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transaction costs, coordination problems, monitoring and enforcement costs, and protection
of property rights; institutions are chosen to mitigate these perceived risks.4
The immediate risk in a state that is founded through violence is that of further violence.
As the new state formed, it encountered two-fold threats: an external military threat from
the East Indian Company, and an internal threat of rebellion by the recently conquered
principalities. Nevertheless, these threats were not additive. On the contrary, the presence
of an external enemy helped unify the population internally. Once the external war was
over, however, the challenge was to maintain internal order. This was a difficult task,
considering that the fragmented city-states had, through centuries of relative geographic
isolation, developed their own language, culture, and identity. This latter point is crucial for
the development of certain types of institutions.
Institutions are founded on a system of formal and informal beliefs, both of which have costs.
While the former requires enforcement, the latter requires cooptation by the people and thus
is a product of some form of social disciplining. Nepal’s adverse geography combined with
the nuevo state’s limited resources made the former a difficult proposition. For social order,
a large degree of cooptation was necessary. This problem of collective action was solved by a
religious “disciplining.” As had happened with Calvinism in the sixteenth and seventeenth
centuries, where the Dutch Republic adopted and promoted the Calvinistic values and ethics
(Gorski, 2003), so was the case in Nepal. The state used the Hindu religion to discipline its
population. Sanskritization, which is a system of religious and lingual consolidation, became
4Production relations are the causes of political institutions and organizations in Marxist analysis.
Additionally, these relations once established can predict the changes to institutions. Brenner (1976) argues
that relations between classes are what fundamentally explains the long-term development of an economy.
In his view, class-relations are the basis of institutions which provide the guiding principles for society:
“different class structure, specifically property relations or surplus-extraction relations, once established,
tend to impose rather strict limits and possibilities, indeed rather specific long-term patterns, on a society’s
economic development.” Interestingly North (1990) conforms to the above argument. North states: “The
margins at which alterations occurred can only be understood in terms of the historically derived costs of
transacting [which he defines as ‘customs of the manor’] and the historically derived models [which he defines
as ‘status relationship of inequality characterized by master-servant status’] that both parties possessed about
their worlds”, and that “neither party would have envisioned a change that would have eliminated that
inequality. The incremental changes are only intelligible in terms of these historical relationships” (p.96).
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the primary tool towards this end (Bista, 1991). Sanskritization created a Hindu state (Hindu
religious texts were traditionally only written in Sanskrit) with Nepali (a derivative of the
Sanskrit language) the lingua-franca of the state. The idea of one nation, one religion, one
language, and one identity was embodied in the monarch himself. Recall that the monarch
was considered a Hindu demi-God. Simplistic symbols as such become important tools used
toward motivating public opinion. One of the major symbols of a unified Nepali nation, even
to this day despite Nepal’s commitment starting in 2008 to republicanism, is the depiction of
PNS pointing his index figure into the sky—expressing this idea of national “oneness”. The
importance of this cannot be overstated: a statue of PNS with his index figure pointed to
the sky still stands in front of the House of Parliament in the center of Kathmandu Valley.
The State relied heavily on informal and communal norms, derived from the Hindu religion,
to regulate social interactions. These social norms defined and regulated social, political, and
economic behavior. In addition, formal institutions, legal and bureaucratic, were established
for the first time in the nineteenth century. For instance, the first legal code was codified in
1856 in the Muluki Ain [national code]. These legal codes, however, were the formalization
of existing social norms defined by the Hindu religion (Whelpton, 1991). The process
of nationalization was further aided by the pedagogical and non-state institutions in the
twentieth century. Hence, the Nepalese had a state, which was heavily reliant on the Hindu
social codes, and that was defined through the monarch. The state, nation, and the kingship
were synonymous. This would be the norm for two-and-a-half centuries until the Royal
Massacre in 2001.
North et al. (2009) argue that order, in natural states, is maintained by distributing resources
among the elites. As argued above, this was the mode of economic organization in the
Kingdom. As in all pre-industrial societies, agriculture was the main occupation in Nepal.
Even as recent as 2016, 65 percent of the population was involved in agriculture (World Bank,
2018). Land, the predominant source of income, was distributed among the elites, who in
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turn had the economic, and in cases political, power over the peasants. The elites gained
access to land by gaining favor with the state.5 The division between those with land and
those without created a class organization of society.
These landowning elites faced a commitment problem. There was a natural tendency among
the elites to reinforce the political and economic institutions to consolidate their resources.
Acemoglu et al. (2005) define this problem as follows: “Individuals who have political power
cannot commit not to use it in their best interests, and this commitment problem creates an
inseparability between efficiency and distribution because credible compensating transfers
and side-payments cannot be made to offset the distributional consequences of any particular
set of economic institutions.” In other words, there is a tendency for inefficient institutions to
perpetuate, or of path dependence. This path dependence can lead to an equilibrium that
does not necessarily maximize social benefits.
It is also important to note that path dependence is not only reliant on economic factors.
Indeed, social and cultural factors can reinforce, or even provide the impetus for the persistence
of institutions. For instance, the caste system played a major role in determining the economic
roles. In particular, it preordained the social position of an individual in society. Although the
caste system, in a social sense, was not as strictly enforced in Nepal as had been the case in
India (see Bista, 1991; Whelpton, 2005), it did nevertheless define functional roles, and in turn
limited economic mobility of individuals. This then provided little incentive for an individual
to take any initiatives, and hence stunted the prospects for economic progress of society.
While the elites busied themselves with the redistributive rather than productive aspect of
the economy, the rest of the population formed a fatalistic view of one’s socio-economic roles
that were detrimental to economic progress.6
5As it happens, an informal system called chakari was rampant in the country. In this system, the
person seeking favor from the higher authority regularly visits the authority’s household and waits on them,
preferably bringing with them gifts and/or gossip about the authority’s competitors. In this way, he/she
gains favor which in the future reciprocates rewards. This is the nature of communication and workflow in a
personalized state.
6Olson (1993) raises the question that perhaps all autocrats think short-term by nature, and this explains
the lack of economic progress. Olson writes: “the rational autocrat will have an incentive, because of his
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As has been presented, Nepali society was organized both along class and functional lines,
each reinforcing the other. It also meant that the institutions built by PNS and his followers
were easily perpetuated and reinforced. Informal values, norms, and beliefs played a major
role in the path dependence of the institutions.
In addition to the lack of social mobility, the economy was also hampered by the fact that
until the mid-twentieth century, Nepal remained an autarkic state. The idea of nationhood
was itself defined vis-à-vis its relation to the British East India Company primarily, but also
other foreign powers generally. Even before the Shah dynasty, the “pure” Hindu principalities
within Nepal were contrasted with the “corrupt” (in a religious sense) Mogul ruled North
India (Whelpton, 1991). Isolation, in essence, was a national interest. Protection of this
national interest was one of the primary goals of the nation and of its’ symbol—the King.
Besides the religious isolation, Nepal was also kept geographically isolated. Perhaps the
geographical isolation only helped the social and economic isolation of the country. The
formidable Himalayas in the north and the thick malarial jungles in the south created a
natural barrier for any intrusion into the country for outsiders.7 Access was difficult, and the
lack of resources—such as fertile land and forests, relative to India in the south, kept Nepal
completely isolated until the latter half of the twentieth century.
interest in increasing the investment and trade of his subjects, to promise that he will never confiscate wealth
or repudiate assets. But the promise of an autocrat is not enforceable by an independent judiciary or any
other independent source of power, because autocratic power by definition implies that there cannot be any
judges or other sources of power in the society that the autocrat cannot overrule. Because of this and the
obvious possibility that any dictator could, because of an insecure hold on power or the absence of an heir,
take a short-term view, the promises of an autocrat are never completely credible. Thus the model of the
rational self-interested autocrat I have offered is, in fact, somewhat too sanguine about economic performance
under such autocrats because it implicitly assumed that they have (and that their subjects believe that they
have) an indefinitely long planning horizon.” But, of course, we have autocrats who have managed economies
exceedingly well—recent examples include Lee Kuan Yu of Singapore and Park Chung-hee of South Korea.
So, being an autocrat by itself does not explain the lack of economic progress. Also note that the kings in
the Indian sub-continent in particular, and South Asia in general, were seen as a defender of rights of their
people, as opposed to the notion of stationary bandits (see Fukuyama, 2011). In many cases, religion played a
role in keeping the checks on the rulers’ powers.
7Malaria was eradicated starting only in the 1960s. Access in and out of Nepal through the south was
only possible in colder months.
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1.1.3 What explains the collapse of institutions?
As discussed above, the monarch in Nepal was the embodiment of institutions that were
developed. The institutions were built using the legitimacy of the Kings as their foundation
and hence was dependent on the consistency of their rule. This provided stability to the
institutions. Borrowing from Fukuyama (2011), legitimacy here is defined as the “means that
the people who make up the society recognize the fundamental justice of the system as a
whole and are willing to abide by its rules.” Legitimacy provided the legal authority for the
rule and in effect was the source of political order. Legitimacy also acted as a substitute for
coercive power. If individuals in society view leaders as legitimate, then those individuals
may more willing to co-opt to the rules and regulations of the state, as opposed to being
forced to follow them. If developing coercive ability is beneficial for the economic progress of
the state (Tilly, 1985), then not needing coercive ability could potentially thwart incentives
for the economic progress of the state. This could perhaps explain the lack of investment in
strong policing and extractive aspects in the Kingdom of Nepal. Even though wars have been
credited for the formation of “strong” states (Tilly, 1985), if social order is the objective of a
“strong” state, then legitimacy can certainly substitute for coercion.
Moreover, the institutionalization of ideology was inherent not only in the formal rules but
more so in the informal values and norms of society. The more a society places importance
on these intangible assets, the bigger the role the idea of an institution plays in that society.
Institutions that have rigid social structures cannot adapt to the changing price structure—be
it brought about by demographic or technological changes.8 A social order built around an
8Brenner (1976) argues that both demographic and commercialization mechanisms are but proximate
factors. He posits that relations between different classes in society, in particular seigneurial exploitation
(or lack thereof), is the key variable that explains how the relative price changes due to demographic or
market factors influenced societal outcomes. In his explanation, varying class relations differentiates the
developmental patterns of society and, thus, varying economic outcomes. This is very much in the spirit
of North (2005), who defines the persistence of multiple socio-economic equilibria due to the variance in
institutions. Additionally, Brenner’s, as well as North’s, position is contrary to a Coasian argument which
would suggest “the existence of a homeostatic system or ecosystem, with a built-in mechanism of self-correction”
(Le Roy Ladurie, 1985). In the former’s argument, path dependence and persistence of inefficient equilibria are
contrary to the self-correction mechanism proposed by the latter. For a comparative discussion in institutional
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individual, mostly through beliefs and values, and which cannot adapt to changes in the
environment is more susceptible to collapse.
This personalized state collapsed under the shock of the Royal Massacre in 2001.
1.1.4 What was the motive for mass civil conflict?
Social conflict can be viewed as a mode of change from one set of institutions to another.
These changes generally are brought about by the changes in the relative price structures
driven by either technological or demographic changes. It is not necessary that changes
in relative price structure lead to changes in institutions through violent conflict. In most
cases, institutional changes are incremental (North, 1992), and perhaps social conflicts are
muted. However, rigidly hierarchical institutions, those that lack “adaptive efficiency”, can
abruptly collapse bringing about disruptive changes. The collapse of the foundations of such
hierarchical structures can lead to violent conflicts that bring about new institutions and
social order. This is certainly the case of personalized institutions. The death or demise of
the patriarch of these institutions can lead to the conflict until a new social equilibrium can
be found. (This is evident from the recent toppling of leaders in the Middle-east and the
ensuing chaos that it has brought about.)
Nevertheless, if the socio-political and economic institutions reinforced each other to keep
political and economic power in the hands of a few united elites, then it is difficult to ascertain
why there would be mass violence. Acemoglu et al. (2005) suggest that the source of de jure
political power is economic might. This power can be harnessed to lead a rebellion against
the holders of de facto power. However, if there is only one ideology, and, in addition, this
ideology is the source of elite wealth, then it is not clear why the elites themselves would
favor a change of this ideology. Moreover, as was the case in Nepal, the de jure and de facto
powers were limited to a few elite families. Path dependence of institutions, or the tendencies
perspective between the Coasian and Marxist schools, see Bardhan (1989).
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of the elites to keep the status quo, should have made sure that the changes were incremental
and not sudden.
The solution to the problem of collective action of mass violence then must come from a
different source—that is from the non-elites who do not hold either de facto or de jure power
internally. The driving force could be an external stimulus, such as foreign incursions, but it
can also come from other internal sources. In the absence of an external force, communism
played a major role in providing the alternate ideology internally to the one monopolized
by the state. By presenting it as an alternative that would, in theory, mitigate the existing
problems of inequality, communism placed itself in a position for mass acceptance in the
event that the legitimacy of the older order was lost.9 This is exactly what happened. The
shock in 2001 corroded the legitimacy of the state institutions. The underlying unequal
resource distribution provided the motive for the individuals to accept an alternative ideology
that favored their state of affairs. The alternative narrative was that of an armed struggle
against the state. Not only was there mass violence in the post-2001 period, but there was
also increased violence in regions with relatively unequal distribution of land. While the
presence of an alternate ideology is necessary, it is, however, not sufficient. For sufficiency, a
drastic socio-political disruption was required. For the Kingdom of Nepal, this came in the
form of the Royal Massacre.
1.2 Conclusion
The Shah dynasty set up the socio-political institutions of the Kingdom of Nepal. These
shared beliefs, norms, and values formed the set of guiding principles of the state. In turn,
these institutions structured the “incentives in exchange, whether political, social, or economic”
(North, 1990). In a Malthusian society, the concentration of the mode of production among a
9See Milanovic (2019) for a discussion on how communism may be seen as a module for the transition
from feudalism to capitalism in the Developing World in the twentieth century.
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few individuals can create asymmetrical power relations. This was the case in the Kingdom
of Nepal. A narrow group of elites controlled much of the land in the Kingdom, which was
legitimized through the monarch. Much of the peasants fatefully accepted their role in the
social and economic hierarchy of the nation. Religion was used for social disciplining. The
political institutions set up by the Shah kings reinforced the social and economic organizations.
However, these institutions were dependent on the monarch. The institutions collapsed due
to the shock of the Royal Massacre. The legitimacy, and with it state capacity, drastically
decreased which created a space for a mass armed revolt.
The Royal Massacre that transpired on the fateful night of June 1st, 2001 fundamentally
altered the two-and-a-half-century old socio-political and economic order. In what follows,
first, I explain in detail the formation of the state and institutions in Nepal. This process
happened over the two centuries prior to 2001. The institutions were essential to keep order
in the Kingdom. The stability of this centralized system was embodied in the Kings. Chaos
ensued in the immediate aftermath of the Royal Massacre. Second, I empirically test the
significance of the Royal Massacre to the armed conflict in the post-2001 period. I find that
conflict increased six-fold after the Royal Massacre compared to before. Additionally, I test
the link between the distribution of land and the distribution of conflict in the absence of
state capacity. I find that unequal regions had twice as much violence compared to more
equal regions.
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Appendix
1.A Figures
Figure 1.A.1: Levels of Institutions
Notes: This figure is replicated from Figure 1 of Williamson (2000). It presents the levels in institutions,
with the time required for changes to occur in each level. The discussions in this dissertation will focus on
levels L2 and L3.
Chapter 2
The Nature and Causes of Intra-State
Conflict
Intra-state conflict, or civil conflict, requires both an opportunity and a motive. Opportunities
can arise from demographic, economic, or political changes. However, an opportunity is not
sufficient for mass actors to take up arms. A motive is necessary.
The literature on civil conflict highlights two channels for opportunity: an opportunity through
economic alterations (referred to as the opportunity cost hypothesis) and an opportunity
through political instability (referred to as the weak states hypothesis). In the former
the likelihood of rebellion increases as the economic rewards of conflict becomes relatively
larger than the costs of conflict; in the latter, states that are ill-equipped to govern their
territory well are prone to violent opposition.1 Both mechanisms provide an opportunity
for individuals or groups to rebel. They differ in the fact that the weak states hypothesis is
more “Hobbesian than economic” (Fearon and Laitin, 2003). That is, while the opportunity
cost hypothesis solely focuses on the cost-benefit relationship of individuals or groups, the
weak state hypothesis focuses on the institutional framework which formulates or guides the
1Rice and Patrick (2008) see weak states as not only the source of instability in these states but also the
cause of instability in more stable Western countries.
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relation between agents.2 Also important to note is that the two channels are not mutually
exclusive. Indeed, the changes in economic price structures could be more pronounced in
weak states.
Though opportunities stir the ideas for conflict, these are only proximate factors. Given
that the actors are rational, a more nuanced motive is certainly necessary for individuals
and groups to take up arms against each other. Economic reasons such as differences in
the allocation of resources across groups could act as a motive for conflict. Alternately,
rather than the differences, economic similarities across ethnolinguistic and religious groups
competing for the same resources could also drive conflicts (Stewart, 2000; Ray and Esteban,
2017).
In what follows, I will, first, provide definitions for intra-state conflict and the capacities
of the state; second, I will review the literature on intra-state conflict as it relates to the
opportunities for conflict; and third, I will review the literature as it relates to the motives
for conflict.
2.1 Definitions of State Capacity and Intra-State Con-
flict
2.1.1 State Capacity
The capacity of the state is defined as the ability of the state to conduct its duties. We can
think of it as a continuum of ability—from low to high, which would in turn indicate the
strength or weakness of the state. Within the economics literature, the strength of a state is
2Literature also suggests that conflict arises due to the irrationality of one (or all) warring parties. While
plausible, here, I have followed the lines of argument where the agents are rational—that is they understand
the cost-benefits of their decisions. Additionally, what may seem irrational could certainly be caused by
information asymmetries. This is discussed in the main text.
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defined as an increasing function of its fiscal and military capabilities. The definition of a
weak state, in this sense, is conflated with the economic development of the state. That is
economically underdeveloped states are considered weak states. While the correlation between
the weakness of the state and its economic development might be strong, the definition of
state capacity solely along economic dimensions is very limiting to study civil conflicts. For
instance, the ability of the state for collective action is an important criterion for social
stability and instability. Wealth, although an important aspect, is not a necessity for collective
action.
Skocpol (1985) provides four dimensions that quantify the capacity of the state. These
dimensions are extractive capacity, the capacity to mobilize financial resources; steering
capacity, the capacity to guide national socio-economic development; legitimate capacity,
the capacity to dominate by using symbols and creating consensus; and coercive capacity,
the capacity to dominate by the use or threat of force.3 In this study, I use this broader
definition of state capacity. Note that this definition encompasses the earlier definition widely
used in the economics literature. I define weak states as a function of (or lack thereof) the
above-listed state capacities.
More generally, we can think of these four capacities as (a) those capacities which increase
individuals’ trust in the political institutions and the rule of law, primarily legitimacy; and
(b) those capacities which can be enhanced through financial investments, namely the ability
to collect taxes and enforce property rights.4 It is also important to note that while the latter
3Additionally, Skocpol (1985) discusses the important role of geopolitics in the nature and capacity of
states. There is enough evidence to suggest that international geopolitics, and especially the political outcomes
in India, has affected politics in Nepal in the past and continues to do so in the present. For instance, 1947
independence from the British in India brought about the fall of Rana regime in Nepal; the 1990 breakup
of the soviet bloc brought about pro-democratic changes in Nepal. For the discussions here, however, we
assume that these geopolitical influences for Nepal did not drastically change over the civil war period. This
is discussed in detail in Chapter 4. Like Skocpol, Rice and Patrick (2008) define state capacity along with
four government responsibilities: “fostering an environment conducive to sustainable and equitable economic
growth; establishing and maintaining legitimate, transparent, and accountable political institutions; securing
their populations from violent conflict and controlling their territory; and meeting the basic human needs of
their population.” On the other hand, Besley and Persson (2011) limit their idea of state capacity to fiscal
(collection of taxes) and legal (protection of private property) roles.
4We can think of the latter as being more responsive to short-term investments—coercive and extractive
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depends on the wealth of nations, the former necessarily need not. Perhaps, it is precisely
this reason that we do not observe violent civil conflicts in all economically underdeveloped
states—that is states which lack fiscal and military capacities. Since a majority of civil
conflicts occur in economically underdeveloped states, it is important to distinguish nations
that have civil conflict and are economically underdeveloped from those that do not have
civil conflict but are also economically underdeveloped. Among other things, the broader
definition of state capacity aids this purpose.
2.1.2 Intra-State Conflict
We must also be clear on the definition of intra-state conflict. An Intra-state conflict can be
violent or non-violent. This study focuses solely on the former. Following the literature, I
define intra-state conflict as satisfying the following: first, there exists fighting between two
or more groups within the political boundaries of the state; second, there are at least 1,000
deaths directly related to the conflict in the overall period of conflict with a minimum of 100
annual deaths; and third, at least 100 individuals are killed on all sides of conflicting groups.5
In what follows, I’ve used intra-state conflict, civil war, civil conflict, conflict, and violence
interchangeably. Unless otherwise noted they refer broadly to the definition outlined here.
2.2 The Opportunities for Intra-State Conflict
There is a widespread consensus on the level of economic development and incidence of civil
conflict. The correlation between a country’s level of economic development and civil conflict
are anchored in observations made by Collier and Hoeffler (1998), Collier and Hoeffler (2004),
capacities can be enhanced with short-term financial investments (see Besley and Persson (2010); Cárdenas
and Tuzemen (2010)). On the other hand, legitimacy requires relatively longer-term investment, and it is
affected by social, cultural, political, as well as economic aspects. Legitimacy perhaps can be thought of as
exogenous in the short-term.
5This definition is derived from, among others, Small and Singer (1982), Fearon and Laitin (2003), Collier
and Hoeffler (2004). The third point rules out any massacres.
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and Fearon and Laitin (2003). The last study finds that “$1,000 less per capita income is
associated with 41% greater annual odds of civil war onset.” Findings from cross-country
studies, though not causal, lead to two explanations leading to the opportunity for civil
conflicts: (a) the weak institutions hypothesis—states with lower capacities are prone to civil
conflicts; and (b) the opportunity cost hypothesis—alteration in economic rewards is the
driver of civil conflicts.6 While (a) relates to the opportunities arising from the structure
of the polity, (b) relates to the economic opportunities arising from changes in the relative
price-ratio for the incidence of conflict.
2.2.1 The Structure of the Polity and Conflict
Civil conflicts are a mode of change from one institutional setup to another, or from one
set of socio-political equilibria to another. The nature and scale of this change depend on
the adaptive capacities of the underlying institutions. Institutions that can easily adapt to
change incrementally and avoid violent conflict. On the other hand, institutions that do not
easily adapt, bring about abrupt and violent changes. States that adopt less productive, or
more redistributive, policies have more rigid institutions. This occurs because the elite favors
the perpetuation of these institutions rather than their reforms. In such states, resources
that could be used for productive investments in institutions are diverted to the elites. Such
states become progressively less capable of governing their territories and enforcing the rules
and regulations.
One line of argument relates civil conflicts to the country’s institutions, in particular the
weakness of its institutions. This line of thought argues that countries with weak institutions
are ill-equipped to govern their territories well, leading to the increased probability of conflict.
Indeed, the cost is relatively low for an agent or a rebel group to overthrow the government
6See Ray and Esteban (2017) and Blattman and Miguel (2010) for a detailed discussion on endogeneity
issues with cross-country civil conflict studies. The latter, debating the added benefit of endogeneity plagued
cross-country conflict literature, suggests that perhaps “cross-country literature has been exhausted.”
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with weak institutions.
The conflict literature has stressed that civil conflicts occur predominantly in weak states,
however, it is not clear why some weak states have conflicts while others do not. Additionally,
quantifying the notion of a weak state, as opposed to a strong state, has also been difficult.
This demarcation has been an area of interest primarily for political scientists (see Tilly, 1985;
Skocpol, 1985; Levi, 1988), but, given the influence of institutions on individual behavior
(and vice versa), recently for economists as well (see North, 1990; Acemoglu et al., 2005;
Besley and Persson, 2010; Cárdenas, 2010).
One way to view the weakness of institutions is through the lens of state capacities. While the
idea of state capacity is relatively easy to formulate, measuring it is a challenge. Let us assume
for a moment that the country’s level of income is a good proxy for the capacity of the state.
While measuring a country’s level of income can be done with some level of certainty, the
difficulty lies in ascertaining whether the income level of the state is the reason or the cause
of conflict. Starting with Snider (1990), the literature has used the government’s budget as a
share of total GDP as a proxy for state capacity. The capacity of the state, as defined by its’
budget, is positively correlated with the economic development of that state. Disentangling
state capacity from the income level of the state is almost impossible. Furthermore, there are
concerns of reverse causality. On the one hand, larger budgets probably decrease incidences of
civil wars, but, on the other hand, the larger size of the budget could very well be a function
of the absence of wars. Besley and Persson (2008) show that, relative to states with no civil
wars, states with civil wars make smaller investments in fiscal capacity in the aftermath of the
conflict. However, civil wars generally cause a negative shock on the nation’s infrastructure,
which in turn surely influences their short-term spending capabilities. On this precise note,
Rodrik (1999) argues that a country’s involvement in a civil war is a reason for the country’s
lack of persistent positive economic growth. To make matters even complicated, research
also supports that the capacities of states are built through wars. Wars have contributed to
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technological growth and institutional development (see Tilly, 1985; Acemoglu and Robinson,
2006; Fukuyama, 2011).
In addition, redistributive states by definition have a large share of their population who
are economically marginalized. Hence, with large swathes of an economically marginalized
population, these states are likely economically underdeveloped. Indeed, the literature on
violent civil conflict finds a strong and positive correlation between economically underde-
veloped states and intra-state conflict (for a sample of studies discussing this relationship,
see Fearon and Laitin, 2003; Collier and Hoeffler, 2004; Blattman and Miguel, 2010; Ray
and Esteban, 2017). However, the direction of this relationship is not clear. While violent
civil conflicts can be seen as a symptom of a lack of economic progress, economic progress is
certainly hindered by violent civil conflicts. Or perhaps, a third variable drives the spurious
relationship between conflict and economic progress.
2.2.2 Relative Price Changes and Conflict
There are similarities in the underlying explanations of the opportunity cost hypothesis and
the weak institutional hypothesis. Both rely on the changes in relative cost-benefit ratios
for the opportunity of a rebellion. However, what distinguishes them is that the former
relies purely on economic, and the latter purely on political explanations. Change in relative
price ratios due to structural changes—such as movement from agricultural to an industrial
economy, or other shocks—such as changes in rainfall, rise, and fall of commodity prices, or
demographic shits, underpin the explanations in the opportunity cost model.
While the relationship between weak states and conflict has been difficult to establish
empirically, there have been some attempts at empirically establishing a causal link between
changes in opportunity cost and civil conflict. The probability of conflict in the latter is higher
where individuals (or groups) opportunity cost of violence is lower. For instance, the above
arguments would suggest that the cost of violence is lower in poorer societies due to fewer
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alternatives for productive labor. With a larger share of people involved in labor-intensive
industries, any displacement, without an alternative replacement, of the labor force would
increase the likelihood of an individuals’ involvement in the conflict.
This argument is used by Miguel et al. (2004) in their study of the impact of economic growth
on civil conflict. They use rainfall variations across 41 different countries in sub-Saharan
Africa as an instrument for growth shocks. They find that a five-percentage-points negative
growth shock increases the likelihood of conflict in the following year by nearly half. The
rainfall shock negatively impacts agriculture and the displaced agricultural workers provide
the recruits for the militia. They conclude that a short-term decline in the opportunity cost
of violence significantly increases the likelihood of conflict.
In spite of the finding, it is unclear why negative economic shocks alone are enough to induce
people to be violent. For a purely economic interpretation, not only must the costs of violent
behavior for individuals be small, but, importantly, the relative rewards of violence must also
be high. Perhaps because food is a necessity for survival, the costs are very high. Dube and
Vargas (2013) study the effect of international price shocks on the conflict in Colombia. They
observe that conflict increased in coffee-producing provinces in Colombia when there was
a negative shock on international coffee prices. This is in line with the labor displacement
argument used by the former study. Interestingly, they also find that conflict increased in
oil-rich regions when there were positive shocks in international oil prices. Here, not only did
the costs of violence decrease, due to labor displacement, but a positive resource shock also
increased the rewards of violence.
However, civil conflicts do happen in places where there are no economic and resource shocks.
Furthermore, we also see relative stability in regions with an abundant supply of financially
lucrative resources despite periods of price shocks—as in Saudi Arabia or Russia. And further
still, we also observe civil conflicts in regions with no productive resources. A large share of
the poorer countries remains poor perhaps due to this resource constraint in the first place.
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Another way relative prices could change is through sudden changes in the structure of
the polity. However, institutions that are formalized through the long-term evolution of
culture and tradition usually only change incrementally over time (North, 2005). This adds
additional difficulty in understanding the role of formal and informal institutions on conflict.
One particular case where we could observe a discontinuous jump in state capacity is when
the institutions of that state are highly dependent on an individual leader.7 In the past, such
individuals have usually been divine monarchs, but religious leaders, tyrants, or even populist
leaders could fall into this category. The sudden death or dethronement of such a ruler can
jeopardize the legitimacy of the institutions they embodied.
Jones and Olken (2009) study the effect of the assassination of leaders on conflicts. They
find a 33 percentage points increase in the intensity of wars when a leader is assassinated
compared to when there is a failed attempt on their lives. These shocks, however, be it
instigated by citizens or foreigners, are almost always endogenous to the war itself. Although
consistent internally, their study does not provide causal evidence for conflicts due to the
lowering of state capacity. Furthermore, foreign influences have played an important role in
civil conflicts as foreigners not only have ideological motivations for intervention but also have
economic motives. For instance, Berger et al. (2013) show that foreign interventions by the
Central Intelligence Agency of the U.S. during the Cold War were followed by significantly
higher exports of U.S. goods to these countries with no change in U.S. imports of goods
coming in from these countries. Moreover, they find that the goods exported by the U.S.
were goods in which the U.S. had a comparative disadvantage with that country. Dube et al.
(2011) find that U.S.-supported coups were valuable not only to the partially nationalized
multinationals in the country of intervention, but it also benefitted asset traders outside the
country trading on supposedly “top-secret” information on foreign interventions. They find
“abnormal returns” to supposedly top-secret coup-authorizations. Furthermore, these returns
7Another case where state capacity is dramatically lowered is through the lowering of coercive capacity.
This happened when the colonial backing of newly formed states was suddenly removed. This increased the
probability of violence in these newly independent states (Fearon, 1998).
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following coup-authorizations were three-times larger than the price changes after the actual
coup themselves.
This makes it difficult to understand whether state capacity, in these states with civil conflict,
was lost due to the loss of the leader, or if the loss of the leader as a consequence of the loss
of state capacity. There are also concerns regarding the long-term persistence of economic
institutions. Acemoglu and Robinson (2008) asserts that, despite large political shocks,
economic institutions persist in the long-run. They argue persistence of institutions is due
to the dual nature of power. Power can be derived de jure or de facto. A shock in political
institutions can lead to a change of the de jure power, perhaps through changes to the
constitution. Nevertheless, in the long-term, elites find a way to capture more de facto
power, for instance through increased lobbying or through social networks. An interesting
historical example studied by Ager et al. (2019) finds that the wealth of children of former
slave owners rebounded back to the level of their parents within one generation after the
negative wealth shock due to the emancipation of slaves in the U.S. This makes economic
institutions persistent over the long-term and, hence, more shock resistant. It also highlights
the need for further explanation than that solely provided by the opportunity cost literature.
Another way relative price changes can occur is through changes in people’s future orientation.
Contract enforcement changes, lack of information, or other types of uncertainty can lead
to conflict. The literature looking at these channels (see Chassang and Padro-i Miquel,
2009; Chassang and Miquel, 2010; Fearon, 2004; Powell, 2006) suggest that higher and less
volatile national income or perception of future income growth decreases the incidence of
conflict today. Increased information asymmetry increases people’s willingness to commit
violence. In-conflict groups assess their decision whether to attack the opposing party based
on the information they hold of their opposition. Depending on the severity of information
asymmetry, warring factions might be more willing to make, what may seem in the future as
an irrational decision. Information asymmetry can also be viewed as a special case within the
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weak institutions framework. If the institutions are strong then it is unlikely that rebels or
government forces underestimate the military and financial strength of the opposing forces.
Yet another channel through which relative prices change is through demographic changes. In
agrarian societies, demographic changes have led to changes in the de factor power between
the landlord and the peasants. Acemoglu et al. (2017) study the role of population pressure
on the conflict in developing countries. They argue that the post-1940s has seen significant
improvement in health outcomes increasing life expectancy and population. On the other
hand, especially in developing counties, there has been minimal corresponding increases in
resource and technology. This, they argue, puts pressure on a scarce resource, like land,
which in turn leads to conflict. They find that a rise in the log population, from 1940 to 1980,
of about 0.68 added 4.2 additional years of civil conflict in the 1980s relative to the 1940s or
1950s.
Strong state capacity could also build the trust of a government among the citizenry by
decreasing information asymmetry. In stronger states, laws might be more respected, and
contracts better enforced. This increases the interaction among individuals, making them
future-orientated, and in turn building trust between individuals, and between individuals
and organizations. Trust also plays a key role in determining the public opinion of the
government, and in turn reducing people’s willingness to act against the government. Nunn
et al. (2018) find that the probability of political turnover during recessions is higher for a
“low-trust” country relative to a “high-trust” country. In essence, their finding suggests the
need for both opportunity (recession) and motive (low trust) for action.
2.3 The Motives for Intra-State Conflict
While changes in relative price-ratios and the presence of weak state institutions are conducive
for violence, it is still not sufficient for mass armed conflict. An underlying motive is necessary.
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The motives could be economic or non-economic.
2.3.1 Differences in the Distribution of Resource and Conflict
The literature on within-country conflict is rife with suggestions that economic divide causes
conflict. Marx has formulated it as a conflict between groups defined by their economic
position. From an institutional perspective, societal groups (or classes) are organizations that
are formed to take advantage of the price structures enforced by institutions. As discussed
above, they are self-serving, leading at times, to drastic social and economic outcomes.
Conflicts between groups arise due to their differing outcomes. The idea of conflictual nature
of classes has been reiterated more recently by, among others, Amartya Sen in On Economic
Inequality asserts “the relationship between inequality and rebellion is indeed a close one”
(Sen, 1973, p.1) and Hannah Arendt in On Revolution writes “all revolutions [since the
French Revolution of 1789] . . . have used and misused the mighty forces of the misery and
destitution in their struggle against tyranny and oppression” (Arendt, 1965, p.102). Further
still, Acemoglu et al. (2005) argue that “conflict over economic institutions is critical to
the functioning of the economy and that this conflict stems, not from differences in beliefs,
ideology or historical accidents, but from the impact of economic institutions on distribution.”
Yet, the empirical literature has found little convincing evidence directly linking economic
disparities to civil conflict. Collier and Hoeffler (2004) find that income inequality is not
related to civil conflict. Fearon and Laitin (2003) find that income inequality, measured
by the Gini index of the distribution of income, “do[es] not come close to either statistical
or substantive significance.” Cramer (2003) suggests that the null and negative correlation
of conflict in the cross-country inequality empirics are perhaps due to the dominant elite’s
attachment to the status quo: where there is high inequality, elites try to preserve the
status quo by strengthening the state, through taxes. This is very much in the spirit of the
arguments presented in Acemoglu et al. (2005), where the authors describe this phenomenon
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as the persistence of inefficient institutions. Ray and Esteban (2017), on the other hand,
suggests that the null findings might be due to measurement issues. Inter-class conflict,
they assert, may be of “lower voltage”, like strikes and demonstrations, and not reflected in
the literature dealing with the number of deaths during the civil war. They further stress
that the likelihood of conflict might actually be greater among groups that are economically
similar rather than being economically different. This argument supports their hypothesis
that conflicts occur between ethnic or religious groups competing for the same resource rather
than economic groups. This is discussed in the next subsection.
State capacity itself is most likely endogenous as nations choose to invest in state-building.
Besley and Persson (2011) outline three parameters, cohesiveness in the population, political
stability, and external threat, along which fiscal-capacity-building investment decisions are
determined. In their formulation, investment in state capacity increases if there is unity
among different groups in the population; similarly, it also increases if there is political
stability for the incumbent in power. In addition to these internal mechanisms, external
factors, such as is the probability of national wars, develop “common interest” which also
increases spending on state infrastructure. In their model, conditional on the level of these
parameters, states can fall into one of three ordered classifications—a cohesive state, with high
cohesiveness of the population, a redistributive state, with low trust among groups but high
political stability for the incumbent, or a weak state, with low values of all parameters. They
also show that political inequality combined with income inequality pushes the state into a
weak state. They, however, note that “this situation can be remedied only by a sufficiently
strong common interest.”
Cárdenas and Tuzemen (2010) show similar results using elites and citizens as the contesting
groups in their model. They predict that both economic and political inequality leads to less
investment in state capacity. Cárdenas (2010) empirically shows, for 100 Latin American
countries, that political and economic inequality is associated with lower incentives to invest
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in state capacity. These results are consistent with the suggestion made by Cramer (2003).
While Cramer postulates that elites will invest more in state capacity to preserve their
position, results from the former studies find that the opposite is true in precisely the cases
with unstable power tenure for the elite group.
Given the intractable problem of land distribution in Nepal and many, mostly failed, attempts
at land reform since the 1950s (see Regmi, 1976), it is difficult to look past unequal distribution
of land as the catalyst for the civil war. We also see a clear agenda from the Maoist rebels
regarding the importance of land. Their political ideologue, Baburam Bhattarai, wrote in
1998 that the objective of the Civil War is to “usher in vibrant, self-reliant, independent,
balanced and planned economic development primarily through a radical land reform program
based on the policy of ‘land to the tiller’ and nationalization” (quoted in Bray et al., 2003).
2.3.2 Similarities in Distribution of Resource and conflict
The final theme is centered around the conflict between groups that are similar economically.
The cause of intergroup conflict can be divided into primordialist (Huntington, 1996; Horowitz,
1985) and instrumentalist positions (Mitra and Ray, 2014; Brubaker and Laitin, 1998). The
primordial view asserts that conflicts are driven by intrinsic hatred between groups. Groups
are fractured along ethnic, religious, or territorial lines. They are linked within-group by
the perception of strong “biological features” or “territorial location” making them coherent
within and contrasting between. This is the source of the struggles between the groups. The
instrumentalist position, on the other hand, argues that conflict between groups is driven by
some underlying, usually economic, agenda. We observe the conflict between groups as it is
easier to mobilize masses based on pre-existing group identities.
The primordialists position is much more difficult to reconcile with data. Given the group
divisions, its’ assertions would imply that there is an inter-group conflict that is ever existent.
It thus cannot explain the variation of group conflict over time, nor the cooperation between
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conflicting groups at other times. It also fails to explain the regional variation in the conflict
between similar groups at a particular time. For the current study, we will focus on the
instrumentalist position.
For the instrumentalists, resource plays an underlying fundamental role. Their arguments
can also be linked back to the opportunity cost model. As an economic resource becomes
available, groups resort to violence. By exploiting the ethnic, religious, and territorial
identities, conflicting groups can use the already available demarcations (motives) instead of
having to rally people around new boundaries and ideologies, hence, minimizing the costs of
recruitment. The preexisting demarcation solves the collective action problem of organizing
armed groups. As such, Ray and Esteban (2017) argue that since conflict is over a common
resource, the conflicting groups must be economically similar, rather than different, else the
cost of violence would be very high for one side. Divisions are necessary but not sufficient
conditions for conflict. Ray and Esteban (2017) adds that their “view cannot survive on
its own: There must be some exploitable historical animosity embedded in those ethnic
divisions.”
The instrumentalists’ argument would in turn undermine the argument for conflict along
with the unequal groups. However, revolutionary conflicts are, almost by definition, conflicts
initiated by a more numerous and economically backward group against a smaller but much
more economically and politically powerful group.
In the case of Nepal, there was an escalation of conflict along ethnic lines in some parts of the
country. Consistent with the instrumentalist view, this happened between ethnic groups over
a common and exhaustible resource—land. Further, the groups were economically similar.
However, economic similarity does not necessarily imply social or political equality. There
were differences in the social and political standing of these groups. One of these groups was
favored by the state. In the sudden decline of state capacity, we expect to see an increase
in the probability of conflict in this region. However, while there was group-based violence
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along pre-existing group cleavages in certain parts of Nepal, it was not observed between the
same ethnic groups in other regions of the country. Hence, along with economic, historical
and political considerations become important explanations for this geographic variation in
conflict. This is discussed in the next chapter.
Additionally, the presence of group-level economic similarities does not rule out the within-
group economic differences. Although the conflict is observed between groups, within-group
exploitation is always possible. Furthermore, economic inequality within the group could lead
to a longer and more intense conflict between groups. The essential fuels for conflict, might
and money, are derived from different strata of each group: might from the poor and money
from the rich. A highly unequal group can more easily solve the collective action problem of
recruitment and financing of wars.
2.4 Conclusion
Intra-state conflicts are an amalgam of political, economic, and social conditions. Weak
states are prone to conflict, however, not all weak states go through civil conflict. Relative
price changes can also trigger conflicts. Whereas these provide the opportunity for conflict, a
motive is necessary for mass armed conflicts. It is difficult to have collective action necessary
for mass civil conflict without a motive.
In what follows, I will discuss these themes in relation to the conflict in Nepal. The massacre
of the King in 2001 negatively shocked the legitimacy of the state. This large shock to the
state capacity was exogenous to the political process and the on-going insurgency, which
had started in 1996. Given this, the weak institution hypothesis would suggest an increased
probability of conflict after the negative shock relative to before the shock. If so, then the
higher incidence of violence should also allow us to test the instrumental theories of conflict.
These are discussed in the following chapters.
Chapter 3
The Institutional History of The
Kingdom of Nepal
Char jaat ra chattis janajati ko sajha phulbari. [A common garden of four castes
and 36 sub-castes.] – Prithivi Narayan Shah
The Kingdom of Nepal was established by the Shah dynastic rulers starting in the middle
of the eighteenth century. Land was used by the rulers as the chief tool for state-building,
which laid the foundation for a rigid socio-political order. This socio-political order, aided
by language and religion, played a pivotal role in promoting the monarch as the symbol
of nationhood, peace, and unity. This system stayed stable for over two centuries until its
collapse in 2001. The breakdown of the system was due to the killing of King Birendra Bir
Bikram Shah. His death de-legitimized the state and it led to an escalation of conflict which
had started in 1996 as an isolated insurgency in the western regions of the country.
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3.1 Unification and the Establishment of the Kingdom
of Nepal
Nepal is partitioned into three distinct geographical regions: in the North, the high Himalayan
range forms a natural border with Tibet and China; in the South, bordering India, are flatlands,
which were densely forested and sparsely populated until the middle of the twentieth century;
and the middle section forms a network of hills and valleys, which predominantly provided
the climate suitable for habitation. Within this latter region of large and small hills, there
existed a loose network of statelets, which would later be united into the Kingdom of Nepal.
Kathmandu valley, one of these statelets, was the most prosperous in the region. Its wealth
was derived from its’ monopoly over the only trade route between the southern kingdoms in
India and the northern kingdom of Tibet. Kathmandu Valley lies in the central region of
what is current Nepal and was divided into three sub-kingdoms. The regions to the east of
Kathmandu Valley were part of the Vijaypur and Makwanpur kingdoms. The region to the
immediate west of Valley was divided into twenty-four kingdoms (Chaubisé rajya) and the
regions further to the west of these statelets were divided into twenty-two kingdoms (Baisé
rajya).
In the mid-eighteenth century, these fragmented tribal statelets were unified by the Shah
rulers from Gorkha, one of the Chaubisé rajyas. Kathmandu was captured in 1768/9 and
much of eastern Nepal were appended into the nuevo kingdom by 1775. Prithivi Narayan
Shah, the king of Gorkha who was the main architect of the unification process, became the
first king of the Shah dynasty that would rule the kingdom for the next two-hundred-and-forty
years.
Much of the late 18th and early 19th century was spent on expansions in the west, including
foreign wars against Tibet, Sikkim, and British India. By 1816, these internal and external
wars had shaped much of the boundary of what became the Kingdom of Nepal.
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Monarchy, Nationality, and the People
The war with the East-India Company (1814-1816) ended in defeat for Nepal. The country
paid heavily, both in lives lost and land surrendered. The objective of the ruling classes
henceforth was the defense against the ever-existent threats of not only the British East India
Company to the south but also the Tibetan and Sikkimese nations to the north and east
respectively.
Nepal was, in some sense, lucky that the wars against the East India Company happened
early in the development of the state. Nothing fosters internal cohesion more than a foreign
threat. This helped initiate the idea that the kingdom was a single nation confined within
these new geographic boundaries. But nationhood is much more than a common enemy.
From the populations’ point of view, it required a sense of common purpose and belonging.
This was not an easy task in a country in which difficult mountainous terrain had engendered
centuries of isolation of the native communities. These isolated groups, in due time, developed
their own language, culture, and religion, which gave them distinct identities. A well-used
quip glorified her diversity as char-jhat, chattis-janajati ko sajha phulbari [a common garden
made of four castes and thirty-six sub-castes].
The building of the idea of nationality among the populace was key for unity and internal
stability. A military unification seldom engenders long-term stability within that state.1
This is especially true of a country that has such challenging geography. It is surprising,
thence, that in geography naturally suited for guerrilla warfare, the Kingdom of Nepal since
its inception has had no significant rebellion against the state until the mid-1990s. For a
national consensus, Nepal needed symbols in the form of common ideas and shared values.
This was the avenue through which sanskritization was introduced. Sanskritization refers
to the process of socio-cultural unification (Bista, 1991). In particular, a common language,
1This was not a problem unique to Nepal. Tilly (1985), discussing the issue of state control by the
European monarchs of the late eighteenth century, writes: “Beyond the scale of a small city-state, no monarch
could govern a population with his armed force alone, nor could any monarch afford to create a professional
staff large and strong enough to reach from him to the ordinary citizen.”
34 CHAPTER 3. INSTITUTIONAL HISTORY
based on Sanskrit, and a common religion, whose texts hitherto were exclusively written
in the Sanskrit language.2 Nepal thus became a Hindu kingdom with Nepali as its official
language.
In the absence of democratically elected governments, religion has played a crucial role in
the legitimization of political order in societies of the past (Fukuyama, 2011).3 Hinduism is
built on defined functional roles for each member of society. The scriptures clearly define the
role of each individual and the hierarchy of the people performing these roles. The role of
the king, as defined in the Laws of Manu, is the protection of the people in his realm.4 His
legitimacy, thus, is justified as a legislature of the laws as defined by the scriptures. The laws
themselves come from a higher being, and the priestly class is given the duty of interpreting
these laws. This then by default provides clear checks-and-balances of the deeds of the king.
The king is in no position to create laws. If he chooses to do so, there are precedents for
rebellion against the king. Indeed, the Mahabharata, a Hindu epic, is the story of revolt
against an unjust king. This has implications for the hereditary rights to the throne. Does
the king have to be born a royal, an offspring of the former king? Or, can any protector of
the people claim the throne?
2The idea of having a common language as a step towards nationhood can be found elsewhere as well.
Hobsbawm (2010) discussing the importance of language on national identity writes: “the moment when
textbooks or newspapers in the national language are first written, or when that language is first used for
some official purpose, measure a crucial step in national evolution. The 1830s saw this step taken over large
areas of Europe” (p.136). Religion has been used by various pre-modern, and indeed modern, states as a
symbol of nationhood. Describing the use of religion as a source of nationality in the 19th century, Hobsbawm
writes: “for the masses in general the test of nationality was still religion: the Spaniard was defined by being
Catholic, the Russian by being Orthodox” (Hobsbawm, 2010, p.137). Further, on using religion as a source for
collective action he writes, “there were . . . movements of popular revolt against alien rule (that is normally
understood as meaning rule by a different religion rather than a different nationality) which sometimes appear
to anticipate later national movements. Such were the rebellions against the Turkish Empire, against the
Russians in the Caucasus, and the fight against the encroaching British raj in and on the confines of India”
(Hobsbawm, 2010, p.139).
3Fukuyama (2011), defining the difference between state formation in India and China, writes: “the
Chinese never thought up a metaphysical system of the depth and complexity of the one that emerged in
India. Indeed, they were able to seize and hold power quite effectively without the use of any transcendental
religion whatsoever” (p.163). However, the Chinese, relative to the Indians, went through a lot more wars in
their early state development. It is possible that the reason for the frequency of these wars was not having a
strong religion in the first place. The need for a strong and coercive state was perhaps a product of a weak
central religion.
4In Hindu tradition, Manu was the first human and progenitor of the human race.
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The latter seems to be what happened in Hindu societies that had occupied the Indian
subcontinent for centuries. There, a stronger king almost always subjugated a weaker king
into the former’s domain. In the Nepali context, however, the definition of the king changed.
In addition to his role as the protector of the people, at some point, the king was also seen as
the reincarnation of Lord Vishnu.5 This had two consequences: first, the king became the
absolute authority. Although in practice, he would consult the priesthood, the priesthood had
no power in deposing the king if he did not follow their interpretation of the scriptural laws.
Second, it ensured the hereditary rights of his successors. No one but the king’s son could be
the king, for divinity could only be transferred through blood. Hence, the aristocratic families
did not in fact have the religious mandate to depose the king and place themselves on the
throne. The latter point ensured the stability of the system for over two-hundred-and-forty
years.
Figure 3.1 shows the Shah kings of the Kingdom of Nepal from 1743 until 2008. What is
common until Birendra, who was killed in 2001, is that the Shah kings have always been the
first sons of the former kings.6 The order of the kingdom was built on this consistency.
5Vishnu is one of the three main Gods of the Hindu Pantheon. Vishnu is the Preserver in the Creator-
Preserver-Destructor trifecta. This definition seems consistent with the traditional role of the king as the
protector of his subjects.
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Figure 3.1: Genealogy of The Shah Dynasty
Notes: The names of kings is followed by their regnal years. Prithivi Narayan Shah’s reign as king started in the Kingdom of Gorkha and finished as
the sovereign of The Kingdom of Nepal. Dipendra was briefly declared King in 2001 while he was in comatose due to a self-inflicted wound suffered
during the events of The Royal Massacre. His reign lasted less than 4 days. Birendra, Nirajan, Dhirendra, Birendra’s wife Aishwarya, daughter Shruti
and four other members of their extended family were killed during The Royal Massacre on June 1st, 2001.
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Thus, with this mandate and with over two hundred years of Sanskritization, the kings were
projected as symbols of authority, nationhood, and unity. They sat at the apex of a Hindu
hierarchical caste society with godly status, deriving legitimacy through peoples’ conformity
to these abstract principles.
After the period of military conquests and foreign wars, a period of relative stability followed.
As is usual of court politics, a period of stability in the frontier engendered power struggles
among the bharadars (courtiers). With the help of a brutal coup, the Rana family took over
the governance of Nepal from 1847 until their fall in 1951. Despite the administrative and
military power lying in the hands of the Rana bharadars, the Shah kings were still seen as the
head-of-state. More importantly, in the eye of the public, the Shah kings were the ultimate
source of authority, which even the autocratic Rana prime ministers did not dare challenge.
It is telling that Juddha Shamsher, a powerful Rana Prime Minister in the 1940s known for
his ruthlessness, was, in public, helpless against the Tribhuwan, the then king, even with the
knowledge that Tribhuwan had conspired to overthrow and possibly kill him. One of the
decedents of the Rana family writes: “Yet, Juddha did not dare retaliate or place himself in
open confrontation with the king, believed to be the incarnation of Lord Vishnu by most of
his subjects” (Rana, 2017, p.204).
This idea of the divinity of the kings is so prevalent in Nepali society that, in a survey
conducted in the early 1990s, over 20 percent of the members of even the most radical
communist factions still thought that the king was a reincarnation of Lord Vishnu (Whelpton,
2005). Perhaps this is one of the reasons why the Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist (CPN-M),
at the onset of an armed guerrilla conflict in 1996, only had the most modest remark against
the king. In their 40 Point Demand, which they presented to the state before the start of
their armed struggle, they noted that: “11. All special privileges of the king and the royal
family should be abolished” (Bray et al., 2003).7 Critically, their demand did not include the
7CPN-M presented a list of forty demands from the government which entailed their vision of the state.
Given their demands were not fulfilled, they threatened armed conflict against the state. The conflict is
described in detail later in this chapter.
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abolishment of the monarchy itself.8
There are many other references to the elevated status of the kings. Bista (1991) in Fatalism
and Development, defining societal attitudes in Nepal, asserts that “[Nepali’s hold] absolute
belief in fatalism: that one has no personal control over one’s life circumstances, which are
determined through a divine or powerful external agency.” Although critical of the state,
of which the king was always the head, Bista still concedes the importance of the royal
institution. “The King”, he argues, “is a positive force for the country and an active catalyst
for the process of nationhood because all Nepalis share a tendency for paternal dependency,
which, in social organization, facilitates a kind of perspective that monarchy provides an
ultimate beneficent paternal figure. This is both reassuring to Nepali, and also becomes the
basis of his developing sense of national identity” (Bista, 1991, p.162, emphasis mine).
The notion of “oriental despotism” is used to argue that premodern states, and their au-
tonomous leaders by extension, were like stationary bandits or rent-seekers. But as Fukuyama
(2011) asserts, “maximum rent extraction was not an inevitable characteristic of premodern
states ruling over agrarian societies . . . one of the monarch’s functions was in fact to protect
the peasantry from the rapacious behavior of landlords and other elites who wanted to
maximize their rents, in the interest of justice and political stability” (p.211). This was very
much how the kings were seen by the people in the Nepali context. There is a well known
Nepali quip: “For knowledge go to Kasi; for justice go to Gorkha.”9
These sentiments were especially true of King Birendra Bir Bikram Shah Dev (the last word,
Dev, is a title of the Shah kings which implies godly status). He had been on the throne since
1972 and was seen as a people’s king. He had taken over a semi-autocratic state after the
death of his father, and chose to have referendums, twice, towards multi-party democracy:
8Some factions within the CPN-M were actively seeking a republican state. There were, however, strong
opposing forces within the CPN-M that argued the importance and the need to use the monarch as the
symbol of nationhood and to align with the King in their struggle against the political parties (Acharya,
2009).
9The holy city of Benaras, and Kasi its’ capital, is the spiritual home of Hinduism. Gorkha is the ancestral
province of the Shah kings.
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first, in 1980 (referred to as Janmat Sangraha), and again, in 1990 (referred to as Jana
Andolan I ). Only in the latter case was there a majority for the proponents of multi-party
democracy, which was duly established in 1991.
Compared to Birendra, his brother Gyanendra, who replaced him on the throne after the
former’s death in 2001, had little reverence. He, as other members of the royal family, was
involved in running lucrative businesses in Nepal. It is not difficult to imagine the amount of
sway the brother of a demi-god had over his business competitors. He had little respect both
among the elites as well as the masses (Whelpton, 2005). Birendra, on the other hand, was
seen as a symbol of peace and national unity, and often promoted as such. He appears in
numerous official portraits releasing doves into the sky.
3.2 The Interrelationship between People, State and
Land
Even before the formation of the Kingdom of Nepal, the land belonged to the kings in their
respective domains. Discussing this, Whelpton (2005) writes:
As kingdoms were established, the older system was gradually superseded by the
concept of the king as ultimate owner of the land, entitled to claim a share of the
crop from the cultivator. The king’s share varied in size but, as in South Asia as
a whole from ancient times, in the medieval centuries in the Kathmandu Valley it
was probably around 50 per cent. The king’s entitlement from a given plot could
be assigned temporarily in lieu of salary to the holder of a particular post, or
permanently for the maintenance of a religious institution or for the support of
those with special religious status: Brahmans, Buddhist monks or other ascetics
(p.26).
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In the early days of the Shah dynasty, the land was used as a tool both to reward and to
placate the bharadars who formed the core of the commanding officers in the military. Prithivi
Narayan Shah used the land to motivate his generals and soldiers during his expansionary
wars. He granted “lands in Gorkha district, his original dominion, to twenty-four leading
families of that area who had participated in the invasion of Kathmandu” (quoted in Regmi,
1964, p.31). The land was also granted to bereaved family members of those killed in wars.
One royal decree states: “If any soldier is killed in war, Marwar birta lands shall be granted to
his sons until they are able to carry arms. After they become so able, they shall be promoted
with a grant of Jagir lands” (quoted in Ibid, p.39).10
The jagir land tenure system was very similar to the timar system used in the Ottoman
empire.11 Timars were appanages granted to soldiers. The land was used in lieu of payment
to the military, and importantly, they were not hereditary, hence there was little chance that
a strong decentralized feudal system would develop as had done in Europe. Jagir, like timar,
ensured that the state ultimately controlled the land. Fukuyama (2011), describing the use
of land in the Ottoman empire, writes:
Each sipahi [a cavalryman] or zaim [middle-ranking officer] lived on his estate and
collected taxes in kind from the local peasantry, usually a wagon load of wood and
fodder and half a wagon load of hay per peasant per year. This system was used
by the Byzantines and simply adopted by the Ottomans. . . . The whole system
was known as dirlik, or livelihood, indicating its function: in an only partially
monetized economy, the sultan’s army could be sustained without having to raise
tax revenues to pay the troops. . . . Timars were granted in return for military
service; they could be taken away if that service wasn’t performed, but only by
the sultan himself. The holders of large estates could not subinfeudate their lands,
as in Europe. When the sipahi grew too old to serve or died, his land reverted to
10Birta and jagir were forms of land tenure systems in Nepal.
11There was a similar system in place in the Muscovite state in the 16th century called pomest’ia.
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the state and could be reassigned to a new cavalryman. Indeed, the status sipahi
itself was not heritable; the children of military men had to return to the civilian
population (p.216-218).
Since the land was the predominant source of income, it was used initially for the process of
state-building. Regmi, a scholar of land tenure systems in Nepal, writes: “Prithivi Narayan
Shah moulded the Birta system to suit his political and military requirements. He gave
Birta holdings to reward his victorious generals, to placate the defeated chieftains, and in
this way to create a feudal land nobility that should constitute an important prop to his
newly-founded Kingdom” (Regmi, 1962, p.8).
By the mid-19th century, expansionary wars had halted. There was a need for internal
stability. Bureaucratic apparatus was developed to administer the now united kingdom.
Rana regime continued the use of land grants as in-kind payments to government employees.
However, they also extended its use to arbitrarily and lavishly reward court loyals and family
members. For instance, the aforementioned Rana Prime Minister, Juddha Shamsher, had
already accumulated a lot of land before his premiership. One of his descendent writes:
“Juddha had risen gradually in ranks and received ample salaries, benefits, and Birta land from
the . . . successive maharajahs [Prime Ministers]” (Rana, 2017, p.102). Another interesting
case of arbitrary use of land assignment under the Rana regime happened when four of the
seventy-five districts of Nepal were appended into the Kingdom in 1861 as a gift from the
British in India. Half of the land in these districts was granted, through a royal decree, to the
then Prime Minister Jung Bahadur Rana and the other half to his brothers (Regmi, 1964).
Most of these untaxed Birta land grants were made during the Rana rule.12
The land was by far the most important source of revenue both for economic as well as political
reasons. In the nineteenth century, around three-quarters of the total government revenue
came from land (Whelpton, 2005). Even in the early 1990s, 40 percent of the population
12By 1952, 36 percent of the land tenure was in the form of Birta. Though some of them had tax liabilities
(Regmi, 1976).
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was still directly involved in agriculture (CBS, 2002). Given the rugged-mountainous terrain,
collecting taxes was a challenge for the state. One way this was overcome was through the
jagir and birta land tenure systems.13 Another solution that was implemented was the use
of tax-farming—that is assigning land to tax collectors. These intermediaries were granted
parcels of land and given the responsibility for paying taxes on them. The tax rate payable to
the state was set by the state which was usually minimal relative to the productive capacity
of the farm (Regmi, 1976). While the state also provided guidance for the rates to be charged
to the tiller whom the tax-collectors employed, the de facto control of these rates, however,
lay in the hands of the tax-collectors. In the absence of direct oversight by the state, and
this is why the tax collectors were necessary in the first place, these intermediaries had much
sway over their tillers.
The way one obtained the land rights was through chakari. “Within Hinduism, chakari is an
essential concept which means to wait upon, to serve, to appease, or to seek favour from god”
(Bista, 1991, p.89). It essentially entails servings one’s superior even if it interferes with one’s
job. This system was in place even before the Shah dynasty, and it officially continued until
the middle of the twentieth century. Whelpton (2005) writes:
Despite the difference of scale, the political system established by Prithivi
Narayan’s conquests was a continuation of that of Gorkha [Prithivi’s Narayan’s
ancestral dominion] and the other hill states west of the Valley. Hindu kingship
was central but institutions and cultural practices in many ways followed the
example of Mughal India, as was now the case in South Asia generally. Mughal ad-
ministration could, very loosely, be termed ‘feudal’ but the most appropriate term
is perhaps ‘patrimonial’, meaning that the state was organised as an extension of
the ruler’s household. Three features of the system is of particular importance
in Nepal both before and after 1768 were: the need for personal attendance on
13Interestingly, although the jagir land tenure along with other land tenure systems was abolished by the
1960s, the term jagir is still in common use today mostly referring to government jobs.
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the king, the pajani under which all appointments were subject to annual review,
and frequent changes in the location of an individual’s jagir, the land assigned to
a state servant in lieu of salary (p.49).
The traditional relationship of the Nepali state to the land can thus be summarized as follows:
first, the monarch owned most lands in his realm; second, the land was assigned for services
rendered to the state; and third, a system of annual reviews, pajani, was used to confirm the
status of the current land assignee. The latter point ensured, at least in the early period
of state formation, that the land assignments were not permanent and hence there was a
minimal chance that a strong feudal system like that in Europe developed in the kingdom.14
This system of land assignment remained in place, almost unaltered, until the fall of the
Rana regime in 1951. After 1951, the intermediary governments and the democratically
elected Congress government in 1959 proposed “land reforms.” Before anything could be
done, the King, citing inefficiencies with the novice parliament, took absolute control. Land
redistribution was discussed in the following decades, some edicts passed, but in practice, it
amounted to little more than unifying the system of land tenure and subjecting all land to
uniform taxation by the state (Regmi, 1976). Little changed in the way of agrarian reform in
the ownership, tenant-owner relationship, or the distribution of land.
What is interesting to note is that the changes in political processes after 1951 actually
tilted power more in favor of the landowners. Whereas before 1951, officials who had land
rights were subject to pajani with the possibility of transfer and even dismissal, post-1951,
ownership became privatized and hence more “sticky.” In the period before 1951, the state
had de jure right to the land. Post-1951, however, all power, legal or otherwise, regarding
control of a particular parcel of the land went to the landlords. Thus, from the peasant point
of view, the changes in 1951 only solidified their dependence on the landlords.
14Moving elites to different location prevented the elites from having deep connections with the population
and raising a military to rebel against the state. This ploy was used by, among others, the Ottomans, the
Muscovites, and the Romanovs. The wars of independence as the ones waged in Latin America by the
hacienda owners against the Spanish government were exactly what this system was trying to prevent.
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Furthermore, land reform acts, such as the one legislated in 1964, made a negligible change,
if any, to the existing structure for the reasons discussed above. Discussing this issue, Regmi
(1968) asserts:
The 1964 Lands Act has thus failed to make any basic change in the existing
structure of landownership and tenancy. The protection of tenancy rights is
at best a measure seeking to stabilize an agrarian development not envisaged
when existing land tenure legislation was remodeled several decades ago. . . . the
traditional pattern of rents continues. No attempt has been made to check absentee
landlordism. Recent land reform measures have, in fact, only strengthened the
position of landowners as rent-receivers without giving them commensurate
obligations (p.141-2).
This is also true of legal changes that occurred throughout Europe after the fall of the Burbon
France in 1789. The newly available lands for sale, especially lands which belonged to the
churches, were captured by those who had power and resources. “Thus in one commune in
the Romagna (Italy) church lands fell from 42.5 per cent of the area in 1783 to 11.5 per
cent in 1812; but the lost lands passed not only to bourgeois owners (who rose from 24 to
47 percent) but also to nobles (who rose from 34 to 41 per cent)” (Hobsbawm, 2010, p.157).
Had land reforms been more comprehensive in Nepal, it would likely not have helped the
peasants anyway.
No matter the changes among the classes of rulers and governors, which family controlled
the land changed very little in the two hundred years leading up to the mid-1990s. What
was supposed to be a temporary land assignment system became permanent. So, it is not
surprising that “[i]n many cases throughout Nepal the wealthiest individuals at local levels are
very often still those whose ancestors obtained revenue-collection rights during the eighteenth
and nineteenth centuries” (Whelpton, 2005, p.51).
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3.3 Non-Social Revolutionary Political Crises of the
Twentieth Century
Social revolutionary political crises not only generate political changes but fundamentally
changes the social structure of the state. The 1789 French revolution would be an example
of such a crisis. Non-social revolutionary political crises on the other hand may change the
political structures with little impact on the society at large (Skocpol, 1979).
Two major non-social revolutionary political crisis took place in Nepal in the 20th century.
First, there was the movement to overthrow the hereditary Rana prime ministers in 1950/51.
This was led by the then underground political parties, headed by the Nepali Congress
Party (NCP), with King Tribhuwan playing a decisive role in the struggle. Second, there
was a “democratic” movement to replace a semi-autocratic panchayat system in 1990/91.15
Although both events were unique to Nepal, one cannot overlook the importance of external
factors that influenced both these movements: the former due to the fall of British rule in
India in 1947, and the latter due to the fall of communism in 1989/90.16 In reality, much of
what happened, and much of what continues to happen within Nepal, is driven by external
events.17
Another thing of note is what these political movements actually accomplished, or rather did
not accomplish. Both these political movements changed who governed under the king, rather
than changing how the socio-political structure was set up. In essence, these movements were
important in so much as they changed the relationship of particular elite groups vis-à-vis the
king, and not much else besides.
15Panchayats are village democracies that are headed by a group of panchas (village elders). In order to
promote democracy at the local village level, Rahul Ghandi’s government, in India in 1989, promoted these
panchayats perhaps using the Nepali model as an example.
16The fall of Nicolae Ceausescu in Romania in 1989, in particular, was much discussed in the Nepali
intelligentsia in the run-up to the democratic movement in Nepal in 1990 (Hoftun, 1994).
17Other social revolutions in the past have also been influenced by external factors. Some of these cases,
such as the ones in France, China, and Russia, are discussed at the end of this chapter. The Royal Massacre
was, however, very different. This is discussed in detail later in this chapter.
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3.3.1 Fall of Rana Family Prime Minister-ship in 1950/51
After a bloody court massacre, the Rana bharadars took over the governance of the country
in 1847. They set in place a hereditary Prime Minister-ship where the role of the head of
government passed from brother to brother. The Rana family had de facto control of the
government, and the king was seen as a ceremonial head of state. This system lasted from
1847 to 1951. It is surprising that an autocratic government, such as that of the Ranas, would
last over a hundred years and not at some point try to depose the king and put themselves
on the throne. But one has to consider that the legitimacy of the Rana rule was based on
the peoples’ perception of the legitimacy of the Shah rulers. Control of the military and the
bureaucracy, in the view of the Ranas, was not enough to gain legitimacy to control the state
directly.
The Rana regime is seen by many as an autocratic system sandwiched between the pre-1847
“people-oriented” Shah rule and the post-1951 Shah-guided parliamentary democracy. But,
little in the way of the structure of the state changed through these periods. Whelpton, a
historian of Nepal, writes: “[F]or the bulk of the population 1846 did not represent a radical
break with the past, but was rather the institutionalisation of one family’s dominance at the
expense of the Shahs and other leading families within the traditional elite” (Whelpton, 2005,
p.50). Moreover, the Rana regime made the state more centralized giving more authority to
the head of the state. This helped them solidify power through the monarch. For instance,
Jung Bahadur Rana, the first Rana Prime Minister, codified Nepal’s first legal system, the
Muluki Ain, in 1861. Among other things, it made Hinduism the official religion of the state,
which in turn helped legitimize the monarch seen as the incarnation of a Hindu God.
Nepali students studying in India had actively participated in the freedom movements in the
decades leading up to the fall of British India in 1947. They brought their sentiment back
home to Nepal. The Rana’s were seen as autocratic governors, and importantly, had support
and links with the British. With the help of King Tribuwan, Nepali political parties that had
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formed among the exiles and Nepali students in India deposed the Rana family.
3.3.2 Fall of the Panchayat Rule in 1990/91
After the overthrow of the Rana Regime, multiparty democracy was established for the first
time in Nepal. The first elections were held in 1959, in which the Nepali Congress Party
(NCP) overwhelmingly won the majority. But in December 16, 1960, King Mahendra Bir
Bikram Shah, son of Tribhuwan and father of Birendra, declared an emergency, dismissed
the Congress government, and took over governance himself. Thus, began the panchayat era,
which would last the next three decades.
Panchayat literally means village council. The system was structured around village councils
that in turn elected half of the members to the national level panchayat, the other half
was chosen by the king. This national panchayat was directly headed by the king. In
essence, it was a semi-democratic one-party system. The major works of the panchayat
governments were to formalize the Sanskritization process that had begun since the start
of the Shah dynasty and had been officially codified during the Rana Regime.18 The push
by international communities for development in the 1960-1990 period helped build schools
and infrastructure throughout the country. The education and bureaucratic systems that
were set-up for state-building were also used as tools to further propagate the national
identity represented by the monarch. The Shah dynasty was glorified in the school curricula,
government institutions were named after the royals, and their images hung in every public
and even private institutions. In all, the panchayat system helped cement the place of the
monarch in the social, cultural, and political spheres of the nation.
18This process of implementing one religion and language was not always driven from the top. At times,
there was a need for a common language which promoted the adoption of Nepali as the lingua franca. For
instance, the establishment of tea estates in Darjeeling, now part of India, brought about the emigration of
12-15 percent of the Kirati population Pradhan (1991) that had originally lived in the eastern hills of Nepal.
In mixing up with the other ethnic groups in Darjeeling, they needed a common language, and hence Nepali
was more easily adopted.
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In hindsight, the biggest problem of the panchayat system was that it was a semi-autocratic
form of government in an era in which communism was spreading in Asia. Internal and,
importantly, an external grievance was against a clause in the constitution that banned
political parties.19 Citing the ban, one analyst notes, “Lifting of this ban was the main
objective of the political opposition throughout the panchayat period, and also the basic goal
of the 1990 democracy movement” (Hoftun, 1994). It is left for one to wonder whether, in
case the political parties had been allowed to actively participate in the panchayat system,
the “democratic” movement would have happened in 1990/91. What changed post-1990 was
the lifting of the ban on political parties, more constitutional authority for the parliamentary
body (the nuevo political elites), and with it widespread corruption. During the democratic
movement, the agitating political parties were very careful to direct their opposition against
the Panchayat one-party system rather than against the king. “They wanted to take away the
king’s political power without harming him as the symbol of national unity” (Hoftun, 1994).
Moreover, the new constitution upheld the role of the king as a Constitutional Monarch, who
was still the head of the “new” state order. Importantly, it also left unchanged the notion of
Nepal as a Hindu kingdom.
Some of the smaller far-left groups were against the establishment of a constitutional monarch
proposed in the 1991 constitution. They lobbied for the creation of a republic instead. Far-left
communist factions, such as Mashal, remained loyal to their objective of an armed Maoist
struggle.20 Having extreme agenda is natural to any open political process. What matters is
the size and weight of these views. In this, these far-left factions had little sway and support
of the electorate. In the long run, however, it seems that the far left Maoist parties were
vindicated precisely for not joining forces with the mainstream political parties including the
19Birendra had taken a neutral stance in balancing the relations between India and China. The Indian
government, having fought a devastating war with China in the 1960s, was wary of China’s increasing presence
within Nepal and supported Indian inclining policies and leaders. A multi-party democracy, with the leaders
of all major parties having been harbored by India during their exiles, would suit India very well.
20Mashal, was one of the more vocal factions within the Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist (CPN-M).
Prachanda, the CPN-M supremo, was the leader of Mashal before uniting with other factions to form the
CPN-M.
3.3. PANCHAYAT ERA 49
NCP or the other Marxist and Leninist communist factions. Post-1990, the major communist
groups had united under the United Marxists and Leninists (UML) umbrella and had resorted
to social democratic agendas, which were actually very similar to the policies that the NCP
government themselves had proposed.21
What was contradictory to the goal of the 1990 movement was that the King, Birendra, came
out to be the political winner. His father, Mahendra, had forcefully taken power in 1960,
which the political parties thought they had finally wrestled away from Birendra in 1990.
Although the events of 1990/91 curtailed the de jure power of the monarch, in the eyes of the
public, however, the democratic movement helped solidify the legitimate role of the monarch
as the head of the state.22 He was viewed evermore as being above human—the one who was
willing to make political and personal sacrifices to grant the demands of his subjects, such as
the 1990 referendum, and the one who stayed above the fray of “dirty” politics practiced by
the political parties.
If anything, the change in 1990 was a wave of populism that swept the globe. The western
ideals of “democracy” was imposed, by a select group of elites in Nepal, onto a nation in
which more than 60 percent of the population was illiterate. In terms of political structure,
the change in 1990 was a reversion back to the pre-1950s Rana regime. The elites were
governing under the tutelage of the king—only this time it was not a single family.23
21NCP’s policies were, in the 1970s and 1980s, very much driven by the Gandhian- and Nehru-ideologies of
the Congress Party in India.
22Post 1990, the king still remained the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Royal Nepal Army. In
addition, Article 115 in the new constitution stated that the king could “declare a state of emergency in the
event of ‘grave threat to the sovereignty, unity or security of any part of Nepal, due to war, outside attack,
armed rebellion, or serious economic disruption’ ” (Hutt, 1994).
23Some of the nuevo political elites included the former members of the governing Rana family.
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3.4 The Two-hundred-and-forty Year Socio-Political
Hierarchy
Figure 3.2 depicts the socio-political hierarchy of the Kingdom of Nepal during the over
two-hundred-and-forty year Shah dynastic rule. The king sat at the apex of this hierarchy. In
principle, this never changed throughout the entirety of the period. The jostle for power, and
with it the political upheavals, mainly took place in the next tier, among the bharadars—the
elite courtier families in the 18th and 19th centuries, and the political elites in the latter part of
the 20th century. The bharadars, under the guidance of the kings, governed the Kingdom with
the help of a bureaucracy. As one analyst put it, “it may be argued that the political changes
were not of a fundamental character in 1951 or in 1990, because the political dominance of
one cultural and social elite survived both events” (Hoftun, 1994).24
Mukhiyas, in the third tier, have generally been the class of landlords who, through ownership
of land, have been in a position to be the local leaders, village elders, pradhan panchas
(local leader of panchayats during the Panchayat era) and local level politicians. Upheavals
among the bharadars did not necessarily engender the replacement of the Mukhiyas. For
instance, after the Panchayat rule ended in 1991, the NCP took over the administrative
duties of the kingdom from the Panchayat administrators.25 At the village level, however,
the former pradhan panchas naturally changed their allegiance to the Congress party. The
NCP central leaders for their part, requiring local influence and representation, accepted the
former pradhan panchas with open arms. Moreover, when the top-level bureaucrats proposed
land reform or any structural change that would alter the relationship between the actors
of the lower rung of the socio-political hierarchy, not much could be done for the landlords
24Interestingly, the changes post-2008 has done little to change the elite class or the social structure at the
bottom. The only significant change after 2008 has been the abolition of the monarchy. In essence, the top
two tiers have merged into one.
25The NCP and the United Marxists and Leninists party (united communist factions) were the major
actors in the pro-democracy struggle in 1990. Of the 205 parliamentary seats in the general election in 1991,
NCP won 53.6 percent and UML won 39.7 percent.
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were now the ones responsible to make these changes. Thus, for over two centuries, the same
families were in power at the local level, and the economic cleavage between the haves and










Figure 3.2: Socio-political Hierarchy in the Kingdom of Nepal
Although the caste system was in place for much of this period, the socio-political hierarchy
was not exclusively aligned with the caste system. While there were landlords who belonged to
other caste groups outside the dominant Hill-Brahman group, they were rare.26 The bharadars
and the bureaucratic appointees likewise were exclusively from the Hill-Brahman group. For
instance, in 1972, while 22 percent of the population belonged to the Hill-Brahman group,
they held 93 percent of higher civil service and political posts (Blaikie et al., 1980). However,
a large segment of the Hill-Brahmans was also among the lower rung of the socio-political
structure. Those who were higher up according to the Hindu caste hierarchy, but, due to
26Hill-Brahman broadly refers to Brahmin and Chettri caste groups that historically descended from the
middle hill statelets and have occupied the upper strata in the social hierarchy of Nepali society. They were
the rulers, courtiers, priests, administrators, military generals, etc. in their domains and continued those
roles under the Shahs. Eastern Nepal traditionally had communal land tenure. Members of these ethnic
communities were assigned to collect taxes. The Subbas (local leaders) acted as quasi-landlords despite not
belonging to the upper Hill-Brahman caste.
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their lack of ownership of land, belonged to the peasant class in the socio-political hierarchy.
One such case was that of the family of the future Maoist supremo, Pushpa Kamal Dahal.
Prachanda (Dahal’s nom de guerre) was born into a poor peasant Brahmin family. He later
recalled how a moneylender had insulted and kicked his father, which, in his words, “was a
political lesson I would never forget” (Roy, 2008, p.14). While caste hierarchy existed, and in
a lot of cases overlapped the political hierarchy, most of the grievances had economic roots.
In summary, a political structure was adopted by the Shah rulers. This was legitimized by
over two centuries of sanskritization, which in turn led to a “permanent” socio-political order.
Although political changes happened at the level of the bharadars, the other actors remained
fixed. Since the landlord-peasant relationship remained fixed, there existed incentives for the
landlords to extract exorbitant rents. This extractive socio-political institution not only led
to a lack of investments in the mode of production and in turn lack of economic growth, but
it also created grievances against the landlords among the peasants.
This parallels the socio-political frictions that have been observed across the Indian sub-
continent. The everyday concerns of the people in similar social structures are in the most
immediate level of society, such as the lower rung of the socio-political structure in Nepal.
The higher-level political authorities are “simply regarded as too distant and too irrelevant
to daily life to matter” (Fukuyama, 2011, p.187).
Writing about the social structure in India, Fukuyama explains that there is one thing that has
remained constant in caste-based societies, through the Hindu governments, or the Muslim
Moghul rulers, or even the British Empire: “protests against social injustice, of which there
was a huge number, were typically never aimed against India’s ruling political authorities
. . . Rather, they were aimed at the social order dominated by the Brahmin class, and often
expressed themselves as dissident religious movements like Jainism or Buddhism that rejected
the metaphysical foundations of the world order” (Fukuyama, 2011, p.187). We have seen
similar dissident religious beliefs in Nepali society. For instance, in the 1970s there was a
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split in the communist faction because one faction wanted to follow Boddhisatva Maoism
(Whelpton, 2005). This idea of combining Buddhism and Maoism (incomprehensible to many)
was mostly in opposition to the dominant Hindu ideology, rather than the acceptance of
either Buddhism or Maoism.
This is not very different from other agrarian states that witnessed socio-political revolutions
in the past. Skocpol (1979), writing about pre-1789 France, pre-1911 China, and pre-1917
Russia, asserts:
The imperial states . . . stood astride large-scale, predominantly agrarian
economies in which land and (non-state) claims to agricultural products were
divided between a mass of peasant families and the landed upper class. . . . the
most dominant (i.e. the surplus appropriating) class was, fundamentally, a landed
upper class. The fundamental politically relevant tensions in all the Old Regimes
were [. . . ] centered in the relationships of producing classes to the dominant
classes and states, and the relationships of the landed dominant classes to the
autocratic-imperial states . . . The imperial states and landed upper classes of
prerevolutionary France, Russia, and China were simply partners in the control
and exploitation of peasantry (p.48).
Despite the existence of grievance against the landlords, the peasants largely did not take
action for two reasons. First, there was no one to politicize the peasants (the clergy were
also part of the institutional setup), at least not until the latter part of the twentieth century.
The existent political leaders almost always used the peasants as political leverage rather
than to make any structural changes to the socio-political order that would help the classes
at the bottom. Second, and more importantly, as long as the peasants saw the king as the
legitimate authority of the state, any rebellion (or support thereof) against the landlords
would imply an indirect rebellion against the king. For it was through the monarch that the
landlords derived their authority over their lands. Rebelling against the monarch for a large
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mass of the population was simply inconceivable. For any large scale revolution, not only did
the peasants need to be politicized, but the overarching institutional structure of the state
needed to weaken.
3.5 The Civil War: 1996 - 2006
The civil war in Nepal started with a unilateral declaration of war against the state by the
Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist (CPN-M) in February 1996.27 It continued for over a
decade concluding in November 2006. This, however, was not the first attempt at armed
rebellion against the state by a communist group. After the royal takeover in 1960, armed
groups within the far-left communist factions had launched an unsuccessful struggle against
“class enemies” in the eastern regions of Nepal.28 This struggle was very much influenced
by a similar class struggle by Naxalites across the border in West Bengal, India (Whelpton,
1994).29 What makes the events of 1996-2006 in Nepal distinct, relative to struggles in the
past, is the scale of violence, the pervasive nature of the conflict, and the socio-cultural and
political changes that it engendered. In the history of the Kingdom of Nepal, nothing comes
close to the events that unfolded in that decade.
It is unclear, however, against whom exactly the Maoists were initially fighting. Despite the
political changes of 1990/91, the socio-political order of the state had remained unaltered.
Given this structure, the Maoists saw two problems of the Nepali state: the monarch, which
represented an “oppressive feudal order”; and the mainstream political parties, which, since
1990, “had allowed the Indian ‘expansionists’ to increase their political and economic control
27CPN-M were composed of several hardline Maoist groups, a bulk of whom comprised the Sanyukta Jana
Morcha Nepal (United People’s Front (Nepal), UPF). The UPF participated in the 1991 elections and won 9
out of 205 parliamentary seats. Prachanda, the CPN-M supremo, was the leader of the Mashal faction within
the UPF coalition. Babu Ram Bhattarai, the CPN-M ideologue, was the leader of the UPF.
28The group abandoned the armed struggle and formed the nucleus of the UML group that participated in
the 1991 election.
29Naxalites refer to broad communist groups fighting against the Indian state. The violence started from
a village called Naxalbari in West Bengal giving its’ name. These groups are discussed further in the data
section.
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over Nepal” (Adhikari, 2014, p.74). Taking into consideration the Maoist guerrilla’s limited
military strength and popular support, the start of the war seems to have been directed
towards the new bharadars (the political elites) that arose from the 1990 movement, and
the “comprador” capitalist who were supported by the new political elites. The case of
nationalism, as in any society, is a strong motive for collective action. The Maoists knew
that going against the monarch, the symbol of nationalism, would be detrimental to their
campaign. Additionally, the army remained loyal to the king even after the political changes
of 1990/91. In turn, Birendra argued against the use of the army against “his own people.”
Moreover, on the eve of the civil war, the Maoist cadres had started a politicized public
campaign. Named Si-Ja, after the two mountains in the western districts of Rukum and
Rolpa—Sisne and Jaljala, the cadres went from village-to-village building roads, toilets,
etc., as well as conducting mass rallies arguing the justification for violence against their
class enemies. This led to clashes with cadres of the NCP. The Congress government, citing
“anti-monarchy and anti-democracy activities” (Manandhar and Seddon, 2010, p.37), launched
a brutal police offensive, Operation Romeo, which further disenfranchised the people of this
region against the government. In all likelihood, the Maoist sympathizers, at the start of the
Civil War, were against the government of the NCP and its apparent appendage, the police
force.
By the end of the war, however, the CPN-M had aligned themselves with the political parties,
including the NCP, and actively campaigned against the monarch.30 The war ended in 2006
with an agreement between the political parties and the CPN-M to create a Constituent
Assembly. This also implied constitutional changes to remove the monarch, which the CPN-M
had actively campaigned for during the latter part of the war. This shift in focus of war
efforts could not have been due to the shift in strategy on the part of the Maoists alone.
What transpired in the evening of June 1st, 2001, when the then king, Birendra, was killed by
30Gyanendra, citing article 115 in the 1990 constitution, had taken absolute control of the government in
February 1st, 2005. In its wake, it was natural for the sidelined political parties to align themselves with the
CPN-M.
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his own son, certainly made this possible. The events of this massacre are discussed below.
No matter who the Maoists were theoretically against, it did not change the nature of violence
at the ground level. Grievance always existed between the peasants and the Mukhiyas.
Exploiting this friction, the Maoist cadres actively persecuted landlords and their source of
power—legal documents pertaining to land ownership, loans, etc. For example, “[i]n Kavre
district, Maoist cadres . . . stormed the house of a landlord-moneylender and burnt the loan
documents they found there. This was meant to demonstrate the party’s commitment to
liberating peasants from feudal oppression. They launched a similar attack in Gorkha district,
burning loan documents held at the branch of the Agricultural Development Bank—an
act that symbolized an assault on ‘the bureaucratic capitalist class, the bastard child of
imperialism and feudalism’ ” (Adhikari, 2014, p.38).
In total, there were more than fifteen thousand deaths directly attributed to the civil war.
Nevertheless, the conflict was limited to isolated western districts until 2001. The conflict
started in the poorest regions of Nepal. The rugged geography and poverty in the western
hills provided an ideal space for guerrilla-type warfare. Geography, combined with limited, or
in this case non-existent, government infrastructure created the space for easy propaganda.
The districts that saw most of the violence in the pre-massacre period, in particular Rolpa
and Rukum, had no motorable roads until they were built to the district headquarters by
the army in 2002/03 (Whelpton, 2005). It is no surprise that some scholars have found a
significant positive correlation between adverse geography and civil war incidents in Nepal
(see Acharya, 2009; Do and Iyer, 2010). They find this as the only consistently significant
relationship across their multivariate regression specifications.
The pre-2001 conflict can be thought of as what Fearon and Laitin (2003) refer to as insurgency.
They define insurgency as “a technology of military conflict characterized by small, lightly
armed bands practicing guerrilla warfare from rural base areas.” These conflicts, as described,
are most suited for what was observed in the remote western districts of Nepal. Conflict
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incidents were few and far between. Of the fifteen thousand deaths in the eleven years of
conflict, less than two thousand is attributed to the period before June 2001. The insurgency
would have most likely remained at that level, or perhaps even fizzled out as had happened
of the insurgency in the 1960s, had there been no shock to the state capacity.
This notion becomes more credible if we consider the developments of the protracted Naxalite
insurgency in India. India, the biggest political influence in Nepal, has had pockets of Naxalite
insurgency since the 1960s. Similar to the CPN-M in Nepal, the Naxalites in certain states of
India have been fighting for a proletariat state, and in particular, land rights for the landless
(Iyer, 2009). Furthermore, CPN-M and the Indian communist groups have coordinated not
only at the financial level but also in the ideological space (Onesto, 2003). Most of the
CPN-M leaders, as leaders of other political groups in Nepal, have had extended involvement
in politics, including schooling, in India. Given the influence India has had historically in
Nepali politics and society, it is not far-fetched to imagine that the outcomes in the insurgency
of CPN-M would have been similar to what has been observed of Naxalite insurgency in
India.
Post-2001, however, the conflict in Nepal escalated and spread to all parts of the country.
Geography suddenly ceased to be an issue for the war. More than 85 percent of the over
fifteen thousand victims died in the 2001-2006 period. The conflict ended in 2006 with a
consensus between the mainstream political parties and the CPN-M to hold an election for
the Constituent Assembly. This consensus took shape after massive urban protests against
the state in large cities across Nepal, orchestrated by the mainstream political parties and
the CPN-M.
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3.6 Socio-political Revolution in Nepal compared with
Old Regimes of the Past
Although the history of Nepal is specific to the state, it can, however, be compared and
contrasted with other states of the past. The institutional structures, the constraints faced
by the different strata within this structure, and the development of the events during
and after the revolution are similar to other social revolutions that have occurred in the
past. The “old regime” in Nepal shares similarities in this regard with the Old Regimes
that were in place in pre-1789 France, pre-1911 China, or pre-1917 Russia. Just as in
Nepal, socio-political structures of these old regimes had been established by the respective
monarchs—Bourbon in France, Manchu in China, and Romanov in Russia; these states had
high agrarian populations;31 the states were controlled by powerful centralized autocrats.32
Moreover, in all cases including Nepal, the socio-political structures had been in place for at
least a couple of centuries and they had not been altered by colonization by a “foreign” power.
Furthermore, all revolutions led to radical changes in the state power structure, including
the overthrow of the monarchies. Highlighting the social tensions in these states, Skocpol
(1979) writes: “As in all agrarian states, the potential for peasant (and urban-popular) revolts
was endemic in the old-regime France, China, and Russia” (p.48, emphasis mine). This was
certainly true of Nepal as well.
3185 percent of the population of pre-revolutionary France were peasants and 80 percent were the same
in China (Skocpol, 1979). The rural population in Nepal in 1990 was 91 percent (The World Bank:
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.RUR.TOTL.ZS?locations=NP).
32Not only were the political structures similar, but so were the power relations between the different strata
of the structures. Discussing the structures of these regimes, Skocpol (1979) writes: “In all three Old Regimes
there were fully established imperial states—that is, differentiated, centrally coordinated administrative and
military hierarchies functioning under the aegis of the absolute monarchies. These imperial states were
proto-bureaucratic: Some offices, especially at higher levels, were functionally specialized; some officials or
aspects of official duties were subject to explicit rules and hierarchical supervision; and the separation of
state offices and duties from private property and pursuits was partially institutionalized (though in different
particular ways) in each regime. None of these imperial states, however, was fully bureaucratic . . . [such that
they] were not in a position to control directly, let alone basically reorganize, local agrarian socioeconomic
relationships” (p. 47).
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What is different, however, is whom the grievance of the masses was against. In the Old
Regimes of the past, external wars led to exorbitant taxes on the population. The defeat in
these wars de-legitimized the monarch, the financial burdens of the war weakened the central
state, and the frustrated populace revolted against the regimes (Skocpol, 1979). This cannot
be more different in the Nepali case. In Nepal, there were no foreign wars and the taxation
had not changed significantly in decades. What did change, and very abruptly, was the death
of King Birendra and his immediate family. This was the event through which the legitimacy
of the two-hundred-and-forty-year-old system was lost. Furthermore, there is little evidence
that the masses in Nepal harbored strong sentiments against the monarch. While, this was
certainly true in the other Old Regimes—the monarch in those cases were seen as stationary
bandits, perhaps as a result of the exorbitant taxes faced by the population.
So, what instigated these revolutions in France, China, and Russia are different from the event
which provided the spark for the mass revolt in Nepal. While in the former cases, the catalyst
for the revolutions was external, in Nepal, the catalyst was internal. In France, China, and
Russia, foreign wars were responsible for depleting state capacities and the legitimacy of the
monarchs. The gradual weakening of the monarch provided the opportunity that led to social
revolutions in these countries. In Nepal, there were no external wars. Rather, the legitimacy
of the state was lost due to the sudden killing of the then monarch. This abrupt break in the
socio-political structure provided the space for the peasant revolt in Nepal.
3.7 The Royal Massacre
The loss of legitimacy can be attributed to the massacre of King Birendra and his entire
immediate family. The Royal Massacre, as it is known, took place on the night of June 1st,
2001. The king and members of the royal family had met at the palace for a routine dinner.
The official report of the massacre reports that there had been some friction between the
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Queen and the Crown Prince, Dipendra, regarding the choice of his bride. Dipendra’s alleged
choice of bride belonged to the lineage of the Rana family that was opposed to the lineage of
the Rana family the Queen belonged to. While political families are important drivers of
politics and also conflicts, it is important to note that the aforementioned Rana families were
not involved in opposing sides of the ongoing conflict. The events of what exactly happened
that night are still very unclear, however, there is consensus that Dipendra had been drinking
and smoking hashish that night. Then at some point during the night, Dipendra, geared
in military fatigue and armed with semi-automatic rifles, gunned-down ten members of the
royal family, including his father, in addition to fatally injuring himself. Dipendra remained
in comatose from the self-inflicted injury until he succumbed to his injuries on June 4th,
2001. As Birendra’s successor, Dipendra was declared King immediately after his father was
declared deceased. As there was no other surviving heir to Dipendra or Birendra, Gyanendra,
the latter’s brother, took over the throne after Dipendra’s death.
3.8 Conclusion
The Shah kings established dynastic rule by unifying diverse populations belonging to various
ethnic communities in the 18th century. Through the process of sanskritization, the monarch
became the symbol of nationality, peace, and unity. This provided socio-political stability
for over two-hundred-and-forty years. The land was used as a tool by the state for in-kind
payments for services rendered to the state. This eventually created a permanent system of
landed class, and peasants who were dependent on this class. The highly unequal distribution
of land and rigid social-political structure meant that the landlords could extract exorbitant
rents from their tenants. The killing of Birendra and his family abruptly changed the socio-
political structure of the kingdom. The absence of a legitimate ruler led to an escalation of
conflict from an isolated insurgency in the western hills into a full-fledged civil war.
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How The Royal Massacre was an exogenous accident, and why it was capable of changing
the nature of the conflict is the topic of the next chapter.
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Appendix
3.A Tables
Table 3.A.1: Chronology of Important Historical Events
Year Event
1768 Prithivi Narayan Shah captures Kathmandu valley; this marks the beginning of the
Kingdom of Nepal.
1850 Jung Bahadur Rana becomes the first hereditery Pradhan Mukhiya (Prime Minister).
1951 Rana regime is overthrown with the efforts of underground political parties and
King Tribhuwan Bir Bikram Shah.
1959 First democratic elections are held; Nepali Congress Party wins the majority.
1960 King Mahendra Bir Bikram Shan Dev, Tribhuwan’s son, dismisses the congress
government and assumes direct rule.
1962 Start of the Panchayat, a semi-autocratic one party system with the king as absolute
ruler, era.
1972 Birendra Bir Bikram Shah is crowned the King after the death of his father Mahendra.
1980 First referendom on the Panchayat system (Jana Sangraha); Panchayat factions
narrowly win over the proponents of multi-party democracy.
1990 Successful mass urban protests to overthrow the panchayat system (Jana Andolan
I); The second referendum opens the path for multi-party democracy.
1991 Second multi-party democratic elections are held; again NCP wins majority; the
role of the King is defined as the ceremonial head in the new constitution.
1996 Start of the Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist led insurgency mostly isolated to
western-mountain districts of Nepal.
2001 The Royal Massacre: King Birendra Bir Bikram Shah is killed along with 11 members
of the royal family; Birendra’s brother Gyanendra takes over the throne.
2006 End of the decade-long Civil War; more than fifteen thousand people are directly
killed as a result of the violence during the conflict.
2008 The Constitution Assembly votes to abolish the Monarchy and declares Nepal a
republic.
Chapter 4
Identification Strategy for the
Empirical Study
There is nothing more uncertain of success nor more dangerous to manage than
the creation of new order of things. – N. Machiavelli
Violence requires both a motive and an opportunity. There is evidence that “(1) state
organizations susceptible to administrative and military collapse when subjected to intensified
pressures from more developed countries abroad and (2) agrarian sociopolitical structures that
facilitated widespread peasant revolts against landlords were, taken together, the sufficient
and distinctive causes of social-revolutionary situations commencing in France, 1789, Russia,
1917, and China, 1911” (Skocpol, 1979, p.154).
In other words, the socio-economic conditions combined with the decay of state due to
external wars provided the motive and the opportunity for revolutions in the past. The
agrarian socio-political structure in Nepal created an excessively unequal distribution of
resources. While the motive is necessary, it is not sufficient for mass armed violence. States
have coexisted with highly unequal societies and with relative political stability. For this
coexistence, either a legitimizing force or a coercive one has been necessary. The former was
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what the Royal institution provided in Nepal. It is precisely the abrupt breakdown of this
legitimizing institution, in the presence of the unequal socio-political and economic structure,
that led to the sudden and widespread violence in the post-2001 period in Nepal.
Evidence of motive was presented in the previous chapter. In this chapter, I discuss the role
of the Royal Massacre in providing the opportunity for mass violence in Nepal.
4.1 The Royal Massacre and the Opportunity for Con-
flict
4.1.1 Conflict trends and the Massacre
The Civil War in Nepal lasted from 1996-2006. What is important to note here is that the
events of the conflict were not uniformly spread throughout the decade, and neither did it
progressively increase or decrease. The Royal Massacre (Massacre henceforth), as it came
to be known, took place on June 1st, 2001, and was allegedly orchestrated by Crown Prince
Dipendra. Dipendra, in a drug-fueled argument over the choice of his bride, gunned-down
ten members of the royal family in addition to taking his own life.1 There was an isolated
insurgency that had affected small remote mountain areas of the country. However, following
the Massacre, the insurgency transformed into a full-fledged and pervasive civil war.
Table 6.1 reports the total number of conflict-related death, disappearance, and injury by
six-month intervals for the entire period of the conflict (1996 - 2006); total incidents aggregates
the three outcomes.2 Period 1 represents the first half (January 1st - June 30th) of 1996,
1Dipendra shot himself after killing members of his family. He remained in comatose until he succumbed
to his injuries on June 4th, 2001. As Birendra’s successor, Dipendra was declared King until his death. As
there was no other surviving heir to Dipendra or Birendra, the latter’s brother Gyanendra took over the
throne.
2Source of the data is the Individual-Level Data on the Victims of Nepal’s Civil War, 1996-2006: A New
Dataset (Joshi and Pyakurel, 2015). Details of the dataset are discussed in Chapter 6.
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period 2 the second half of 1996, and so on. Period 12 reports conflict outcomes in the
period after the Massacre.3 There were a total of 14,982 incidents reported in the entirety
of the Civil War of which 88 percent are deaths, 5 percent are disappearances, and the
remaining 7 percent are injuries.4 Note that only 13 percent of deaths and 11 percent of
injuries and disappearances occurred in the period before the Massacre. Note also that on
average, 275 incidents occurred per six-month period in the three years leading up to the
Massacre, with little fluctuation from period-to-period. However, there was a 2.7 fold increase
in incidents (2.6 fold increase in deaths, 1.7 fold increase in disappearances, and 9.4 fold
increase in injuries) in the first period immediately following the Massacre. The conflict
incidents remained at a high level for the next four years.
The explosion of violence in the aftermath of the Massacre can also be seen by looking at
the geography of conflict. Figure 4.1 reports each district’s share of total incidents related
to the civil war in Nepal. Panel A reports each district’s share of incidents for the period
before the Massacre, that is from January 1st, 1996 to May 31th, 2001. Panel B reports the
same in the period after the Massacre, that is from June 1st, 2001 to December 31st, 2006.
There were a total of 1,999 conflict-related incidents before the Massacre. Conflict, in the
pre-Massacre period, was restricted to the western districts of Rukum and Rolpa (the adjacent
dark cells in panel A). These districts were the traditional stronghold of the Communist Party
of Nepal-Maoists (CPN-M). Indeed, 30% of the all pre-Massacre conflict-related incidents
occurred in these two districts and a further 18% in the neighboring districts of Jajarkot and
Kalikot. In addition, extreme poverty and mountainous terrain make these districts ideally
suited for insurgency type conflicts.5 This is very much in line with the conflict and adverse
3Period 12 aggregates conflict outcomes for the first seven months after the Massacre (June 1st, 2001 -
December 31st, 2001), while period 11 aggregates over the last five months before the Massacre (January 1st,
2001 - May 31st, 2001). All other periods represent six-month intervals between 1996 and 2006.
4This dataset primarily records fatalities directly related to the conflict. Informal Sector Service Center
(INSEC) compiled the dataset to provide financial support to those directly affected by the civil war. Hence,
while the reported number of deaths and disappearances are exhaustive in the dataset, only individuals with
serious injury are reported in this dataset.
5Fearon and Laitin (2003) describe insurgency as “a technology of military conflict characterized by small,
lightly armed bands practicing guerrilla warfare from rural base areas.” Insurgency in their view is different
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Table 4.1: Aggregate Conflict Outcomes per Six-month Interval, 1996-2006
Period Date Deaths Disappearances Injuries Total Incidents
1 Jan 1 - Jun 30, 1996 55 1 0 56
2 Jul 1 - Dec 31, 1996 44 1 0 45
3 Jan 1 - Jun 30, 1997 41 5 0 46
4 Jul 1 - Dec 31, 1997 54 1 2 57
5 Jan 1 - Jun 30, 1998 126 5 9 140
6 Jul 1 - Dec 31, 1998 284 9 27 320
7 Jan 1 - Jun 30, 1999 279 7 47 333
8 Jul 1 - Dec 31, 1999 206 9 7 222
9 Jan 1 - Jun 30, 2000 278 22 7 307
10 Jul 1 - Dec 31, 2000 177 6 7 190
11 Jan 1 - May 31, 2001 247 25 7 279
12 Jun 1 - Dec 31, 2001 640 43 66 749
13 Jan 1 - Jun 30, 2002 2,038 93 303 2,434
14 Jul 1 - Dec 31, 2002 1,629 93 159 1,881
15 Jan 1 - Jun 30, 2003 449 49 48 546
16 Jul 1 - Dec 31, 2003 1,494 72 129 1,695
17 Jan 1 - Jun 30, 2004 1,501 82 60 1,643
18 Jul 1 - Dec 31, 2004 1,192 55 52 1,299
19 Jan 1 - Jun 30, 2005 1,340 79 29 1,448
20 Jul 1 - Dec 31, 2005 449 31 17 498
21 Jan 1 - Jun 30, 2006 635 80 20 735
22 Jul 1 - Dec 31, 2006 52 5 2 59
Total 13,210 773 998 14,982
Notes: This table reports estimates of conflict outcomes (incidents, deaths, disappearances, and injuries)
between 1996 and 2006. Total incidents equals the sum of deaths, disappearances, and injuries. Period 12,
the first period after the Massacre, aggregates conflict outcomes for the first seven-months after the Massacre
(June 1st, 2001 - December 31st, 2001), while period 11 aggregates over the last five-months before the
Massacre (January 1st, 2001 - May 31st, 2001). All other periods represent six-month intervals between 1996
and 2006. There were two cease-fires during the entire period of the conflict: first from August 3rd, 2001 to
November 23rd, 2001 (spanning part of period 12), and second from January 29th, 2003 to August 26th, 2003
(spanning almost entire period 15).
Source: Author’s calculation using Joshi and Pyakurel (2015).
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geography hypothesis. The period before the Massacre accounted for only 13.3% of the total
incidents in the entire period of the Civil War. Post Massacre, however, the conflict spread
to all regions of the country. Not only was the violence more pervasive, but the intensity
of the conflict was also higher. Of the total of 14,982 incidents overall, 12,983 occurred in
the post-Massacre period. Contrary to the adverse geography hypothesis, conflict in the
post-Massacre period spread to all parts of the country—mountains, forests, or flatlands.
Rukum and Rolpa, the districts with nearly a third of the incidents in the pre-Massacre
period, accounted for only 6.5% of the incidents in the post-Massacre period.
Another way to gauge the pervasiveness of violence is to look at the number of districts that
were affected by conflict across time. This will provide additional evidence in support of
the change in the nature of conflict immediately following the Massacre. Figure 4.2 reports
the number of districts that were affected by violence in six-month intervals between 1996
and 2006. Conflict-affected districts are defined as districts with more than five deaths in
a six-month interval.6 The dashed vertical line represents the Massacre. As earlier, I have
divided 2001 into the first five months (period 11), and the last seven months (period 12).
It is unlikely that this classification significantly affects the number of districts involved in
violence in the first period after the Massacre. Moreover, there were two cease-fires during
the entire Civil War period: first from August 3rd, 2001 to November 23rd, 2001 (spanning
part of period 12), and second from January 29th, 2003 to August 26th, 2003 (spanning almost
the entire period 15). If anything, conflict, and hence conflict outcomes, should be muted in
the first period after the Massacre.
Only two districts in the first three periods spanning 1996 and 1997 had more than five deaths,
and there were three districts affected by the conflict in the last period of 1997 (period 4).
For the next seven periods, that is the three-and-a-half years before the Massacre, on average,
10 out of a total of 74 districts were affected by conflict, with a maximum of 14 districts
from a full-scale civil war.
6Table 4.A.1 provides other measures to calculate affected districts.
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Panel A: Before June 1st, 2001
Panel B: After June 1st, 2001
Figure 4.1: District’s Share of Incidents Pre and Post Massacre
Notes: Panel A reports each district’s share of total incidents for the period January 1st, 1996 to May 31st
2001. Panel B reports each district’s share of total incidents aggregated for the period June 1st, 2001 to
December 31st 2006. Total incidents includes deaths, disappearances, and injuries. There were a total of
14,982 incidents in the entire period of interest, of which 1,999 incidents occurred in the period before the
Massacre, and 12,983 incidents in the period after the Massacre. Data is available for 74 of 75 districts. Data
is missing for one district (Manang), which is shaded gray in the map.
Source: Author’s calculation using Joshi and Pyakurel (2015).
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affected by violence in the latter half of 1998 and also in the first half of 1999. That, however,
changed drastically starting the first period after the Massacre. In this period, 35 districts,
or half of all districts, were affected by conflict. In the first four years after the Massacre, the
only periods with less than 60 districts affected were the periods 12 and 15, both of which
in-effect had a bilateral cease-fire between the Maoists and the government. Even in these
periods, the number of districts affected was at least three-fold higher compared with the
average for the last 3 years before the Massacre. What caused this discontinuous jump in
conflict?
Foreign pressures, such as wars, tend to either strengthen the state through centralization
and state-building, such as what happened in Western Europe in the premodern times (Tilly,
1985), or they have the opposite effect—that is the weakening and collapse of the state. Weak
states, given the motive, are susceptible to internal civil turmoil. The above line of argument
suggests that a long and drawn out conflict could strain the resources of the state and make
it weaker. While conflict could gradually change in the presence of a long drawn out war,
the events that occurred in Nepal were anything but—the conflict suddenly and drastically
changed course. We also know that Nepal was not involved in a foreign war. In what follows,
I will argue that this sudden and discontinuous jump in the conflict outcomes was due to the
unpredictable events of the Massacre. Further, I will show there is nothing else to suggest
that society at large was progressively affected by the conflict in the period leading up to the
Massacre. It was the Massacre that destroyed the legitimacy of the state and not the other
way around.
4.1.2 Events leading up to the Massacre
If the Massacre did suddenly change the socio-political order and with it the nature of the
conflict, we must be sure that the conflict or other political factors did not change before
the Massacre. To that end, firstly, I will discuss the internal political events leading up to
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Figure 4.2: Temporal Distribution of the Number of Districts Affected by Conflict
Notes: Each bar reports the total number of districts with more than five deaths in each six-month interval.
The dashed vertical line represents the Massacre, June 1st, 2001. Period 12 aggregates conflict outcomes for
the last seven-months after the Massacre (June - December 2001), while period 11 aggregates over the first
five-months before the Massacre (January - May 2001). All other periods on the horizontal axis represent
six-month intervals between 1996 and 2006. There were two cease-fires between the government and the
CPN-M during the period of conflict: first from August 3rd, 2001 to November 23rd, 2001 (spanning period
12), and second from January 29th, 2003 to August 26th, 2003 (spanning almost entire period 15). See also
Table 4.A.1.
Source: Author’s calculation using Joshi and Pyakurel (2015).
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the Massacre, and secondly, I will discuss the foreign perception of the country before the
Massacre. Given that there is no change in internal socio-political events or the perception of
internal events from the outside, it is safe to assume that the Massacre was an “accident”.
Despite the ongoing insurgency in certain parts of the country, there was political stability
in most other parts of the country. One way to see this is to look at the trends in general
elections that happened in the 1990s. Nepal had become a fresh democratic state in 1990
and held elections for the first time in 1991. In total, three general elections were held in
that decade. Table 4.2 reports the results from the election for members of the House of
Representatives. There are a total of 205 seats. Nepali Congress Party (NCP) won the
majority of seats in the 1991 and 1999 elections, while the centrist Communist Party of
Nepal (CPN-UML) had slightly more seats in the 1994 election. What is important to note
is that there is little change if any to suggest that the Maoist insurgency, which had started
in 1996, had any effect on the trends of the electoral process. The NCP and CPN-UML won
around eighty percent of the votes in all three elections; the number of votes cast had steadily
increased throughout the decade. There is little, if anything, to suggest what was to follow
starting the latter half of 2001.
Further evidence of internal stability comes from the macroeconomic aggregates. It is argued
that the weakening of the state economically could provide the opportunity for rebellion.
Figure 4.3 shows the trends in aggregates that show the economic health of the state. These
indicators include growth of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), government’s tax revenue,
government’s spending on the military, and revenue from two important sectors of Nepal’s
economy—international development aid and remittances. These indicators are available
from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators. There is little to predict the outcome
of the aftermath of the Massacre looking at the trends in these series before 2001. In fact,
the economy with a GDP growth averaging 5% seems to have had no impact of the ongoing
insurgency that had started in 1996.
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Table 4.2: House of Representative Election Results in the 1990s
Party Votes % of votes Seats % of seats
Panel A: 1991 Election
Nepali Congress 2,742,452 37.75 110 53.66
Communist Party of Nepal (UML) 2,040,102 27.98 69 33.66
Rashtriya Prajatantra Party (Chand) 478,604 6.56 3 1.46
Others 2,014,002 27.64 23 11.22
Total 7,275,160 99.93 205
Panel B: 1994 Election
Nepali Congress 2,545,287 33.38 83 40.49
Communist Party of Nepal (UML) 2,352,601 30.85 88 42.93
Rashtriya Prajatantra Party 1,367,148 17.93 20 9.76
Others 1,117,895 14.67 14 6.83
Total 7,382,931 205
Panel C: 1999 Election
Nepali Congress 3,214,068 37.29 111 54.15
Communist Party of Nepal (UML) 2,728,725 31.66 71 34.63
Rastriya Prajatantra Party (Thapa) 899,511 10.44 11 5.37
Others 1,776,592 20.6 12 5.86
Total 8,618,896 205
Abbreviations: UML - United Marxist-Leninist.
Notes: This table reports results from the elections for the House of Representatives in 1991, 1994, and 1999
in Nepal. The United Peoples’ Front, the party that contributed most to the members of the CPN-Maoists,
participated in the 1991 elections and won 9 out of 205 parliamentary seats.
Source: http://archive.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/2229_arc.htm.
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Figure 4.3: Trend in Economic Aggregates
Notes: The figure shows the trends in economic aggregates for the period of the Civil War. The dashed
horizontal line at 2001 represents the Massacre.
Source: World Development Indicators, World Bank.
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It is also important to see what the perception of the country was from the outside. One of
the criteria dubbed important for conflict is the autocratic tendency of a country—that is,
the more public participation in the political process in the nation (that is less autocratic
tendencies), the lower the probability for civil strife. The Center for Systemic Peace (CSP)
collects and compiles a dataset to measure such characteristics. This is available via the
Integrated Network for Societal Conflict Research (INSCR).7 Of particular interest is the polity
score index, which measures the “patterns of authority”. Polity score is a variable constructed
by assigning scores relevant for democratic and autocratic features of a nation. Among other
things, such features include participation in the election, press freedom, political power of
the executive.8 Polity score uses a twenty-point scale (ranging between +10 and -10) that
measures democratic (positive) or the autocratic (negative) tendency of the polity. A polity
with a score of +6 or above is considered democratic, with +10 considered as being “strongly
democratic”; on the other hand, a polity with a score of -6 and below is considered autocratic,
with -10 considered as being “strongly autocratic”.
Figure 4.4 shows the trend in the polity score for Nepal. It tracks the score from 1951 until
the end of the Civil War in Nepal. The dashed vertical line represents the Massacre. It is
interesting to note that before the Massacre, there is little to suggest a degression of the
polity.9 On the contrary, the 1990s show an improvement in the polity score. On the eve of
the Massacre, the country was very much a democracy judging by the polity score. As with
other internal political events, the measure of “autocratic tendency” of the state provides
little evidence for what was to follow. The sharp decline in the polity score in 2002 was
perhaps due to the dissolution of the parliament by the then King, Gyanendra, on October 4,
2002. The consequent jump in the score in 2006, likewise, corresponds with the restoration of
the parliament on May 19, 2006. The latter is most likely a response to the change in 2001.
7INSCR can be accessed here: http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscrdata.html.
8For a detailed description of the variable and the dataset, see: http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/
p5manualv2018.pdf.
9Here degression implies the movement towards autocracy and, hence, increased probability of civil strife.
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Figure 4.4: Trends in Polity Score, 1951-2006
Notes: Polity score uses a twenty-point scale (ranging between positive and negative 10) that measures
democratic (positive) or autocratic tendency of the polity. A polity with a score of above +6 is considered
democratic, with +10 considered as being “strongly democratic”; on the other hand, a polity with a score
below -6 is considered autocratic, with -10 considered as being “strongly autocratic”. Solid line reports the
score for Nepal. The dashed vertical line represents the Royal Massacre in 2001.
Source: Center for Systemic Peace: https://www.systemicpeace.org/polityproject.html.
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Another piece of corroborating evidence comes from The Worldwide Governance Indicators
(WGI) project (Kaufmann et al., 2010). The WGI provides six indices that proxy the
perception of governance for a particular country. The index is constructed by utilizing
surveys of the public, private enterprises, and non-government sectors. It also includes
the perceptions of experts worldwide. The six governance dimensions include Voice and
Accountability, Political Stability and the Absence of Violence/Terrorism, Government
Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law, and the Control of Corruption. Each of
these six indices is scaled for each country such that they range from -2.5 (worst) to +2.5
(best). The index can be used to compare the relative position of a country vis-à-vis other
countries in a particular year and the changes in the country’s relative position over time.
These indices are available for over 200 countries starting in 1996. For the period of interest,
these measures are available for Nepal for the years 1996, 1998, 2000, and 2002-2006.
Figure 4.5 shows the trends in these six indices for Nepal during the period of the Civil
War. The figure also provides a 95% confidence interval signifying the statistical uncertainty
around these estimates. It is interesting to note that only two indices—Voice and Account-
ability (labeled Accountability in Figure 4.5) and Political Stability and the Absence of
Violence/Terrorism (labeled Political violence in Figure 4.5)—declined in the period after the
2001 Massacre relative to before. All other indices show very little if any, negative change in
the country relative to other nations in the sample. While the increase in political violence
is not surprising, it is reassuring to know that Accountability (which I have referred to as
legitimacy) was the only governance indicator that significantly declined in the immediate
aftermath of the Massacre. One thing to note is that the WGI indicators are based on the
perception of the public and experts, and hence, they should be read with further behavioral
uncertainty in addition to the statistical uncertainty. Nevertheless, the WGI indices provide
us with additional evidence of a decline in the legitimacy of the government while there was
some stability around other governance measures.






























































































































































































































Figure 4.5: Trend in World Governance Indicators
Notes: The figure shows the trends in six World Governance Indicators with their 95% confidence interval for
the period of the Civil War. The dashed horizontal line at 2001 represents the Massacre. Each indicator
(Voice and Accountability, Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism, Government Effectiveness,
Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law, and Control of Corruption) is based on several hundred variables obtained
from 31 different data sources, capturing governance perceptions as reported by survey respondents, non-
governmental organizations, commercial business information providers, and public sector organizations
worldwide. For definitions of the indicators see Table ??.
Source: Worldwide Governance Indicators (Kaufmann et al., 2010).
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4.1.3 The Massacre: a unique accident?
As Fukuyama (2011) writes: “sometimes violence or the threat of violence is necessary to
break out of the equilibrium” (p. 45). However, in the Nepali context, the socio-political
equilibrium was dislodged before the incidence of mass violence. Indeed, the threat and
scale of violence sharply increased in the post-Massacre period. Although a “civil conflict”
was ongoing since 1996, it neither had much influence nor did it have mass support. It
had remained an isolated insurgency, but that dramatically changed immediately after the
break in the socio-political order. This sudden change in the socio-political structure can be
attributed to the Massacre of King Birendra and his family.
Following the events of the Massacre, the nature and impact of the conflict drastically changed.
While the conflict was responsible for 1,999 deaths in the five years leading up to the Massacre,
it was responsible for 12,983 deaths in the five years post Massacre. Moreover, the insurgency
in the pre-Massacre period was restricted to few remote mountainous districts in western
Nepal but touched all regions of the country post Massacre. There was nothing to suggest
that conflict would escalate in the manner it did. Even as late as 2001, the masses, especially
in the big cities, were somewhat indifferent to the insurgency that had been ongoing for the
past five years. For instance, in February 2001, only a few months before the Massacre, riots
broke out in Kathmandu Valley and other large cities around the country because an Indian
movie star had allegedly made derogatory remarks about Nepal. There seemed more space in
the public realm for events as trivial as these. Such events highlight the fact that not only
were the masses indifferent to the insurgency, there was also a sense of internal cohesion and
stability—a sense of nationality and oneness that inspired these reactions. Such sentiments
abruptly changed following the Massacre.
The death of Birendra and his family was completely unrelated to either national politics
or the insurgency. External factors—coups or foreign wars—were also not the issue. In
this sense, the Royal Massacre can be described as a “unique accident”. Not only was this
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event a unique accident, but one that had substantial consequences. The history of a two-
hundred-and-forty-year-old socio-political and economic structure hinged on it. Essentially,
the structure crumbled over a fateful dinner.
4.2 Conflict in the Absence of Legitimacy
4.2.1 Loss of legitimacy
Symbolism, among other things, has been very important for social revolutions. Consider
the fall of Bastille on July 14th, 1789. It was such an important event during the French
revolution that the French still today celebrated this day as the day the values of liberté,
egalité, and fraternité were confined upon them. It is said that when Louis XVI heard of the
incident he remarked to his advisor Duc de La Rochefoucauld Liancourt: “C’est une révolt”;
Liancourted, understanding the magnitude and untameable nature of the event, corrected
the King: “Non, Sire, c’est une révolution.”
When there are sudden and exogenous shocks to an institution, the ensuing impacts are
significant. Post Massacre Nepal was, to put it concisely, chaotic. The break in the two-
hundred-and-forty-year-old socio-political order was what caused this chaos. This event was
not only sudden and exogenous, but it was also a unique event in the country’s history.
The symbol of nationality, peace, and unity had under precarious circumstances ceased to
exist. As Hobsbawm (2010), explaining the impact of the fall of Bastille for the 1789 French
revolution writes: “In times of revolution nothing is more powerful than the fall of symbols”
(p.61). Such was the impact of the Massacre for Nepal. The killing of Birendra and his family
abruptly changed the structure of the old institution, which lowered legitimacy and state
capacity. This entailed the escalation of violence in the post-Massacre period.
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Legitimacy, which the government had before June 1st, 2001, collapsed overnight.10 This
loss of state capacity provides us with two views into the civil conflict in Nepal. The period
before June 1st, 2001, is a period of higher legitimacy, and with it a relatively higher state
capacity; whereas, the period after the Massacre is a period with little legitimacy and of a
relatively lower state capacity. Arguably coercive and steering capacities were also higher
in the pre-Massacre period relative to the post-Massacre period.11 It is almost impossible
to quantify this change in state capacity. However, given the reverence and divine status
of Birendra, the diametrical opposite public opinion of Gyanendra, and the circumstances
around Birendra’s (and his family’s) demise, we can be certain that the capacity of the state
drastically and abruptly lowered.
While there was a sudden change in the state capacity, everything else that could affect public
opinion remained unchanged. Unlike most civil conflicts that dampen economic activities,
Nepali economic growth had been consistently positive in the Civil War period. Macours
(2010) finds that the overall economy actually grew during the civil war period. This is in part
because Nepal is not dependent on large infrastructures, which have been guerrilla targets in
civil wars in various countries. Additionally, a large share of the revenue was derived from
western tourists who were relatively unscathed during the period of conflict. The year 1998,
for instance, was promoted as a “Visit Nepal” year to attract tourists. This was not an
attempt to nullify the negative impact on tourism due to the insurgency, but on the contrary,
due to the indifference of the politicians and bureaucrats towards the insurgency.12
10Similar to the loss of legitimacy and weakening of the state, Fearon and Laitin (2003) argue that coercive
capacities could be lost which could weaken state capacity and increase the probability of conflict onset.
Fearon (1998) refers to the newly independent states in Africa that suddenly lost the backing of former
imperial power as examples of such loss of state capacity and argues that the ensuing civil conflicts were
caused by this power vacuum.
11Tilly (1985) writes: “Legitimacy is the probability that other authorities will act to confirm the decisions
of a given authority. Other authorities . . . are much more likely to confirm the decisions of a challenged
authority that controls substantial force; not only fear of retaliations, but also desire to maintain a stable
environment recommend that general rule. The rule underscores the authority’s monopoly of force.” Arguably,
it is easier for a national symbol, as Birendra was, to deter violence relative to someone who has little credence.
If so, Birendra wielded both greater legitimacy and coercive powers than his successor Gyanendra.
12Furthermore, there was a genuine attempt on the parts of the leaders on both sides of the conflict not to
harm foreign nationals who were not directly involved in the war. Baburam Bhattarai, the second-in-command
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What was also peculiar to Nepal was the nature of the centralized state. Authoritarian
states in the modern context, such as Nepal, have “territorial coheren[ce] and unbroken area
with sharply defined frontiers, governed by a single sovereign authority and according to
a single fundamental system of administration”, while the Old Regimes of the past were
“patterned much more on the ‘estate’ ” (Hobsbawm, 2010, p.88). The central authority was
very much dependent on the lords of these estates for control. This in turn meant that,
with much less centralization, the lords had much more control over their territories. The
socio-political changes in such states are not entirely dependent on the central authority but
also the lordships. This was different in Nepal. The monarch was the focal point of the old
structure of the Nepali state. This makes the Massacre especially important for the loss of
state capacity.
4.2.2 Implications of the sudden loss of legitimacy
The Massacre provides us an ideal window to test the weak institution hypothesis. According
to this hypothesis, the probability of conflict increases when the capacity of the state decreases.
Unlike other conflicts, where the decrease in state capacity is highly correlated to the conflict
itself, in the Nepali context we have an “accident” that lowered the state capacity. Hence,
the change in conflict outcomes after the Massacre relative to before can be identified using
this shock. Since insurgency had begun in 1996, I test the relative increase in the magnitude
and scope of conflict due to exogenous negative shock to the state capacity. This, in essence,
is the first stage of the identification.
No matter the nature and magnitude of a shock, mass socio-political action is not possible
without motives. Economic backwardness and difficult geography are seen as the most
important factors influencing the incidence of insurgency (see Fearon, 1998; Collier and
of the Maoist, discussing a robbery of foreign tourist asserted: “[e]ven we were surprised by the media reports
. . . It is just impossible that our highly motivated and disciplined cadres would commit such heinous crimes
. . . be assured foreign tourists are completely safe in our areas, and will be so in future” (Tiwari, 2002).
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Hoeffler, 1998; Blattman and Miguel, 2010). The former creates a space for recruiting rebel
fighters, while the latter provides ideal physical cover for the rebels. Both played a role in
the incidence of the Maoist insurgency in the 1996-2001 period. However, these motives
explain little of the change post-2001 when the conflict escalated and was more pervasive.
Geography could not have changed in the period, nor was there an economic decline. On
the contrary, the economy had positive growth in this period. Moreover, there were similar
left-wing inspired revolutions in the 1960s in Nepal. These insurgencies were stamped out,
and the insurgents later joined mainstream politics. In those cases, there was the motive,
but they lacked the opportunity—not just any opportunity, but a sudden displacement of
legitimacy.
Fearon and Laitin (2003) assert that “[m]ost important for the prospects of a nascent insur-
gency . . . are the government’s police and military capabilities and the reach of government
institutions into rural areas” (emphasis in original text). Military capabilities and the reach
of the state did not decline in the period after 2001 in Nepal. Arguably, the government’s
reach increased with the deployment of the army and the building of new roads.
This leaves us with two possibilities for the increased violence: first, there were high economic
rewards, such as the discovery of oil fields or other natural resources, or second, there were
underlying grievances. It is safe to assert that Nepal is not blessed with the former. Even if
it was, it would be difficult to explain the collective action on only this account.
A way to view land constraints in Nepal is through a Malthusian framework. In a secular
Malthusian model, a rise in the supply of labor with an inability to increase agricultural
productivity will lead to a strain on the fixed resource. The socio-political structure in Nepal
allowed the rentier class to extract surplus rents from the peasants by increasing taxes, tallies,
and fines, above and beyond the taxes imposed by the state. This relationship further tilted in
favor of the landlords as the population of the peasants increased. In the decades 1960-2000,
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the population in the country increased more than twofold, from 10 million to 24 million.13
Demographic changes haven’t always brought about conflict, nor has it unambiguously
brought about social tensions. Inter-class friction concerning population pressures only
worked in particular instances in the late medieval and early modern societies of Europe.
Brenner (1976) argues that secular increases in population in the thirteenth century did in
fact decrease freedom of the peasantry in England and parts of France (Vermandois, Laonnais,
Burgundy). The supply of labor increased and with it the power of the landlord to subject
the peasants to restrictive laws. In other parts of France (Normandy, Picardy) with similar
population pressures, however, there were little changes “to the long-term trends which
had resulted in the previous disappearance of serfdom.” The key to understanding these
contrasting developments is, Brenner argues, by viewing the secular changes in the population
through the lens of pre-existing “character of the landlord-peasant class relations.” In areas
with extractive class relations, population changes reinforced this relationship, whereas, in
areas with more freedom for the peasants, population changes had little impact.
In Nepal, with the fall of the Rana regime in the early 1950s, the semi-feudal structure of
revenue collection through intermediaries by the state was abolished. This ushered in uniform
land tenure, in particular privatization of property, throughout the kingdom. Privatization
led to two separate outcomes in the post-1950 period: first, it was sufficient, from the
state’s point-of-view, to simply change the system of revenue collection without changing the
pre-existing property relationship between the landlords and the peasants (some land tenure
in the Rana period were tax-exempt, unifying the taxation system meant higher revenues
for the state through an increase in the tax base); and second, privatization led to increased
autonomous control for the landlord over their lands, essentially giving them legal power over
the peasants.14
13Source: https://populationstat.com/nepal/.
14Despite land reform being the central political factor in the post-1950 period, little actual reform was done
(Regmi, 1976). The system of jagir and pajani, which were abolished post-1950, had limited arbitrary power
of the landlord vis-à-vis their tillers. These systems are discussed in detail in Chapter 3 of this dissertation.
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The unequal distribution of land was legitimized by the old state through the monarch. This
highly unequal distribution fostered grievances. In the presence of a legitimate state, it is
not certain that these grievances would come to the fore, at least not in the manner it did.
However, when there is an abrupt breakdown of the state order, such as due to the Massacre,
we should expect to observe increased conflict in regions that had a more unequal distribution
of land. I address this issue empirically in Chapter 6.
4.3 Possible Sources of Endogeneity of the Identifying
Assumption
Despite the official account blaming the Massacre on the Crown Prince, there are, conceivably,
alternate hypotheses that could be problematic for the identifying assumption. These
conspiracy theories either put the blame on the new king, Gyanendra (Birendra’s brother),
or foreign intelligence agencies such as the Central Intelligence Agency in the U.S. and the
Research and Analysis Wing in India. There are reasons why alternate theories potentially
make sense. First, the fact that only Gyanendra and his immediate family survived the
Massacre, raises some red flags.15 Second, the use of the army against the Maoists was
becoming a contentious issue. The army was not immediately used to suppress the rebellion
until a state-of-emergency was declared at the end of 2001. There were political squabbles,
between the Prime Minister and the Commander-in-Chief of the army, two of whom together
made up the Security Council, about the deployment of the army against the Maoists. The
latter held the opinion that there needed to be “consensus” among all the political parties
for the army’s deployment. More importantly, the de facto power regarding the deployment
of the army laid with Birendra, and he was reluctant to use it against his own people
15Gyanendra was away during the fateful family gathering; Gyanendra’s son, according to some anecdotes
(including his own), heroically, saved some of the other extended family members; and Gyanendra’s wife was
shot but recovered. Some other members of the extended family also survived the event.
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(Whelpton, 2005). Bhusal (2003) discussing the events of a security council meeting in May
2001 between the aforementioned two leaders writes: “Is the army under the government’s
control? Certainly not. Shouldn’t it be?” Then referring to the 1991 constitutional change
that should have given the democratic government control of the army, but did not, he
remarks: “[w]e are asking that question a decade too late.”
Most of these speculations, however, were a direct result of the Maoists using the Royal
Massacre as political capital. In a letter published days after the Massacre by a national daily,
the Maoists claimed that “we can now say that we—NCP(Maoist) [Nepal Communist Party]
and King Birendra—had similar views on many national issues and this had created in fact an
informal alliance between us” (Bhattarai, 2001). The use of this incident as political capital
was unfortunate, but not uncommon. Perhaps the propaganda further helped undermine the
legitimacy of the state in the post-Massacre period.
What is important for the identification here is that the conspiracy theories themselves were
far fetched. As Whelpton (2005) writes: “suspicions were naturally . . . almost certainly
unfounded. First, there was no solid evidence to back them up, and secondly many of the
reasons for doubting the official version were also even stronger reason for doubting any of
the conspiracy theories” (p.216).
Another potential driver of higher conflict levels in the post-Massacre period, relative to
the pre-Massacre period, could be the changing military dynamics of the rebels rather than
the loss of state capacity. This could certainly be problematic for identification. Indeed,
Mao described phases of guerrilla war as strategic defensive, strategic balance, and strategic
offensive. Maoist guerrillas in Nepal claimed in 2001, before the Massacre, that they were
moving from a strategic defensive phase to a strategic balance phase (Bray et al., 2003).
They had created the People’s Liberation Army in 2000. Their increased military campaign
would certainly impact the intensity of the conflict in the post-Massacre period. If indeed
this was the case, which is difficult to capture ex-post, the Massacre of Birendra and his
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family likely helped the Maoists’ cause. Their efforts for increased military offensive would
surely have been much difficult otherwise if it would have happened at all. Furthermore, the
focus in the increase in the Maoists’ military capacity seemed to be the “foreign invasionary
forces”—referring to the Indian military—and the perceived imminent invasion by India
(Onesto, 2003). The vociferous claims by Maoist leaders of “foreign invasionary forces” must
have certainly aided their recruitment efforts. Perhaps recruitment was the main objective
of their claim of an Indian invasion. In any case, there are inconsistencies in their claims of
both working with the monarch and preparing a military to fight against him. Hence, the
accuracy of any of their political statements during the insurgency cannot be taken as fact.
To account for some of these effects due to changes in military strategies, I compare the
Naxalite related conflict outcomes in India to Maoist related conflict outcomes in Nepal.16
Considering the similarities in the agendas, funding, and cooperation between the two rebel
groups in the two countries, a relative comparison between the two groups might help net
out the effect of evolving military tactics and other immeasurable time dynamics. This is
discussed empirically in Chapter 5.
4.4 Conclusion
Although “[a]n excessively unequal model of development cannot coexist with political
stability” (Milanovic, 2010), a spark—internal or external—seems necessary for societies to
break out of this unequal socio-political “equilibrium”. In the absence of an opportunity for
mass rebellion, an unequal society in Nepal did exist for two-hundred-and-forty years. The
key to this internal stability was the legitimacy of the monarch.17 The monarchs were seen
16Naxalites refer to broad communist groups fighting against the Indian state. The violence started from a
village called Naxalbari in West Bengal giving its’ name. Similar to the Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist,
the Naxalites in certain states of India have been fighting for a proletariat state, and in particular, land rights
for the landless (Iyer, 2009). These groups are discussed in detail in Chapter 5.
17While the monarch, aided by religion, provided legitimacy for the stable socio-political structure in Nepal,
there have been cases elsewhere, both in the past and in the present, where coercive capacity has been used
for similar socio-political stability.
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as a symbol of nationality, peace, and unity. They were seen as the divine objects of order
and justice. The socio-political structure itself was built around them. This idea ensured
political stability despite a highly unequal society. But all this changed in the 2000s as Nepal
went through a devastating civil war.
The Royal Massacre was a unique exogenous accident unrelated to any internal or external
political events. This led to a collapse of the old and stable socio-political structure, which
de-legitimized the state. The underlying motive for conflict—the unequal distribution of
land—was already present, but it was subdued due to the legitimacy of the monarch. In the
absence of legitimacy, we see an increase in the both the volume and pervasiveness of conflict
incidents. In what follows, I empirically test the hypothesis that conflict outcomes increased
in the immediate aftermath of the Massacre.
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Appendix
4.A Tables
Table 4.A.1: Number of Districts Affected by Conflict per Six-Month Inverval
Number of districts with conflict related deaths
Periods at least 1 death more than 5 deaths more than 10 deaths more than 20 deaths more than 30 deaths
1 12 2 2 1 1
2 10 2 1 1 1
3 13 2 2 0 1
4 19 3 2 0 1
5 25 8 4 1 1
6 34 14 8 5 4
7 38 14 9 4 4
8 33 7 5 2 3
9 37 13 9 4 4
10 44 10 3 1 2
11 48 11 7 3 3
12 69 35 18 12 7
13 72 61 48 32 21
14 73 62 52 25 17
15 71 35 14 5 2
16 71 65 54 36 14
17 72 62 53 29 17
18 71 64 49 17 11
19 72 55 39 22 15
20 70 28 11 1 2
21 68 34 20 13 6
22 34 1 0 0 1
Notes: Each entry represents the total number of districts with the noted number of deaths for each six-month
interval. See also Figure 4.2.
Source: Author’s calculation using Joshi and Pyakurel (2015).
Chapter 5
Loss of Legitimacy and the
Opportunity for Conflict: An
Empirical Analysis
In what follows, I test the hypothesis that legitimacy is crucial for national stability. Civil
conflicts can potentially be avoided if the public has trust in their government. To this end, I
will use the difference-in-differences framework to control for any secular time trend in the
Maoist-led conflict outcomes in Nepal using communist-related conflict outcomes in India. In
so doing, I find that the Royal Massacre increased conflict-related deaths in Nepal by over
200 percent in the first year after the Massacre, and, on average, by over 600 percent annually
in the post-Massacre period.
Communist related conflict in India started in the 1960s from an area known as Naxalbari.
Since then, these insurgencies in India are broadly referred to as the Naxalite insurgency.
The Naxalite conflict mainly affect the eastern part of India (see Figure 5.B.1). The Naxalite
insurgency in India acts as a good counterfactual for the CPN-M conflict in Nepal due to the
ideological similarities between the two movements. As with the CPN-M conflict in Nepal,
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the Naxalites have been fighting for a proletariat state, and in particular, land rights for the
landless (Iyer, 2009). Besides, CPN-M and the Indian communist groups have coordinated
at the financial and the ideological space (Onesto, 2003). Most of the CPN-M leaders have
had extended involvement in politics, including schooling, in India. Furthermore, given the
geographic proximity to India, the political processes and changes in Nepal have traditionally
followed the events in India. Given the historical influence India has had in Nepali politics
and society, and the close ideological motivation between the two communist-led conflicts,
it is not far-fetched to imagine that the conflict outcomes in the CPN-M insurgency would
have been any different from what was observed in the Naxalite insurgency in India.
5.1 Data and Variables
In the previous chapter, we noted a spike in conflict outcomes in the immediate aftermath of
the Massacre. Despite the observed increases in conflict outcomes immediately following the
Massacre, we cannot parse out these changes from secular time changes, or for that matter
changes due to military tactics of either the rebels or the government forces. The latter
could very well have been a response to the loss of legitimacy; the former, however, can be
controlled for. To that end, I compare the communist-related insurgency in India to that in
Nepal. For this purpose, I use the PRIO Battle Deaths Dataset, v3.1 (Lacina and Gleditsch,
2005) (henceforth PRIO).1 PRIO reports conflict-related deaths, which includes both the
number of soldiers and civilians killed in combat, in state-based armed conflicts for the period
1946-2008. I use annual data on communist related conflict deaths for the period 1996-2006
for intra-state conflicts in Nepal and India. In particular, I use deaths associated with the
CPN-M (Maoists) insurgency in Nepal and use conflict-related deaths due to four communists
groups—Naxalites, Communist Party of India - Maoists (CPI-M), Maoist Communist Center
1PRIO Battle Deaths Data can be accessed here: https://www.prio.org/Data/Armed-Conflict/Battle-
Deaths/.
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of India (MCC), and Peoples War Group (PWG)—in India. They are broadly referred to as
Naxalites in this study.2
PRIO uses several sources to report a high, best, and low estimate of the total number of
annual deaths related to the conflict. Table 5.1 reports these annual death estimates. For the
period of interest, PRIO’s best estimate of the total number of deaths in Nepal is 12,129,
which is 1,067 deaths fewer than the total deaths reported in Joshi and Pyakurel (2015)
dataset (JP2015 henceforth) (see column (1) of Table 5.A.1).3 PRIO’s high estimate of total
deaths in the 1996-2006 period is 14,169 and their low estimate is 8,502. There are a total
of 13,984 deaths and disappearances reported in JP2015, which is 185 deaths fewer than
that what is reported as a high estimate in PRIO. The annual high death estimates in PRIO
mostly match the estimates in the JP2015 dataset. For this reason, I have used the high
estimate in PRIO as the preferred estimate. Nevertheless, most of the main results are also
available for the best and low estimates. Using the best estimate doesn’t significantly alter
the findings.
For the 1996-2006 period, the total number of deaths attributed to the Naxalite conflict
in India ranges between 1,376 (low estimate) to 6,315 (high estimate). For the Naxalite
conflict, the only discrepancy between the best estimate and the high estimate is 10 deaths
in 2006, while the discrepancy between the best and high estimates in Nepal for the entire
1996-2006 period is 2,040 deaths. Most of this discrepancy in the Nepali data is in the early
part of the conflict decade. Since PRIO is based on conflict deaths reported in the media,
the discrepancy between the best and high estimate in Nepal in the first few years of the
conflict suggests the lack of interest, and thus reporting, in the conflict in Nepal.
2There is no other communist-group-related violence reported for India in PRIO. These four communist
groups are active in the eastern, central, and southern states of India. These groups in India area of
Naxalite-Maoist insurgency in India is also known as the Red Corridor. See also Figure 5.B.1.
3Details of the JP2015 are discussed in Chapter 6 where it is used for a more geographically disaggregated
study.
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Table 5.1: PRIO Total Annual Death Estimates
Indian Naxalites Nepali Maoists
Year Low Estimate Best Estimate High Estimate Low Estimate Best Estimate High Estimate
1996 138 442 442 44 100 196
1997 43 425 425 40 100 196
1998 25 667 667 118 250 302
1999 125 594 594 150 159 309
2000 50 548 548 175 260 287
2001 100 432 432 380 429 1051
2002 100 482 482 2780 3947 4896
2003 99 515 515 1800 2105 2105
2004 71 566 566 1431 2451 2451
2005 199 892 892 1104 1848 1848
2006 426 742 752 480 480 528
Notes: This table reports the total annual death estimates from PRIO database. Indian Naxalites includes
conflict related deaths due to: Naxalites, Communist Party of India - Maoists (CPI-M), Maoist Communist
Center of India (MCC), and Peoples War Group (PWG). Nepali Maoists reports conflict related death
estimates attributed to Communist Party of Nepal - Maoist (CPN-M).
Source: PRIO Battle Deaths Dataset, v3.1 (Lacina and Gleditsch, 2005).
5.2 Methodology
To test the hypothesis that a negative shock to legitimacy increased conflict, we use a
comparative study to parse out the changes in communist related conflict trends in Nepal
relative to the trends in communist related conflict in India. To that end, we use a difference-
in-differences (DD) framework to estimate the causal relationship between (loss of) legitimacy
and conflict.4 The identification comes from the fact that Nepal experienced a loss of
legitimacy while India did not. The DD regression specification is as follows:
ln(Ygt) = δ (T×G) + βT+ αG+ γY eart + εgt (5.1)
where Ygt is the aggregate conflict deaths for each group g ∈ {CPN −M,Naxalites} in
year t ∈ [1996, 2006]. G is a group-dummy variable which equals one if Nepal and zero if
India and T is a treatment-dummy variable with T = 1 if t ≥ 2001 and zero otherwise. The
4See Angrist and Pischke (2008) for further detail on the difference-in-differences framework.
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coefficient of interest, δ, captures the difference in the level of violence in the post-Massacre
period in Nepal relative to its own period before the Massacre, and relative to the Naxalite
conflict-related deaths in India.
For a consistent DD estimate, we need the PRIO series in the two countries to follow a
“parallel” trend before the “intervention.” This implies that in the absence of the Massacre
the PRIO series for deaths due to CPN-M and deaths due to Naxalite would not deviate
from each other’s pre-Massacre trends.
Figure 5.1 reports the annual trends in deaths in panel A, and the log trends in panel B,
for Maoist related deaths in Nepal and Naxalite related deaths in India for the period 1996
to 2006. The figure uses the high estimate of death counts reported in the PRIO database
(trends using PRIO’s best estimate is reported in Figure 5.B.2). Note that the trends in
deaths due to both conflicts in the 1996-2000 period are relatively parallel. Additionally,
in the period before the Massacre, Naxalite related conflict deaths are higher than CPN-M
related conflict deaths. However, CPN-M conflict-related deaths escalated beginning in
2001, while Naxalite related conflict deaths stayed fairly stable. Post Massacre, CPN-M
conflict-related deaths far surpassed those deaths related to the Naxalite conflict and stayed
at this higher-level until the end of the CPN-M conflict in 2006.
Pre-2001, there were on average 302 more annual deaths due to Naxalite insurgency compared
to CPN-M insurgency, while post-2001, there were on average 1,527 more annual deaths due to
CPN-M conflict. The average difference of deaths between the two insurgent groups over the
two periods (before and after the Massacre) suggests an increase of over 1,829 annual deaths
in Nepal in the aftermath of the Massacre compared to before. This represents a six-fold
increase in conflict-related deaths in Nepal. It is probable that had the Royal Massacre not
happened in Nepal, conflict outcomes in the post-2001 period in Nepal would not have been
much different from the trends in conflict-related deaths in India. Considering that both
conflicts were peasant uprisings, mostly directed against the landed elite, geographically
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isolated within each country, and the mutual relation between the two governments and the
two militant communist factions in the two countries, it is safe to assume that any foreign
influence would have affected both conflicts similarly. What transpired in Nepal seems to be
entirely driven by the unique events within the country. The sudden and drastic increase
in conflict and the absence of foreign intervention suggests that the Royal Massacre played
a major role in changing the nature of the conflict. The Massacre at the very least almost
instantaneously transformed a geographically limited insurgency into a full-fledged civil war
in Nepal.
5.3 Results
A DD estimate can be calculated using the specification outlined in equation (5.1). Table 5.2
reports results using the high estimate of total deaths in panel A, best estimate in panel B,
and low estimate in panel C. Columns (1)-(3) report DD estimates with no controls, and
columns (4)-(6) add year fixed-effects. Since PRIO only reports annual estimates of death,
we are unable to separate the pre and post-Massacre period within 2001. Hence, column
(7) reports estimates with 2001 weighted by the share of months "exposed to treatment"
after the Massacre. That is, while 2002-2006 use a treatment weight equal to 1, 2001 uses a
weight equal to 712 . Further, column (8) reports estimates on a sample that excludes 2001 all
together. In this latter sample, 2002 is the first period after the Massacre, while 2000 is the
last period before the Massacre.5
Whereas having more than one time dimension improves inference over a simple two-group-
two-period model in a classical DD framework, the use of time dimension does bring up
another problem—that of serial correlation. Bertrand et al. (2004) note that the use of time
dimension makes the standard errors downward biased if the errors in the equation (5.1)
5A more granular temporal study is possible using the Joshi and Pyakurel (2015) dataset. However, this
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Panel B: Log of Total Deaths
Figure 5.1: Annual Trends in Conflict Related Deaths
Notes: Panel A reports the trends in PRIO’s high estimate of the total number of annual deaths due to Maoist
related incidents in Nepal and Naxalite related incidents in India. Panel B reports the logged series of the
same. Indian Naxalite groups used to calculate total deaths in India are Communist Party of India—Naxalites,
Maoist (CPI-M), the MCC, and Peoples War Group (PWG).
Source: See Table 5.1.
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are serially correlated. The preferred method for Bertrand et al. (2004) when working with
a small number of groups is to collapse the data into two time periods—before and after
treatment, and to run regression (5.1) using this collapsed dataset. With only two groups,
however, there are not enough degrees of freedom for inference using this specification. Thus,
columns (2), (3), (5), and (6) report standard errors corrected for auto-correlation using
Newey and West (1987) type standard errors.
Using the full sample, I find that the annual deaths increased by between 1.7 log points to 2.1
log points. The increase is the least using the low estimate of PRIO and most using the best
estimate. Using the preferred estimate (that is the high estimate in PRIO), I find that the
annual deaths increased by 1.8 log points in the period after the Massacre relative to before.
This translates to a 6.1 fold increase in the number of annual deaths in the post-Massacre
period. The estimated effect size of 6.1 is calculated using the regression coefficient as follows:
{
























= e1.812 ≈ 6.123.
Controlling for the year fixed-effects and auto-correlation does not significantly change the
precision of the estimates. For instance, adding these controls increases the standard errors
from 0.360 in column (1) to 0.401 (5) for the preferred estimate.
A sample that gives partial weight to 2001 does not change the results. In fact, the estimates
here are slightly larger. For instance, the estimated impact of the Massacre using PRIO’s
high estimate is 1.81 using the unadjusted 2001, while it is 1.87 using the 712 weight for 2001.
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Similarly, excluding 2001 increases the range of annual deaths to between 1.86 and 2.5 log
points with the preferred estimate of 1.85 log points (or 6.4 fold increase).
All estimates in Table 5.2 are significant at least at the 5% level. The preferred estimate for
the full sample suggests that, in the post-Massacre period in Nepal, Maoist related deaths
increased by 612 percent over the pre-Massacre deaths in Nepal and relative to the Naxalites
conflict-related deaths in India. The restrictive sample suggests that the increase in the
post-Massacre period could be as high as 635 percent. To make this estimate more relevant,
consider that a 612 percent increase suggests that the annual conflict deaths, which was on
average 258 before the Massacre, increased to 1,580 after it. This is a significant increase in
the number of people who died in the aftermath of the Massacre. Another way to say this is
that in the absence of the Massacre, we would expect on average 1,200 fewer deaths every
year.
5.4 Robustness Checks
Moulton et al. (1990) shows that the standard error of the DD coefficient has a large downward
bias when there is a correlation between individuals within a group (commonly referred to as
within-group clusters). These within-group correlations are especially problematic when there
are a small number of groups, as is the case here with just two groups in the DD regression.
This can be problematic for inference as it significantly lowers the standard errors and in turn,
increases the size of the t-statistics. A standard way to account for the within-group clusters
is to structure the error term in equation (5.1) with group-level clusters. The regression
model here does not have enough degrees of freedom to follow this approach.
Donald and Lang (2007) propose a different approach. Using their framework, we can modify
equation (5.1) into the following three specifications to correct for the within group clusters.
The first specification, DL1, takes the difference of the outcome variable between the two
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Table 5.2: Effect of Loss of Legitimacy on Conflict Related Deaths
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
wt 2001 w/o 2001
Panel A: High Estimate
δ̂ High 1.812*** 1.812*** 1.812*** 1.812*** 1.812*** 1.812*** 1.866*** 1.849***
(0.360) (0.366) (0.337) (0.370) (0.401) (0.375) (0.436) (0.447)
Effect Size 6.123 6.123 6.123 6.123 6.123 6.123 6.462 6.353
R-squared 0.740 0.857 0.849 0.854
Panel B: Best Estimate
δ̂ Best 2.073*** 2.073*** 2.073*** 2.073*** 2.073*** 2.073*** 2.246*** 2.249***
(0.453) (0.460) (0.408) (0.422) (0.437) (0.360) (0.443) (0.454)
Effect Size 7.949 7.949 7.949 7.949 7.949 7.949 9.450 9.478
R-squared 0.699 0.863 0.888 0.888
Panel C: Low Estimate
δ̂ Low 1.712** 1.712** 1.712*** 1.712** 1.712** 1.712** 1.855** 1.858**
(0.612) (0.642) (0.548) (0.698) (0.739) (0.630) (0.751) (0.764)
Effect Size 5.540 5.540 5.540 5.540 5.540 5.540 6.392 6.411
R-squared 0.749 0.833 0.842 0.838
N 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 20
Year FE x x x x x
NW lags (1) (3) (1) (3)
Standard errors in parenthesis; *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01
Notes: This table reports the DD estimate, δ̂DD, from regression equation (5.1). Panel A uses high estimate of
death from PRIO, Panel B uses best estimate, and Panel C uses low estimate. Columns (1)-(6) uses 2001-2006
are the treatment years; column (7), adjusts 2001 as 712 treated; and column (8) drops 2001 altogether.
Standard errors in columns (1), (4), (7) and (8) are heteroskedasticity consistent; the other columns account
for serial correlation using Newey-West type standard errors with 1-year and 3-year lags. Effect Size is
calculated from δ̂DD as follows:
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= e1.812 ≈ 6.123.
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groups in each period, that is ∆(ln yt) = ln(YCP N−M,t) − ln(YNaxalite,t). We then run a
regression of this difference in outcomes on a time dummy, T. As with the regular DD in
equation (5.1), T = 1 if t ≥ 2001 or zero otherwise. Here, we assume that the population
distribution of the differences in the outcomes are independent and identically distributed
(iid) normal. DL1 can be specified as follows:
∆(ln yt) = α + δDL1 Tt + νt. (5.2)
In the second specification, DL2, we further difference the series of first differences, from DL1,




.6 We then run a regression of
this group-and-time differenced outcome on an indicator which equals one if it is the first
period after the intervention and zero otherwise. This specification also captures the jump
in conflict outcomes in the post-Massacre period relative to the trend before the Massacre.
Moreover, DL2 allows us to assume iid without the need for normality assumption. DL2 can




= α + δDL2 I(t = 2001) + ηt (5.3)
where I(t = 2001) = 1 if t = 2001 or zero otherwise.
It is important to keep in mind that whereas DL1 utilizes all the periods in the post-
Massacre to capture the average treatment effect, DL2 utilizes only the first period after the
Massacre to captures the treatment effect. Hence, δDL2 is more susceptible to the noise in
the pre-treatment trends.
Furthermore, if the trends in deaths between the two conflicts are the same in the pre-
treatment period, then we should expect the intercept in DL2 to be zero. Hence, we add
6The first difference of equation (5.2) over time is actually similar to equation (5.3) with additional




= δ(Tt −Tt−1) + (νgt − νg,t−1).
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a third specification which modifies equation (5.3) by excluding the intercept. This third
regression specification is referred to as DL3.
Table 5.3 reports the estimates and standard errors from the above mentioned specifications.
Columns (1) and (2) of this table report the estimate, δ̂DL1, from regression equation (5.2);
columns (3) and (4) report the estimates, δ̂DL2, from equation (5.3); and column (5) reports
estimate from the DL3 specification. Further, as before, standard errors in columns (2) and
(4) account for serial-correlation with the Newey-West strategy. As in Table 5.2, Table 5.3
reports estimates using all measures from PRIO: high, best, and low death counts in panels
A, B, and C respectively.
The estimates and standard errors for the DL1 regression in columns (1) and (2) are the
same as in columns (4) and (5) of Table 5.2. This is not surprising as both methods are a
variation of the traditional difference-in-differences framework and both utilize all the data
available after the Massacre. Whereas the 6.1 fold increase reported in those columns for
PRIO’s preferred estimate captures the average annual increase in deaths in the entire period
after the Massacre, the estimates presented in columns (3) - (5) capture the increase in deaths
using only the first period immediately following the Massacre. This increase for PRIO’s
preferred estimate using the DL2 methodology is 5.2 fold and using the DL3 methodology
is 4.6 fold. It is interesting to note that with just 7 months of treatment in 2001, which
included a 3-month-long cease-fire, both DL2 and DL3 estimates using the PRIO’s high
death count is significant at the 10% level. Moreover, the effect sizes are not very different
from the average effect reported in columns (1) and (2) of the same table.
If we use PRIO’s best estimate combined with the full sample (that is DL1), the increase in
the number of deaths in the post-Massacre period is 7.9 fold. If instead we use the only the
first period after the Massacre (that is DL2), the impact of the Massacre is a 2.0 fold increase
in deaths. Using PRIO’s best estimate and employing the DL2 methodology does lower
the effect size from 5.2 fold to 2.0 fold compared to using PRIO’s high estimate. However,
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using the best estimate increases the average annual effect from 6.1 fold (using PRIO’s high
estimate) to 8.0 fold (see columns (1) and (2)) if we use all the available data.
The increase in deaths in Nepal due to CPN-M insurgency using only the first period after
the Massacre combined with the low estimate is not different from the changes in deaths
due to communist insurgency in India. Additionally, these estimates are not statistically
significant. This is perhaps due to a greater amount of measurement error in PRIO’s low
estimate combined with only a single period of post-Massacre data used in the DL2 and
DL3 methodology. Using all the available data after the Massacre, the average annual effect
using PRIO’s low estimate (in columns (1) and (2)) is significantly different than zero and
the estimates suggest a 5.5 fold increase in average annual deaths.
It seems likely that the CPN-M related deaths in Nepal increased by at least 2.0 fold after
the Massacre relative to the period before the Massacre and controlling for the trends in
Naxalite related conflict deaths in India. Likewise, if we utilize all the available data in the
post-Massacre period, average annual deaths in Nepal increased by over 6.1 fold due to the
Massacre.
Figure 5.2 compares the relative effect sizes using some of the specifications described above.
In particular, it reports the estimates with a 95% confidence interval for the DD regression
from column (4) of Table 5.2, and the DL2 regression reported in column (3) of Table 5.3.
The former estimate uses all the data available in the post-Massacre period, while the latter
estimate uses information from only the first year after the Massacre. An effect size equal
to 1 implies that the change in conflict-related deaths from pre to post Massacre in Nepal
is equal to the change in conflict deaths in the same period in India. An effect size that is
greater than 1, implies that the difference in conflict deaths over the two periods in Nepal
is higher (by as many folds) compared to the deaths in India. For instance, using the high
estimate, we see an effect size of 6.1 for the DD estimate (implying an average of 6.1 fold
higher annual conflict deaths in Nepal) and 5.2 for the DL2 estimate (implying a 5.2 fold
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Table 5.3: Estimates using Alternate Specifications
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
DL1 DL1 DL2 DL2 DL3
Panel A: High Estimate
δ̂ High 1.812*** 1.812*** 1.655*** 1.655*** 1.536*
(0.370) (0.401) (0.263) (0.238) (0.716)
Effect Size 6.123 6.123 5.233 5.233 4.646
R-squared 0.69 0.355 0.338
Panel B: Best Estimate
δ̂ Best 2.073*** 2.073*** 0.704* 0.704* 0.739
(0.422) (0.437) (0.340) (0.317) (0.913)
Effect Size 7.949 7.949 2.022 2.022 2.094
R-squared 0.698 0.056 0.068
Panel C: Low Estimate
δ̂ Low 1.712** 1.712** -0.049 -0.049 0.082
(0.698) (0.739) (0.481) (0.469) (1.298)
Effect Size 5.540 5.540 0.961 0.961 1.085
R-squared 0.394 0.000 0.000
N 11 11 10 10 10
NW lags (1) (1)
Standard errors in parenthesis; *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01
Notes: Columns (1) and (2) of this table report estimates for δ from equation (5.2); columns (3) and (4)
report estimates for δ from equation (5.3); and column (5) reports estimates from regression specification
DL3. Panel A uses high estimate of death from PRIO, panel B uses best estimate, and panel C uses low
estimate. Columns (2) and (4) account for serial correlation using Newey-West type standard errors with
1-year lags. See Table 5.2 for the calculation of effect size.
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increase in conflict deaths after the Massacre in Nepal). Besides the estimated effect for the
low death count in PRIO, which had no explanatory power in the regression (the R2 of this
regression is close to zero), all other specifications indicate an increased and significant effect
on conflict-related deaths in the post-Massacre period in Nepal. As expected, the average
annual effect for the entire post-Massacre period is larger than the effect that utilizes only the
first period after the Massacre. Note also that the first period after the Massacre only had 7
months of conflict with a 3-month-long cease-fire while the control years all have 12 months.
Figure 5.2: Estimated Effect of Loss of Legitimacy, with 95% Confidence Interval
Notes: This figure reports the estimated effect size with a 95% confidence interval using high, best, and
low deaths reported in the PRIO database. For each PRIO death measure, the figures reports the DD
regression estimate with time fixed-effect, presented in column (4) of Table 5.2; and the DL regression
estimate, presented in column (3) in Table 5.3. While the DD estimates report the effect of the Massacre on
the entire post-Massacre period, the DL estimates report the effect on the first year after the Massacre. See
Table 5.2 for the calculation of effect size.
Source: Tables 5.2 and 5.3.
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Whereas the difference-in-differences estimates above capture the effect of the decline in the
capacity of the state due to the Massacre, we can also test for the null effect in the years
where the legitimacy did not change. Using a similar difference-in-differences methodology,
we should expect to find no effect on conflict-related deaths in the years before the Massacre.
To that end, Figure 5.3 reports the DD estimates calculated for each year treating ‘as-if’ there
was a massacre in the prior year. The estimate of each year is calculated using a regression
similar to that in equation (5.3) with the time indicator, I, equal to one in the first year
after the placebo massacres. The estimates report the difference (or the jump) in conflict
deaths across the two groups before and after these placebo massacres. For instance, the
estimate for the 1997 placebo effect uses 1996 as the control year. The figure also reports a
95% confidence interval for all the estimates.
The effect for 2001 in Figure 5.3 is equivalent to that reported in column (5) panel A of Table
5.3. This is the actual effect of the Massacre on conflict deaths in 2001 relative to 2000. It
reports a 4.6 fold increase in conflict outcomes in 2001 compared to 2000. What is interesting
to note is that in all the placebo years prior to the actual Massacre, there is no effect that is
significantly different from zero at the 5% significance level. Indeed, it seems that conflict
did not change at all in the years leading up to 2001. All estimates for these years are equal
to 1 or close to it. This provides additional evidence towards the hypothesis that the loss of
legitimacy significantly changed the conflict outcomes in Nepal.
5.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have empirically established the importance of the legitimacy of the
government for civil conflicts. The potential for conflict in the pre-Massacre period was
suppressed by the presence of legitimate authority. The Royal Massacre removed this authority.
This sudden and drastic accident changed the course of what was an insurgency before the
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Figure 5.3: Comparison of Placebo Effects
Notes: This figure reports difference-in-differences estimates for each year as-if the treatment had occurred at
the end of the previous year. These estimates are differences of logged deaths across the two groups in each
year, and the consequent difference of these group-differences from the previous year. These estimates are
equivalent to the DL2 specification. For 2001, the estimate is the actual effect reported in column (5) panel
A of Table 5.3.
Source: Author’s calculation using PRIO Battle Deaths Dataset, v3.1 (Lacina and Gleditsch, 2005).
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Massacre into a full-fledged civil war in its aftermath. The absence of legitimacy provided
the opportunity for the escalation of the conflict. I find an immediate rise in conflict-related
deaths following the Massacre. CPN-M related conflict deaths in Nepal increased by at least
2.0 fold if one uses information only from the first period after the Massacre. Note that this
period had only seven months of conflict including a three-month-long cease-fire compared
to 12 months in the control period. This would imply that this effect using just the first
period after the Massacre is perhaps a lower bound. Considering the entire period after the
Massacre, conflict-related annual deaths increase by at least 6.1 fold. This means that while
annually 258 people lost their lives in the five-and-half years before the Massacre, 1580 people
did so annually in the aftermath of the Massacre. This is a significant rise in conflict-related
deaths.
This posits the question as to why conflict increased in the post-Massacre period. Do all
states that experience a sudden change (loss) of legitimacy or state capacity experience
increased conflict? Or, are motives necessary for conflict. In the next chapter, we test the
hypothesis that the underlying driver for the conflict in Nepal was the unequal distribution
of land. Given this, the escalation in conflict in the post-Massacre period should be more




Table 5.A.1: Annual Conflict Outcomes using Joshi and Pyakurel (2015)
Year Deaths Disappearances Injuries Total Incidents
1996 99 2 0 101
1997 95 6 2 103
1998 410 14 36 460
1999 485 16 54 555
2000 455 28 14 497
2001 887 68 73 1,028
2002 3,667 186 462 4,315
2003 1,943 121 177 2,241
2004 2,693 137 112 2,942
2005 1,790 110 46 1,946
2006 687 85 22 794
Total 13,211 773 998 14,982
Notes: This table reports the annual number of deaths, injuries, and missing people directly attributed to the
Maoist conflict in Nepal. Total incident is the sum of the three measures.
Source: Individual-Level Data on the Victims of Nepal’s Civil War, 1996-2006: A New Dataset (Joshi and
Pyakurel, 2015).
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5.B Figures
Figure 5.B.1: Naxalite Affected Districts in India, 2007
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Panel B: Log of Total Deaths
Figure 5.B.2: Trends in Conflict Related Annual Deaths using PRIO’s best estimate
Notes: Panel A reports the trends in the total number of annual deaths due to Maoist related incidents in
Nepal and Naxalite related incidents in India. Panel B reports the trends in the logged series of the same.
Indian Naxalite groups used to calculate total deaths in India are Communist Party of India—Naxalites,
Maoist (CPI-M), MCC, and Peoples War Group (PWG).
Source: Author’s calculation using best estimate from Table 5.1.
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Panel B: Log of Total Deaths
Figure 5.B.3: Trends in Conflict Related Annual Deaths using PRIO’s low estimate
Notes: Panel A reports the trends in the total number of annual deaths due to Maoist related incidents in
Nepal and Naxalite related incidents in India. Panel B reports the trends in the logged series of the same.
Indian Naxalite groups used to calculate total deaths in India are Communist Party of India—Naxalites,
Maoist (CPI-M), MCC, and Peoples War Group (PWG).
Source: Author’s calculation using low estimate from Table 5.1.
Chapter 6
Unequal Distribution and the Motive
for Conflict: An Empirical Analysis
The previous chapter discussed the effect of loss of legitimacy on conflict outcomes. In this
chapter, I test the motive for conflict within Nepal. While the former established the trigger
for the escalation of the conflict, the latter sheds some light on the root cause of the conflict.
If indeed, measurement issues such as suppressed levels of conflict had prevented us from
linking conflict motives to conflict outcomes in the period before the Massacre, then the
escalation of conflict in the aftermath of the Massacre provides us with an ideal vantage point
through which to potentially overcome this hurdle.
If unequal distribution of land was the reason for grievance, then we should be able to observe
this in the period when the conflict became widespread. The identification allows us to do
exactly this. In the pre-Massacre period, conflict was isolated and could not be related to the
motives. In the post-Massacre period, however, conflict was widespread and it can be linked
to the distribution of land. Since the legitimacy for the distribution of land was derived from
the legitimacy of the monarch, the loss of the latter eroded the former. Hence, we should
expect to see higher conflict in more unequal regions after the Royal Massacre.
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Furthermore, I test whether the other main correlate of conflict, that is the regional level
of income, is an important determinant of conflict in the post-Massacre period. If the level
of income is a determinant of the patterns of conflict, then the arguments for the effect of
land distribution on conflict will not be as strong. On the other hand, if income levels do
not explain conflict and inequality does, then we have stronger support for the distributional
hypothesis.
6.1 Data and Variables
I use Individual-Level Data on the Victims of Nepal’s Civil War, 1996-2006: A New Dataset
(Joshi and Pyakurel, 2015) to calculate conflict outcomes (JP2015 henceforth). JP2015 records
incidents by district (the second administrative tier in the country) for the entire civil war
period from 1996 to 2006 in Nepal. Conflict outcomes are defined as deaths, disappearances,
and injuries. A variable that aggregates all three is referred to as total incidents. The entire
period of the civil conflict is divided into twenty-two six-month intervals.1 Table 6.1 reports
total deaths, disappearances, injuries, and incidents for each of the six-month interval of
the conflict. Period 12 is the first period after the Massacre. There are 14,982 incidents
reported in the dataset of which 88 percent are deaths, 5 percent are disappearances and the
remaining 7 percent are injuries.2 Note that only 13 percent of all conflict-related deaths and
11 percent of injuries and disappearances happened in the period before the Royal Massacre.
There are a total of 13,984 deaths and disappearances reported in JP2015. Compared to the
deaths reported in the PRIO database, which was used in the previous chapter, JP2015 has
1Since the Royal Massacre occurred in June 1st 2001, the calendar year 2001 is divided into two periods:
a period before the Massacre consisting of five months, and a period after the Massacre consisting of the
latter seven months of that year. All other calendar years are divided into two equal six-month periods.
2This dataset primarily records fatalities directly related to the conflict. Informal Sector Service Center
(INSEC) compiled the dataset in order to provide financial support to those directly affected by the Civil
War. Hence, while the reported number of deaths and disappearances are exhaustive in the dataset, only
individuals with serious injury are reported. This is the reason for the disproportionate amount of deaths in
the dataset.
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185 fewer deaths and disappearances combined relative to the high estimate in PRIO, and
1,855 more deaths and disappearances relative to the best estimate in PRIO.3 While PRIO
uses national surveys and media reports to verify their death claims, JP2015 is based on
surveys conducted by a human-rights organization within Nepal.
In addition to the number of incidents, JP2015 geo-references each incident to one of the
seventy-four districts in Nepal.4 JP2015 also report the date on which the incident occurred,
the district in which the incident occurred, and a list of demographic, economic, and ethno-
linguistic characteristics of the victim. The geo-spatial location of each incident is important
as it lets us compare the number and frequency of the incidents to the socio-economic
characteristics of each district.
The outcome variable is constructed from the series presented in Table 6.1. In particular, it
includes the total number of incidents (TI), the total number of deaths or killed (TK), the
total number of days of conflict (TD), and the total number of months of conflict (TM). TI
includes all—killed, injured or missing—geo-identifiable observations in the JP2015 dataset.
TK is a subset of TI, which includes all observations that are identified as killed in the
incident. While TI and TK capture the intensity of conflict, the latter two outcomes—TD
and TM—capture the frequency, or the persistence, of conflict. The total number of days
(months) of conflict is calculated by tallying the number of days (months) in each district
with at least one recorded incident aggregated over each six-month period.
Figure 6.1 presents the distribution of the outcome variables across time aggregated for all
districts. As defined above, the period is six-month intervals for the 1996-2006 period. The
vertical line represents the timing of the Massacre. Panel A reports all incidents (deaths,
disappearances, and injuries); panel B reports only deaths; panel C aggregates the number of
3PRIO database which estimates the battle-related deaths in civil conflicts can be accessed here: https:
//www.prio.org/Data/Armed-Conflict/Battle-Deaths/. Also, see Data and Methodology section of Chapter
5.
4Data is available for 74 of a total of 75 districts. Districts became the second tier administrative zones in
Nepal starting in 1950s.
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Table 6.1: Aggregate Conflict Outcomes per Six-month Interval
Period Deaths Disappearances Injuries Total Incidents
1 55 1 0 56
2 44 1 0 45
3 41 5 0 46
4 54 1 2 57
5 126 5 9 140
6 284 9 27 320
7 279 7 47 333
8 206 9 7 222
9 278 22 7 307
10 177 6 7 190
11 247 25 7 279
12 640 43 66 749
13 2,038 93 303 2,434
14 1,629 93 159 1,881
15 449 49 48 546
16 1,494 72 129 1,695
17 1,501 82 60 1,643
18 1,192 55 52 1,299
19 1,340 79 29 1,448
20 449 31 17 498
21 635 80 20 735
22 52 5 2 59
Total 13,211 773 998 14,982
Notes: This table reports estimates of conflict outcomes (deaths, disappearances, and injuries) between 1996
and 2006. Total incident is the sum of deaths, disappearances, and injuries. Period 12, the first period after
the Royal Massacre, aggregates conflict outcomes for the first seven-months after the Massacre (i.e. June
1st, 2001 - December 31st, 2001), while period 11 aggregates over the last five-months before the Massacre
(i.e. January 1st, 2001 - May 31st, 2001). All other periods represent six-month intervals between 1996 and
2006. There were two cease-fires during the Civil War period: first from August 3rd, 2001 to November
23rd, 2001 (spanning part of period 12), and second from January 29th, 2003 to August 26th, 2003 (spanning
almost all of period 15).
Source: Author’s calculation using Joshi and Pyakurel (2015).
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months with at least one recorded incident for each district; panel D does the same using
district-day cells. Whereas panels A and B report the intensity of conflict, panels C and D
report the frequency of conflict.
All panels of Figure 6.1 shows an abrupt and drastic rise in conflict outcomes immediately
following the Massacre, relative to the periods before the Massacre. By all measure, conflict
in the first period after the Massacre at least doubled relative to the last period before the
Massacre. This change is also marked considering the overall relatively stable trend in conflict
outcomes in the periods before the Massacre. Relative to this, the first period after the
Massacre presents a significant change in outcomes. Conflict outcomes escalated in the second
six-month period following the Massacre and remained high thereafter. The dip in conflict
outcomes in period 15 was most likely due to a cease-fire that lasted almost the entire period.
Note that period 12, the first period after the Massacre, also had a 3-month-long cease-fire.
The trends in Figure 6.1 is very much in line with what was found using the PRIO database
in Chapter 5.
The main explanatory variable is a measure of the distribution of farmland which proxies
inequality. To calculate the inequality in the distribution of land in each district, I use
the Gini index of ownership of farmland. This measure is calculated using the Agricultural
Census tables for the year 1991/92 (CBS, 1993).5 Each holding of farmland is defined as an
economic unit of agricultural production under single management. Any holding with crop
production of less than 8 dhurs (or 0.014 hector area) in the Tarai (or flatlands) or 4 anas (or
0.013 hector area) in the high mountains and hills are coded as holdings with no farmland.6
Table 6.2 reports descriptive statistics. The Gini index ranges from 0.33 to 0.68. To make
5I have used the Gini index calculated using 1991/92 census so that it is not endogenous to the conflict
itself. 1991/92 census is the last available data before the start of the Civil War. I also provide a robustness
check using the Gini index calculated from the 2001/02 census. Further, in the robustness checks section, I
have defined inequality as the share of land owned by the top decile of landowners and also as the average
size of landholding in each district.
6Nepal is divided into three ecological regions. These regions divide the country into three bands extending
from east-to-west: mountains in the north, hills in the middle, and Tarai (or flatlands) in the south.
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Notes: Each bar reports the aggregate conflict outcomes for each six-month period. The dotted vertical
line represents the Royal Massacre, June 1st, 2001. Period 12, the first period after the Royal Massacre,
aggregates conflict outcomes for the first seven-months after the Massacre (i.e. June 1st, 2001 - December
31st, 2001), while period 11 aggregates over the last five-months before the Massacre (i.e. January 1st, 2001 -
May 31st, 2001). All other periods represent six-month intervals between 1996 and 2006. There were two
cease-fires during the Civil War period: first from August 3rd, 2001 to November 23rd, 2001 (spanning period
12), and second from January 29th, 2003 to August 26th, 2003 (spanning almost entire period 15). Total
Incidents includes deaths, disappearances, and injuries; number of months (days) of conflict is a measure
that tallies the total number of district-months (-days) with at least one recorded incident in each six-month
period. For period-to-period change in outcomes see Figure ??.
Source: Author’s calculation using Joshi and Pyakurel (2015).
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this more relevant, consider that these Gini indices are equivalent to comparing the income
inequality in Switzerland, which in terms of income is one of the world’s most equal countries,
and South Africa, the most unequal.7
Table 6.2: Descriptive Statistics of the Explanatory Variables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Mean SD Min Max 25th perc. Median 75th perc.
Explanatory variables
Gini1991 0.46 0.07 0.33 0.68 0.40 0.44 0.51
Gini2001 0.48 0.06 0.38 0.70 0.43 0.47 0.53
Top 10% Share 33.39 6.23 24.76 61.07 28.85 31.97 37.91
Average Farm Size 0.88 0.35 0.28 1.76 0.64 0.82 1.12
Control variables
Log GDPpc 5.36 0.29 4.83 6.45 5.16 5.34 5.49
Slopes 50.93 25.46 0.00 91.87 33.78 56.35 71.12
Banks 0.03 0.04 0.00 0.27 0.02 0.02 0.03
Roads 6.94 14.62 0.00 93.78 0.00 4.34 7.44
Post Office 0.22 0.08 0.10 0.46 0.17 0.20 0.25
HDI 0.45 0.07 0.30 0.65 0.41 0.46 0.49
Nepsppc 0.60 0.29 0.05 1.00 0.39 0.59 0.89
CHHEpc 0.34 0.18 0.02 0.79 0.25 0.33 0.46
UPFn 0.89 1.41 0.00 7.00 0.00 0.00 1.00
Log Population 12.40 0.79 9.61 13.89 12.02 12.50 12.88
Acronyms: HDI - Human Development Index; UPF - United Peoples Front; Nepsppc - percent of Nepali
speakers; CHHEpc - percent of Chettri and Hill Brahmins ethnic groups.
Notes: This table reports the summary statistics of each variable used in the study. Gini1991 captures
Gini index for distribution of farmland calculated using the 1991/92 Agricultural Census. This is the main
regressor of interest. Gini2001, Top 10% Share, and Avg FarmSize are alternate measures of inequality used
as a robustness check for the main regressor. For a detailed definition of the variables and sources see Table
6.B.1.
The list of control variables include measures identified in the literature as affecting civil
conflicts. These variables capture the following concepts: regional income level and socio-
economic development, geographic variation, ethno-linguistic diversity, political factors, and
population. In particular, they include the district’s GDP per capita, proxying the average
household income in each district; Slopes—the average percent of incline of terrain in the
7Switzerland had an income Gini index of 0.339 in 1992 and South Africa had a consumption Gini index of
0.593 in 1993. Source: World Bank’s PovcalNet, http://iresearch.worldbank.org/PovcalNet/povOnDemand.
aspx.
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district; and measures of infrastructure in each district such as Roads—total kilometers of
road per 100 square kilometers, Banks—the number of banks per capita, and Post Office—
the number of post office buildings per capita. The list also includes an index for overall
socio-economic welfare in the district, measured by the Human Development Index (HDI).
Furthermore, I use two measures to capture the ethno-linguistic diversity in each district:
Nepsppc—a measure that captures linguistic variation (that is the percent Nepali language
speakers), and CHHEpc—a measure that captures the ethnic variation (that is the percent
of Hill Brahmans and Chettri caste in the district).8 In addition to these variables, I add a
political variable, UPFn, which is a spatial dummy matrix that identifies the neighboring
districts of those districts that were won by the United People’s Front in the 1991 election.
The majority of this political group later formed the CPN-Maoists party.9 Table 6.2 presents
descriptive statistics of these variables.
6.2 Methodology
To test the impact of the distribution of resources on conflict, I use the geographically
disaggregated dataset that reports the number of conflict outcomes by district within Nepal.
The data is available for 74 out of 75 districts, each of which is indexed by i = 1, 2, ..., 74.
Further, I divide the entire 1996-2006 period into six-month intervals, s. There are a total of
twenty-two (s = 1, 2, ..., 22) such intervals, with s = 12 the first period after the Massacre.
As discussed in the data section, the outcome variable, y, is calculated in four different ways
for each district: the total number of incidents (TI), the total number of deaths or killed (TK),
the total number of days of conflict (TD), and the total number of months of conflict (TM).
TI and TK capture the number of incidents and the number of deaths respectively in each
district in a six-month period. The total number of days (months) of conflict is calculated
8The definition of these variables are provided with their sources in Table 6.B.1.
9See Acharya (2009) for further discussion on the UPFn variable.
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by tallying the number of days (months) in each district with at least one recorded incident
aggregated over each s. For instance, if a district had at least one incident every month in
time interval s = 3, then this district would get a value of TMi,s=3 = 6.
For the base specification, I measure inequality using the Gini index for the distribution of
land calculated using the 1991/92 Agriculture Census. To capture the effect of the distribution
of land on conflict outcomes, I first start with a univariate model as follows:
ln(yis) = αi + δOLS Ginii + εis, (6.1)
where yis aggregates outcome in district i over period s. δOLS captures the effect of inequality
in land distribution, Gini, on conflict outcomes. There is little reason to believe that the
distribution of land is the only determinant of conflict outcomes. In fact, there is conflicting
arguments about the impact of distribution on conflict in the literature. Hence, I further
add a vector of control variables including population controls, time fixed-effects (γs), and
ecological region fixed-effects (Regioni) to equation (6.1). This multivariate framework can
be specified as follows:
ln(yis) = αi + δOLS Ginii + ΓXi + γs + θRegioni + εis. (6.2)
Xi is a vector of district-specific control variables summarized in Table 6.2. Note that
the regressors do not vary over time. The source of these control variables is the 1991/92
Agricultural Census. As for Regioni, Nepal can be geographically divided into three ecological
regions: High Himalayas, Churia Hills, and Tarai (flatlands). The Region dummy categorizes
each district into one of the three ecological regions. The index of interest, δOLS, captures
the effect the distribution of land on conflict outcomes controlling for the above variables.
Thus far, the regression models do not account for the variation in legitimacy across time.
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Equations (6.1) and (6.2) are the type of regression specifications that have been used in
the literature. They form the baseline to compare results from regression specifications that
allow for changes to the institutional factors such as displacement of legitimacy. To include
the effect of the Massacre, in the above specification, I add a treatment indicator, T, which
“turns on” post Massacre; that is, Ts = 1 for s ≥ 12 and zero otherwise. T is interacted with
the main explanatory variable Gini to capture the changes in outcome due to Gini after the
Massacre compared to the conflict outcomes before the Massacre. The specification is as
follows:





In this specification, the effect of Gini on conflict outcomes is captured by ∂ ln(yis)
∂Ginii
= δ1+δ2Ts.
In particular, δ2 captures the effect of the loss of legitimacy. The effect of the distribution of
land on conflict outcomes in the post Massacre period is captured by δOLS×T = δ1 + δ2. As
in equation (6.2), we can update this model with the list of control variables, and time and
region fixed-effects.
Furthermore, as the Gini and the variables in Xi do not vary over s, we may collapse the
outcomes for each district across T to run, what I refer to as, a Before-After (BA) regression.
The BA model is essentially a two-period regression, which aggregates conflict outcomes for
each district before and after the Massacre. The BA regression has the additional benefit,
over equation 6.3, of removing serial correlation that may arise due to s. We can specify the
BA regression as follows:









s=1 yis, and S is the number of periods in each T. As in equation (6.3), the
loss of legitimacy changes the effect of the Gini by δ2. The variation in outcome due to the
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variations in the Gini in the post-Massacre period is captured by δBA = δ1 + δ2.
While equations (6.3) and (6.4) capture the change in conflict outcomes due to the variation
in Gini index before and after the Massacre, it however, fails to account for the secular
time trends within each district or, indeed, any unmeasurables. To account for this, I first
divide the districts into two groups: j ∈ {JH , JL}, with j = JH if district i has “high”
inequality and j = JL if “low” inequality.10 Then, using these two groups, I run the following
difference-in-differences (DD) regression:




+ γs + εjs, (6.5)
where Groupj is a dummy that equals one if j = JH and zero otherwise. yjs is the average




i yis and Nj is the total number of
districts in group j. Assuming that the two groups have common trends in the pre-Massacre
period, the parameter, δDD, captures the causal effect of the Massacre on changes in conflict
outcomes for the unequal group compared with the relatively equal group. If indeed inequality
was propogated by institutional factors, then we should expect the high inequality set of
districts to have more “bite” to the collapse of legitimacy.
Small number of groups and clusters within each group can potentially downward bias the
t-statistic in equation (6.5). This can lead to the rejection of the null hypothesis of no effect
of treatment more often than what is actually true. For a detailed discussion see Donald
and Lang (2007). To correct such a bias, the above DD equation can be modified into the
following three specifications: the first specification, DL1, takes the difference of the outcome
variable between the two groups, that is ∆(ln ys) = ln(yJH ,s) − ln(yJL,s). We then run a
regression of this difference in outcomes on a treatment dummy, T.11 As with the regular
10High-inequality group is defined as districts with above-median Gini index and whereas all other districts
comprise the low-inequality group. Other group compositions are also provided as robustness checks in the
study.
11A derivation of DL1 and DL2 are provided in the Appendix.
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DD, T = 1 if s ≥ 12 and zero otherwise. Here, we assume that the population distribution
of the differences in the outcomes are independent and identically distributed (iid) normal.
DL1 can be specified as follows:
∆(ln ys) = βs + δDL1 Ts + νs. (6.6)
In the second specification, DL2, we further difference equation (6.6) over time, that is
∆(ln ys)−∆(ln ys−1). We then run a regression of this group-and-time differenced outcome on
an indicator that equals one if it is the first period after the intervention and zero otherwise.
This specification also captures the jump in conflict outcomes in the post-Massacre period
relative to the trend before the Massacre. Moreover, DL2 allows us to assume iid without




= β + δDL2 I(s = 12) + η, (6.7)
where I(s = 12) = 1 if s = 12 or zero otherwise.
It is important to keep in mind that whereas DL1 utilizes all the periods in the post-Massacre
to capture the average treatment effect, DL2 captures the same but utilizes only the first
period after the Massacre. Hence, δDL2 is more susceptible to the noise in the pre-treatment
trends. Further, if we believe that the trends in the outcomes of the two groups are the same
in the absence of any intervention, then we should expect the intercept in DL2 to be zero.
Hence, we add a third specification, DL3 which modifies equation (6.7) by excluding the
intercept. The estimator of interest for this regression is referred to as δDL3.
Common Trends Assumption
The DD methodology is identified given that in the absence of treatment, the change in
outcome for the treated and untreated will follow the same pattern as in the pre-treatment
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period. A consistent DD estimator, thus, requires common trends in the pre-treatment trends
of the treatment and control series. This is commonly referred to in the literature as “parallel
trends”. For our case, the treatment group is the group with high inequality and the control
group is the group with low inequality.
One way to get an idea of parallel trends is to look at the trends in the raw data. Figure 6.2
presents the logged trends in the conflict outcomes for the high and low-inequality groups. For
this exercise, the high-inequality group is defined as a group consisting of districts that have
the Gini index higher than the median, else the districts are categorized as a low-inequality
group. Figure 6.C.1 shows the trends using groups that are in the 1st quartile (low) and
4th quartile (high) of the distribution of the Gini index. The vertical line represents the
Massacre. The fitted lines before and after the Massacre show the trends in the two series.
Unlike the trends between the CPN-M and Indian Naxalite series in the previous chapter,
the conflict outcomes here are volatile making it difficult to ascertain if the two series have
parallel pre-treatment trends.
We can conduct a more formal test to check if the pre-treatment trends in the two series are
parallel. One way to judge this is to ask how different the “gap” between the two series is for
other periods of conflict relative to a period before the Massacre. An ideal choice for the
reference year is the last period before the Massacre. If there are significant differences in the
gap between the two series in the other periods before the Massacre compared to the last
period before the Massacre, then this would violate the parallel trends assumption. If, on the
other hand, the gap in the pre-treatment period between the two series is not statistically
different from the gap in the last period before the Massacre, then we may assume that the
pre-treatment trends are parallel. To do this, I run the following regression:
ln(yjs) = α + γs + εjs, (6.8)
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Panel D: Total Days of Violence
Low Inequality High Inequality
Figure 6.2: Parallel Trends, eye-ball test
Notes: Each panels shows trends in log between low and high-inequality groups by conflict outcomes. High-
inequality group is composed of districts that have a Gini index greater than the median Gini index, all
other districts comprise the low-inequality group. Panel A measures the total number of incidents (deaths,
disappearances, and injuries); Panel B measures the total number of deaths; Panel C tallies of the number
of district-months with at least one recorded incident; and Panel D does the same for district-days. The
dotted vertical line represents the Royal Massacre, June 1st, 2001. Period 12, the first period after the
Royal Massacre, aggregates conflict outcomes for the first seven-months after the Massacre (i.e. June 1st,
2001 - December 31st, 2001), while period 11 aggregates over the last five-months before the Massacre
(i.e. January 1st, 2001 - May 31st, 2001). All other periods represent six-month intervals between 1996 and
2006. There were two cease-fires during the Civil War period: first from August 3rd, 2001 to November 23rd,
2001 (spanning period 12), and second from January 29th, 2003 to August 26th, 2003 (spanning almost entire
period 15).
Source: Author’s calculation using Joshi and Pyakurel (2015).
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where γs are period-specific dummy variables. γs is the estimated difference in the pre-
treatment trends between the two groups relative to a reference period.
Figure 6.3 charts the values of γs from the above regression. The last period before the
Massacre is the reference period in the regression. As before, the vertical line represents
the Massacre. The first period after the Massacre is labeled as the “Event”. As before,
each periods is a six-month interval before the event (indicated in the figure as negative
time values) or after the event (indicated in the figure as positive time values). The figure
provides both the estimated difference and the 95% confidence interval around these estimates
relative to the last period before the Massacre. In all panels, the difference between the high
and low-inequality groups relative to the last period before the Massacre is not statistically
significant in the pre-treatment period. More importantly, the trend in the two series in the
three-and-half-years (or 6 periods) before the Massacre is very close. Given these estimates,
we cannot reject the null that the pre-treatment trends are parallel. Additionally, it is
reassuring to see that in this event study type formulation, the difference in the post-Massacre
period is statistically significant immediately following the Massacre. Since the difference
between the high and low-inequality groups is positive and significant, it implies that the
high-inequality group had higher conflict outcomes relative to the lower-inequality group.
This in discussed in detail next.
6.3 Results
6.3.1 Unequal Distribution and Conflict, OLS Specifications
The hypothesis suggests that as inequality increases so does grievance, which in turn increases
the likelihood of violence. Table 6.3 reports results from regression using the univariate and
multivariate specifications in equations (6.1) and (6.2). In these specifications, we do not
account for the Massacre, and so we treat the entire period of conflict with constant state
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Panel A: Total Incidents Panel B: Total Killed
Panel C: Total Months of Violence Panel D: Total Days of Violence
Time relative to Royal Massacre
Figure 6.3: Parallel Trends, formal test
Notes: This figure reports the γs from regression equation (6.8) for Total Incidents (TI), Total Deaths (TK),
Total Days of Conflict (TD), and Total Months of Conflict (TM). The outcome variable is the Gini index
of distribution of farmland from the 1991/92 Agricultural Census. High-inequality group is composed of
districts that have Gini index greater than the median, all other districts comprise the low-inequality group.
The reference period is the period before the conflict, or event time −1. See also Figure 6.2.
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capacity. This is the type of regression reported in the literature. The specification in column
(1) of this table reports results using the Gini index as the only regressor; column (2) adds
period fixed-effects to column (1); column (3) adds a vector of control variables to column (1);
column (4) adds both period fixed-effects and control variables to the specification in column
(1). The outcome variable in panel A is total incidents, in panel B is total deaths, in panel
C is the number of months of conflict, and panel D is the number of days of conflict. It is
interesting to see that in columns (1) through (4) the estimate of the effect of land distribution
on all conflict measures is negative. This is contrary to our hypothesis. The direction of the
estimates suggests that conflict outcomes are lower in regions where ownership of land is more
unequal. However, in almost all specifications the estimate is statistically not different from
zero. Columns (5) and (6) updates columns (3) and (4) respectively controlling for ecological
region fixed-effects. Column (7) reports results with clustered standard errors at the district
level for specification in (6). It is interesting to note that while the coefficients are still not
statistically significantly different from zero, they are in the same direction as suggested by
the hypothesis in specifications (5) through (7). Ecological regions are important as land is
more productive and easier to farm in the flatlands than in the mountains. Table 6.3 gives us
an idea why the literature on conflict has found such varying results of the effect of inequality
on civil conflict.
Without a clear identifying strategy it is difficult to estimate a consistent estimator. The
discrepancy between the estimates in Table 6.3 suggests that the estimates calculated using
the simple OLS framework may not be consistent. To further highlight this fact, Figures 6.4
and 6.5 present the correlation between the Gini index and the outcomes of interest. The
correlation is calculated for the period before the Massacre and the period after the Massacre
for each outcome measure. The fitted regression lines control for the district’s per capita
GDP. These correlation charts suggest that what was mostly a negative relation between
conflict outcomes and the Gini index in the period before the Massacre reversed to a positive
relation in the period after. At a minimum, these charts provide further evidence that the
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Table 6.3: Effect of Inequality on Conflict, δOLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Panel A: Total Incidents
Gini (δ̂OLS) -0.582 -0.582* -0.362 -0.362 0.189 0.189 0.189
(0.471) (0.316) (0.682) (0.388) (0.753) (0.448) (0.962)
R-squared 0.001 0.547 0.091 0.637 0.098 0.644 0.644
Panel B: Total Killed
Gini (δ̂OLS) -0.547 -0.547* -0.412 -0.412 0.272 0.272 0.272
(0.463) (0.318) (0.673) (0.396) (0.744) (0.460) (0.947)
R-squared 0.001 0.536 0.093 0.629 0.100 0.635 0.635
Panel C: Number of Months with Conflict
Gini (δ̂OLS) -0.345 -0.345** -0.182 -0.182 0.097 0.097 0.097
(0.274) (0.173) (0.405) (0.214) (0.454) (0.251) (0.486)
R-squared 0.001 0.575 0.089 0.663 0.094 0.668 0.668
Panel D: Number of Days with Conflict
Gini (δ̂OLS) -0.372 -0.372 -0.216 -0.216 0.288 0.288 0.288
(0.408) (0.266) (0.588) (0.314) (0.650) (0.368) (0.828)
R-squared 0.001 0.575 0.096 0.670 0.103 0.678 0.678
N 1628 1628 1628 1628 1628 1628 1628
Period FE x x x x
Control vars x x x x x
Ecological Region FE x x x
Clustered SE x
Standard errors in parenthesis; *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01
Notes: This table reports estimates for δOLS from equations (6.1) and (6.2). Gini index measures the
distribution of land holdings for each district from the 1991/92 Agricultural Census. Each panel represents a
measure of outcome variable: the number of reported incidents (deaths, missing, and injured) is reported in
panel A, and the number killed directly related to the civil war is reported in panel B. The last two outcomes
measure the frequency of incidents. For each district, outcomes in panel C and D tallies the number of
days (months) with conflict in each six-month interval. There are 74 districts and 22 periods in the sample.
Ecological Region are three geographic regions in Nepal: high-mountain, middle hills, and flatlands. Standard
errors are clustered at the district level in column (7). Robust standard errors are reported for all other
specification.
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nature of conflict changed between the two periods—before and after the Massacre. If so, it
is best to account for this change.
To account for the Massacre and the change in state capacity, Table 6.4 provides estimates
from equation (6.3). In this regression, we interact the Gini with a treatment dummy, T,
which equals one in the post-Massacre period or zero otherwise. The estimates measure the
percentage change in outcome in the post-Massacre period due to one basis-point change in
the Gini index, relative to the pre-Massacre period. As in Table 6.3, the specifications in the
various columns of Table 6.4 varies by the controls.
First, it is interesting to note that the only specification with an opposite sign than what is
suggested by the hypothesis is the specification in column (2), which accounts only for the
period fixed-effects. However, this estimate is not statistically significantly different from zero.
In all other specifications, besides when the standard errors are clustered, the estimates are at
least statistically significant at the 5% significance level. Moreover as expected, the estimates
are positive, suggesting an increase in conflict outcomes due to change in the Gini index,
using a wide range of controls. Total deaths in panel B is the only statistically significant (at
the 10% significance level) estimate in column (7), which also controls for clustered errors
along with period and ecological fixed-effects and control variables. It is, however, unclear
whether clustering the standard errors are necessary for these regression.12 Nevertheless, it is
interesting to note that by just controlling for the differences in the two periods of conflict,
we can find some effect of the Gini index on conflict outcomes.
The effect sizes are calculated using the regression coefficients δOLS×T from equation (6.3).
For example, the effect size for the estimate of 0.370 in column (1) panel A of Table 6.4 is
calculated as follows:
12Abadie et al. (2017) argue that “clustering is, in essence, a design problem, either a sampling design or
an experimental design issue.” They show that clustering standard errors are not ideal when working with
the whole population, as is the case in the current work.
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Post-Massacre
Figure 6.4: Correlation between Gini Index and Conflict Intensity
Notes: This figure presents a bivariate correlation of conflict intensity and Gini index of the distribution
of farmland in each district aggregated for the period before and after the Royal Massacre. The fitted line
controls for per capita GDP of each district. Conflict intensity is measured as conflict related incident (deaths,
disappearances, and injuries) or conflict related deaths. The Civil War lasted from 1996 to 2006. The panels
on the left present data for period before the Massacre, i.e. before June 1st, 2001, and the panels on the right
present data from after the Massacre.
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Gini Index
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Figure 6.5: Correlation between Gini Index and Conflict Frequency
Notes: This figure presents a bivariate correlation of conflict frequency and Gini index of the distribution
of farmland in each district aggregated for the period before and after the Royal Massacre. The fitted line
controls for per capita GDP of each district. Conflict frequency is measured by tallying the number of
district-months (or district-days) with at least one recorded incident. The Civil War lasted from 1996 to
2006. The panels on the left present data for period before the Massacre, i.e. before June 1st, 2001, and the
panels on the right present data from after the Massacre.
Source: Author’s calculation using Joshi and Pyakurel (2015).
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= e0.370 ≈ 1.448.
This estimated effect suggests an increase in conflict incidents of 1.5 folds in the period after
the Massacre compared to the period before. Overall, the estimated effects in panel A suggest
an increase in the total incidents in the post-Massacre period between 0.5 and 5.4 folds over
the pre-Massacre period. Likewise, deaths, reported in panel B, increase between 0.5 to 5.5
folds; the number of months of violence, reported in panel C, increases between 0.7 to 2.7
folds; and the number of days of violence, reported in panel D, increased between 0.7 and
5.0 folds. If we were to assume that all controls are necessary for these regressions, then
the preferred effect of the loss of legitimacy, reported in column (7), suggests an increase
in conflict-related deaths by 1.7 fold and an increase in the number of days of conflict by
1.7 fold. To make it more relative, the latter result suggests that if a district had at least
one death in 50 days of a six-month spell before the Massacre, after the Massacre the same
district had on average 80 days with at least one death in a six-month spell.
As the regressors do not vary over time, we can run the above regression by aggregating the
data over the two-time intervals: before and after the Massacre. This would help negate the
effect of serial correlation present due to the time dimension in the previous specification.
Table 6.5 presents results from the specification in equation (6.4). In this regression, our
estimated effect of inequality on conflict outcomes is calculated by adding the coefficients on
the Gini and Gini× T variables. The controls used here are the same as the ones used in
the previous two tables.
Depending on the specification, the estimate for total incidents ranges between 0.9 and 2.1
folds. This implies that, in the post-Massacre period, one basis-point increase in the Gini
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Table 6.4: Effect of Inequality on Conflict, δOLS×T
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Panel A: Total Incidents
Gini x T (δ̂2) 3.120*** -0.056 3.394*** 0.570*** 3.393*** 0.566*** 0.566
(0.114) (0.169) (0.103) (0.165) (0.102) (0.162) (0.366)
Gini (δ̂1) -2.757*** -0.543* -2.066*** -0.648 -1.714*** -0.128 -0.128
(0.412) (0.321) (0.490) (0.394) (0.549) (0.451) (0.933)
δ̂OLS×T (= δ̂1 + δ̂2) 0.370 -0.590 1.334 -0.070 1.683 0.446 0.446
Effect Size 1.448 0.554 3.796 0.932 5.382 1.562 1.562
R-squared 0.293 0.547 0.428 0.640 0.435 0.647 0.647
Panel B: Total Killed
Gini x T (δ̂2) 3.019*** -0.013 3.287*** 0.609*** 3.285*** 0.600*** 0.600*
(0.111) (0.159) (0.101) (0.158) (0.100) (0.155) (0.356)
Gini (δ̂1) -2.650*** -0.538* -2.063*** -0.718* -1.570*** -0.064 -0.064
(0.409) (0.321) (0.504) (0.403) (0.568) (0.464) (0.912)
δ̂OLS×T (= δ̂1 + δ̂2) 0.369 -0.540 1.227 -0.101 1.715 0.540 0.540
Effect Size 1.446 0.583 3.411 0.904 5.557 1.716 1.716
R-squared 0.288 0.536 0.426 0.632 0.432 0.639 0.639
Panel C: Number of Months with Conflict
Gini x T (δ̂2) 1.850*** -0.094 2.010*** 0.264** 2.010*** 0.261** 0.261
(0.066) (0.115) (0.058) (0.110) (0.057) (0.109) (0.237)
Gini (δ̂1) -1.635*** -0.280 -1.192*** -0.315 -1.030*** -0.049 -0.049
(0.238) (0.184) (0.270) (0.220) (0.306) (0.256) (0.496)
δ̂OLS×T (= δ̂1 + δ̂2) 0.220 -0.370 0.820 -0.046 0.980 0.221 0.221
Effect Size 1.246 0.691 2.270 0.955 2.664 1.247 1.247
R-squared 0.314 0.575 0.449 0.664 0.454 0.670 0.67
Panel D: Number of Days with Conflict
Gini x T (δ̂2) 2.766*** -0.039 3.005*** 0.508*** 3.005*** 0.504*** 0.504
(0.097) (0.150) (0.086) (0.144) (0.085) (0.142) (0.325)
Gini (δ̂1) -2.300*** -0.345 -1.725*** -0.471 -1.397*** 0.006 0.006
(0.353) (0.272) (0.407) (0.321) (0.459) (0.372) (0.806)
δ̂OLS×T (= δ̂1 + δ̂2) 0.466 -0.370 1.285 0.038 1.615 0.510 0.510
Effect Size 1.594 0.691 3.615 1.039 5.028 1.665 1.665
R-squared 0.312 0.575 0.455 0.674 0.462 0.681 0.681
N 1628 1628 1628 1628 1628 1628 1628
Period FE x x x x
Control vars x x x x x
Ecological Region FE x x x
Clustered SE x
Standard errors in parenthesis; *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01
Notes: This table reports estimates for δOLS×T from equation (6.3). See also Table 6.3.
Effect Size is calculated from δ̂ as follows:{




ln(yT =10 ) − ln(yT =00 )
}


















e0.370 ≈ 1.448. This represents a 1.5 fold increase in conflict in the post-Massacre period relative to the
pre-Massacre period.
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index increased conflict incidents by between 3 and 8 percent over the conflict incidents in
the pre-Massacre period. The latter increase employs all the controls. The average number
of conflict incidents before the Massacre was 118. The estimated effect suggests that conflict
incidents increased to 127 for each basis-point increase in the Gini index in the post-Massacre
period. We also see in Panel B that there was between 2.7 and 12.3 percent increase in
conflict-related deaths per basis-point increase in the Gini index. The frequency of conflict
also increased across the two periods: one basis-point increase in Gini increased the number
of days of conflict by between 2.2 and 6.2 percent and the number of months of conflict
between 4.4 and 13.0 percent. These BA estimated effect sizes are slightly smaller than the
OLS results of Table 6.4.
Figure 6.6 reports the estimates of δOLS, δOLS×T , and δBA from equations (6.2), (6.3), and
(6.4) respectively. The estimates are replicated from column (6) of Tables 6.3, 6.4, and 6.5.
The estimates presented here are for the number of total deaths (TK) and the number of
days of conflict (TD). In the above tables, these estimates are reported in panels B and D
respectively. These estimates control for time fixed-effects, ecological fixed-effects and the list
of control variables reported in Table 6.2. The estimates are reported with a 95% confidence
band. A positive delta implies an increase in conflict outcomes due to the Gini index, and a
negative delta implies a decrease. The first pair of estimates do not account for the loss of
legitimacy. Using this specification, the estimates suggest no change in conflict intensity or
frequency attributed to the Gini index. The second and third pairs of results account for the
loss of legitimacy. The estimates in the second pair suggest an average of 1.7-fold increase
in both the number of deaths and the number of days with conflict in the post-Massacre
period relative to before the Massacre. That is, a district with 1 basis-point higher Gini
index saw a 170% increase in the number of deaths and the number of days of conflict in the
post-Massacre period relative to before the Massacre. The last pair of estimates look at the
overall number change in the entire period after the Massacre compared to before. A district
with 1 basis-point higher Gini index saw a 12-fold increase in the number of deaths and the
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Table 6.5: Effect of Inequality on Conflict, δBA
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Panel A: Total Incidents
Gini x T (δ̂2) 6.006*** 5.938** 6.006*** 5.938** 6.006*** 5.938*** 5.938***
(0.398) (2.848) (0.319) (2.302) (0.312) (2.236) (2.020)
Gini (δ̂1) -5.066*** -5.032** -4.854*** -4.820** -3.930** -3.896* -3.896**
(1.393) (2.501) (1.399) (1.964) (1.636) (2.090) (1.940)
δ̂BA (= δ̂1 + δ̂2) 0.946 0.908 1.156 1.118 2.076 2.048 2.048
Effect Size 2.575 2.479 3.177 3.059 7.973 7.752 7.752
R-squared 0.590 0.590 0.758 0.758 0.770 0.770 0.770
Panel B: Total Killed
Gini x T (δ̂2) 6.050*** 6.473** 6.050*** 6.473*** 6.050*** 6.473*** 6.473***
(0.394) (2.840) (0.311) (2.283) (0.305) (2.213) (2.046)
Gini (δ̂1) -5.048*** -5.259** -4.873*** -5.085** -3.756** -3.968* -3.968**
(1.389) (2.445) (1.436) (2.041) (1.665) (2.155) (1.946)
δ̂BA (= δ̂1 + δ̂2) 1.010 1.223 1.180 1.393 2.300 2.513 2.513
Effect Size 2.746 3.397 3.254 4.027 9.974 12.342 12.342
R-squared 0.596 0.596 0.771 0.771 0.780 0.781 0.781
Panel C: Number of Months with Conflict
Gini x T (δ̂2) 4.085*** 3.519* 4.085*** 3.519** 4.085*** 3.519** 3.519*
(0.284) (2.006) (0.235) (1.689) (0.233) (1.672) (1.766)
Gini (δ̂1) -3.036*** -2.753 -2.597*** -2.314 -2.260** -1.976 -1.976
(0.998) (1.933) (0.956) (1.422) (1.111) (1.532) (1.458)
δ̂BA (= δ̂1 + δ̂2) 1.055 0.769 1.495 1.209 1.825 1.549 1.549
Effect Size 2.872 2.158 4.459 3.350 6.203 4.707 4.707
R-squared 0.568 0.568 0.728 0.728 0.735 0.735 0.735
Panel D: Number of Days with Conflict
Gini x T (δ̂2) 5.475*** 5.406** 5.475*** 5.406*** 5.475*** 5.406*** 5.406***
(0.358) (2.556) (0.285) (2.064) (0.280) (2.009) (1.911)
Gini (δ̂1) -3.957*** -3.923* -3.650*** -3.616** -2.916** -2.882 -2.882*
(1.249) (2.282) (1.247) (1.793) (1.436) (1.874) (1.728)
δ̂BA (= δ̂1 + δ̂2) 1.525 1.486 1.825 1.796 2.565 2.526 2.526
Effect Size 4.595 4.419 6.203 6.025 13.001 12.503 12.503
R-squared 0.596 0.596 0.707 0.763 0.773 0.773 0.773
N 148 148 148 148 148 148 148
Time Dummy x x x x
Control vars x x x x x
Ecological Region FE x x x
Clustered SE x
Standard errors in parenthesis; *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01
Notes: This table reports estimates for δBA from equation (6.4). See also Table 6.3. Refer to Table 6.4 for
calculations of Effect Size.
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number of days of conflict in the post-Massacre period relative to the entire period before
the Massacre.
Figure 6.6: Comparison of various OLS Estimates
Notes: This figure presents the estimate of δ using the specifications reported in panels B (total killed, TK)
and D (total days of conflict, TD) of column (6) of Tables 6.3 (OLS), 6.4 (OLS x T), and 6.5 (BA). The
estimates control for time fixed-effect, ecological region fixed-effects, and a list of control variables reported
in Table 6.2. Standard errors for the "OLS x T" and "BA" estimates is calculated using the Delta Method
reported in Greene (2012) (p.108).
Source: Tables 6.3, 6.4, and 6.5.
6.3.2 Unequal Distribution and Conflict, DD Specifications
Next, to account for the secular variation across time, we run a DD specification outlined in
equation (6.5). While the regressions presented thus far reported results using individual
districts as observations, the specifications presented below are based on group-level data.
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Specifically, each district is grouped into two bins according to their level of inequality.
A unit of observation here is a group in each six-month period. Groups are divided into
high-inequality (districts with above-median Gini index) or low-inequality (all other districts)
categories. The group-dummy equals 1 if the district is in the high-inequality group and zero
otherwise. The outcome using the total months of conflict is dropped for the DD specifications
due to lack of variation in the grouped data structure.
Columns (1)-(4) of Table 6.6 report results from the DD regression utilizing various controls.
Adding the period fixed-effects, in column (2), changes the precision over not including them,
as in column (1), but it does not affect the magnitude nor the significance of the estimates.
An effect size of 6.8 implies a 680 percent increase in conflict incidents for the high-inequality
group relative to the low-inequality group in the post-Massacre period. Adding the control
variables in column (3) and further adjusting for serial correlation in column (4) affects the
magnitude, and, for the number of days of conflict, also the precision of the estimate. The
estimate for total incidents decreases in columns (3) and (4) from 1.9 to 1.1, which implies a
drop in effect size from 6.8 to 2.9 folds. Likewise, the estimated effect size for total killed and
total days of conflict both decrease from 7.1 to 3.2 folds and from 4.2 to 1.9 folds respectively.
These are nevertheless significantly large increases in conflict measures in the post-Massacre
period using all outcome measures.
The last three columns in Table 6.6 present estimates using the Donald and Lang (2007)
specifications outlined in equations (6.6) and (6.7). DL3 does not include an intercept relative
to DL2. The estimates of DL1 are the same as that of the DD with control for period
fixed-effects. Whereas the estimates for DD and DL1 capture the average change in conflict
outcomes utilizing the information from the entire after the Massacre, the estimates for
DL2 and DL3 capture the change using only the period immediately following the Massacre.
The estimates for the two latter specifications are much smaller but still in the expected
direction. Despite a three-month-long cease-fire in the first period immediately following the
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Massacre, it is interesting to see that the estimates for DL2 are significantly positive. While
the magnitude is larger in DL3, it is more imprecisely estimated relative to the former. The
DL2 and DL3 estimates suggest that, for the high-inequality group, there were between 1.5
and 1.8 folds more deaths, 1.6 and 1.9 folds more incidents, and 1.2 and 1.3 folds more days
of conflict after the Massacre relative to before the Massacre controlling for the trends for
the low-inequality group.
The groups used for the regressions in Table 6.6 to categorize high and low-inequality districts
are arbitrarily divided over the median. Another way to classify the groups would be to
compare the districts that are above the 75th percentile (or 4th quartile) of the distribution of
the Gini index to those below the 25th percentile (or 1st quartile) of the distribution. The
former in Table 6.7 is the high-inequality group and the latter the low-inequality group.
Since the 4th quartile and the 1st quartile groups are relatively more unequal and more equal
respectively compared to the groups split over the median, we should expect more "bite" in
the 1st and 4th quartile formulation compared to the below and above the median formulation.
Indeed, comparing the estimate that controls for the list of variables and period fixed-effects
(column 3), the estimated effect using the bottom and top quartile groups is almost double
the effect using the groups below and above the median. While the increase in death was 3.2
fold between the groups divided by the median, the increase in death is 6.2 fold for the above
75th percentile group compared to the below 25th percentile group. Overall, the increase in
total deaths using the top and bottom percentile groups ranges from 5.6 to 7.0 fold if one
looks at the average in the entire post-Massacre period, and between 2.4 and 2.8 fold if one
focuses only on the data from the first period after the Massacre. Similarly, total incidents
ranges from 5.2 to 6.6 folds using the entire period after the Massacre and between 2.8 and 3.2
folds using the first period after the Massacre; the total number of days of conflict increased
between 3.7 and 4.6 folds using the entire period, and between 1.4 and 1.6 folds using the
first period after the Massacre.
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Table 6.6: Effect of Inequality on Conflict, DD Estimates for above and below median-
inequality groups
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
DD DL1 DL2 DL3
Panel A: Total Incidents
δ̂ 1.918*** 1.918*** 1.047** 1.047*** 1.918*** 0.505*** 0.646
(0.641) (0.239) (0.427) (0.250) (0.239) (0.113) (0.501)
Effect Size 6.807 6.807 2.849 2.849 6.807 1.657 1.908
R-squared 0.584 0.971 0.990 0.764 0.050 0.077
Panel B: Total Deaths
δ̂ 1.958*** 1.958*** 1.148** 1.148*** 1.958*** 0.438*** 0.579
(0.629) (0.246) (0.417) (0.278) (0.246) (0.115) (0.508)
Effect Size 7.085 7.085 3.152 3.152 7.085 1.550 1.784
R-squared 0.591 0.969 0.990 0.761 0.037 0.061
Panel C: Number of Days with Conflict
δ̂ 1.435*** 1.435*** 0.660 0.660** 1.435*** 0.150* 0.269
(0.435) (0.203) (0.377) (0.295) (0.203) (0.077) (0.350)
Effect Size 4.200 4.200 1.935 1.935 4.200 1.162 1.309
R-squared 0.562 0.952 0.984 0.714 0.010 0.029
N 44 44 44 44 22 21 21
Period FE x x x
Control Variables x x
AR(5) x
Standard errors in parenthesis; *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01
Notes: This table reports estimates for δ from regression equation (6.5) in columns (1)-(4), and from equations
(6.6) and (6.7) in columns (5)-(7). Districts are classified into high-inequality (that is districts above the
median Gini index) and low-inequality (all other districts) groups. Gini index measures the distribution of
land holdings for each district from the 1991/92 Agricultural Census. Each panel represents a measure of
the outcome variable. The first two panels measure the number of reported incidents (deaths, missing, and
injured) and the number killed directly related to the civil war. The last outcome measures the frequency of
incidents. For each group, the outcome in panel C tallies the number of days with conflict in each six-month
period. Refer to Table 6.4 for calculations on Effect Size. Standard erros using the Newey-West strategy with
a five-period lag is reported in column (4). Robust standard errors are reported in other all specification.
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The effect sizes using the bottom and top quartile groups are all larger in magnitude than
when comparing the above and below median groups. This provides additional evidence
that the higher-inequality groups had more “bite” to the loss of legitimacy. This is further
evident when comparing the 2nd quartile group to the 3rd quartile group. Since the latter set
of groups are relatively more equal compared to the 1st and 4th quartile groups, we should
expect to see lower estimated effect of the Massacre. Indeed, total killed is estimated to
increase 1.4 folds using the 2nd and 3rd quartile groups (see column 3 of Table 6.B.5), whereas
it is estimated to increased 6.2 folds for the 1st and 4th quartile groups.
All specifications suggest that there was a significant increase in conflict in the districts with
higher inequality compared to those with relatively lower inequality in the period after the
Massacre. Consistent with the hypothesis, this evidence shows the importance of accounting
for variations in institutional factors, such as state capacity, to identify the relationship
between inequality and conflict.
6.3.3 Income Level and Conflict, DD Specifications
Since the level of economic development is the most consistent correlate of civil wars in
cross-country studies, Tables 6.8 and 6.9 report results from the DD and DL specifications
respectively using district’s per capita GDP as the main regressor instead of the measure
of inequality. Columns (1)-(3) report estimates using median as the cut-off point for the
groups, and columns (4)-(6) report estimates utilizing above p75 and below p25 as the high
and low-income groups. Columns (1) and (4) of both tables report estimates from univariate
regression with per capita GDP as the only regressor; specifications reported in columns (2)
and (5) of both tables control for period fixed-effects; columns (3) and (6) account for the
list of control variables in addition to the period fixed-effects. Columns (1)-(3) of Table 6.8
is analogous to columns (1)-(3) of Table 6.6; columns (4)-(6) of Table 6.8 are analogous to
columns (1)-(3) of Table 6.7. Likewise, specifications in Table 6.9 are comparable to columns
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Table 6.7: Effect of Inequality on Conflict, DD estimates for 1st and 4th quartile groups
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
DD DL1 DL2 DL3
Panel A: Total Incidents
δ̂ 1.653** 1.881*** 1.776*** 1.776*** 1.881*** 1.029*** 1.165
(0.623) (0.236) (0.379) (0.261) (0.231) (0.176) (0.699)
Effect Size 5.223 6.560 5.906 5.906 6.560 2.798 3.206
R-squared 0.553 0.971 0.998 0.775 0.111 0.140
Panel B: Total Deaths
δ̂ 1.721*** 1.943*** 1.822*** 1.822*** 1.943*** 0.876*** 1.019
(0.626) (0.248) (0.406) (0.299) (0.242) (0.173) (0.688)
Effect Size 5.590 6.980 6.184 6.184 6.980 2.401 2.770
R-squared 0.551 0.967 0.986 0.766 0.086 0.114
Panel C: Number of Days with Conflict
δ̂ 1.302*** 1.517*** 1.513*** 1.513*** 1.517*** 0.346*** 0.505
(0.460) (0.199) (0.408) (0.338) (0.194) (0.111) (0.459)
Effect Size 3.677 4.559 4.540 4.540 4.559 1.413 1.657
R-squared 0.547 0.963 0.981 0.774 0.035 0.066
N 42 42 42 42 20 18 18
Period FE x x x
Control Variables x x
AR(5) x
Standard errors in parenthesis; *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01
Notes: This table reports estimates for δ from regression equation (6.5) in columns (1)-(4), and from equations
(6.6) and (6.7) in columns (5)-(7). Districts are classified into high-inequality (those districts with Gini above
the 75th percentile of the distribution of Gini index) and low-inequality (those districts with Gini below the
25th percentile of the distribution of Gini index) groups. See also Table 6.6.
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(5)-(7) of the previous two tables.
Findings from cross-country literature suggest that civil wars are positively associated with
low-income. Thus, we should expect higher-income districts to see lower levels and frequency
of conflict. Estimates in columns (1), (2), (4) and (5) of Table 6.8 suggest otherwise. Here,
the estimates suggest that there was an increase in conflict outcomes in richer regions relative
to poorer regions in the post-Massacre period compared to the period before the Massacre.
However, once we account for the list of control variables the effect is not statistically different
from zero. The size of the estimates in columns (3) and (6) also suggest that the income
level of the region played no significant part in the variation of conflict outcomes in the
post-Massacre period relative to the pre-Massacre period. This latter set of estimates suggest
an 11 percent decrease in conflict incidents and a 12 percent decrease in conflict deaths in the
period after compared to before the Massacre for the higher income group. Depending on
the specification, the days of violence for the higher income group increased by 0.04 percent
or did not change at all in the period after relative to before the Massacre.
The DL estimates in Table 6.9 present further evidence against the hypothesis that conflict
outcomes are negatively related to a regions level of income. The estimates in columns (1)
and (4) are equivalent to the estimates in columns (2) and (5) of Table 6.8 respectively. The
estimates in columns (2) and (3) similarly suggest an increase in deaths for the high-income
group relative to the low-income group even when using information from only the first period
after the Massacre. Depending on the construction of the groups, DL2 and DL3 estimate
an increase in total deaths by between 3.4 and 3.9 folds, an increase in total incidents by
between 3.2 and 4.1 folds, and an increase in the total number of days of conflict by between
1.7 and 2.0 fold using only the first period following the Massacre.
The results from Tables 6.8 and 6.9 do not support the general hypothesis that civil conflict
and the level of economic development of a region are negatively correlated. Perhaps the
limited variation in per capita GDP across the districts in Nepal, relative to cross-country
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Table 6.8: Effect of GDP on Conflict, DD Estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Groups: above and below Median Groups: above p75 and below p25
Panel A: Total Incidents
δ̂ 1.549** 1.549*** -0.126 1.733*** 1.852*** -0.008
(0.627) (0.229) (0.461) (0.604) (0.276) (0.762)
Effect Size 4.707 4.707 0.887 5.658 6.373 1.000
R-squared 0.575 0.972 0.991 0.580 0.959 0.982
Panel B: Total Killed
δ̂ 1.599** 1.599*** -0.131 1.764*** 1.879*** 0.020
(0.617) (0.228) (0.428) (0.589) (0.281) (0.701)
Effect Size 4.948 4.948 0.878 5.836 6.547 1.020
R-squared 0.579 0.971 0.992 0.599 0.958 0.985
Panel C: Number of Days with Conflict
δ̂ 1.178*** 1.178*** -0.009 1.388*** 1.469*** 0.455
(0.418) (0.175) (0.177) (0.446) (0.196) (0.481)
Effect Size 3.248 3.248 1.000 4.007 4.345 1.576
R-squared 0.565 0.962 0.996 0.601 0.966 0.987
N 44 44 44 43 43 43
Period FE x x x x
Control Variables x x
Standard errors in parenthesis; *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01
Notes: This table reports estimates for δDD from regression equation (6.5). Districts are classified into
high-income (districts above median per capita GDP) and low-income (all other districts) groups in columns
(1)-(3), and high-income (above p75 per capita GDP) and low-income (below p25 per capita GDP) groups in
columns (4)-(6). See also Table 6.6.
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GDP variations, affects the statistical significance of the results presented below. On the
other hand, it could very well be that income of a region is a good predictor for insurgency
type conflicts, whereas, full-fledged civil wars are a much complex phenomenon, one that has
deeper roots. Regardless, these estimates here suggest, if anything, that conflict increased
much more in richer regions relative to poorer regions in the aftermath of the Massacre.
Table 6.9: Effect of GDP on Conflict, DL Estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Groups: above and below Median Groups: above p75 and below p25
DL1 DL2 DL3 DL1 DL2 DL3
Panel A: Total Incidents
δ̂ 1.549*** 1.187*** 1.239** 1.852*** 1.351*** 1.404*
(0.229) (0.136) (0.582) (0.273) (0.188) (0.758)
Effect Size 4.707 3.277 3.452 6.373 3.861 4.071
R-squared 0.696 0.166 0.184 0.714 0.144 0.160
Panel B: Total Killed
δ̂ 1.599*** 1.242*** 1.294** 1.879*** 1.341*** 1.367*
(0.228) (0.133) (0.569) (0.277) (0.185) (0.742)
Effect Size 4.948 3.463 3.647 6.547 3.823 3.924
R-squared 0.711 0.186 0.206 0.712 0.147 0.158
Panel C: Number of Days with Conflict
δ̂ 1.178*** 0.515*** 0.565* 1.469*** 0.607*** 0.684*
(0.175) (0.068) (0.293) (0.194) (0.083) (0.340)
Effect Size 3.248 1.674 1.759 4.345 1.835 1.982
R-squared 0.695 0.013 0.157 0.767 0.150 0.184
N 21 21 21 19 19 19
Standard errors in parenthesis; *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01
Notes: This table reports estimates for δDL from regression equations (6.6) and (6.7). Districts are classified
into high-income (districts above median per capita GDP) and low-income (all other districts) groups in
columns (1)-(3), and high-income (above p75 per capita GDP) and low-income (below p25 per capita GDP)
groups in columns (4)-(6). See also Table 6.6.
Figure 6.7 compares the effect size of the estimates for the regressions using the district’s
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Gini index and GDP per capita. It reports the estimates of total conflict incidents (TI), total
conflict deaths (TK), and total days of conflict (TD) with a 95% confidence interval using
estimated effects from column (3) of Tables 6.6 and 6.8. These specifications account for the
list of control variables and period fixed-effect. The horizontal dashed line at estimated effect
size equal to one represents the case when conflict outcomes in the post-Massacre period
are equal to those in the pre-Massacre period. An effect size above this line suggests is an
increase in conflict outcomes in the post-Massacre period by n-fold over the pre-Massacre
outcomes. For instance, the estimated effect of total deaths is 3.1 using the Gini index as
the predictor and 0.9 using the per capita GDP as the predictor. This implies that while
conflict deaths in the aftermath of the Massacre increased by more than 300 percent due to
higher inequality, it decreased by 10 percent due to higher income levels. Whereas all the
estimated outcomes for the inequality measure are in the expected direction and significantly
large, the estimates for per capita GDP suggests minimal effect, if any, on explaining the
variation in conflict across time. Moreover, the estimated slopes of per capita GDP indicate
that the effect of income is equally likely to be positive as it is to be negative.
6.4 Robustness and Sensitivity Checks
This section presents results using various measures of inequality to check the sensitivity
of the estimated effect of inequality on conflict. In addition, results are also presented for
select subsamples of the dataset. The alternate inequality measures used in Tables 6.10, 6.11,
6.12, and 6.13 are Gini2001—Gini index of farmland derived using the 2001/02 Agricultural
Census, Top 10 Share—the share of farmland held by the top 10 percent of landholders in
the 1991/92 Agricultural Census, and Avg FarmSize—the average size of a farm holding in
the 1991/92 Agricultural Census. While the average size of the farm in each district is more
closely associated with the idea of the mean as opposed to variance, nevertheless, this concept
does give us an idea of large farm holdings within districts and so is a useful measure.
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Figure 6.7: Comparing the Effect of District’s Land Inequality and Income Level on Conflict
Deaths
Notes: This figure reports the effect sizes for Total Incidents (TI), Total Deaths (TK), and Total Days of
Conflict (TD) for both the Gini index of land ownership and the per capita GDP. All reported estimates
control for period fixed-effect and the list of control variables specified in Table 6.2. Estimated Effect calculates
the magnitude of each outcome in the post-Massacre period (T = 0) relative to the pre-Massacre period
(T = 1). i.e. Effect = OutcomeT =1
OutcomeT =0
. The horizontal dashed line, at Effect size = 1, represents an equivalent
effect size in the pre and post-Massacre periods.
Source: Author’s calculation using estimates and standard errors from column (3) of Tables 6.6 and 6.8.
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Table 6.10 presents results using the specification in equation (6.3) and Table 6.11 presents
results using the specification in equation (6.4). These specifications control for a list of
variables, time fixed-effects, and ecological region fixed-effects. In both tables, all four conflict
outcomes are presented in various panels. Columns (1) and (5) of Table 6.10 replicate baseline
estimates (that is those estimates using the Gini index from the 1991/1992 Agricultural
Census) from column (6) of Table 6.4. Likewise, columns (1) and (5) of Table 6.11 replicate
baseline estimates from column (6) of Table 6.5. Panels A-D present results for the four
conflict outcomes.
Looking at Table 6.10, the effect sizes are equivalent to the baseline estimates if one uses the
average size of farm holdings. For instance, the estimate for the total number killed in the
post-Massacre period corresponds in both cases to a 1.7-fold increase over the pre-Massacre
period. Using the share of land held by the top decile of landholders decreases the effect to a
slightly greater number of deaths in the aftermath of the Massacre relative to before. Using
the Gini index from the 2001 census finds a lowering of deaths in the post-Massacre period.
The results are mixed for this specification.
Table 6.11 employs the BA specification where the data is collapsed into two periods—before
and after the Massacre. Using this specification results in an increase in conflict outcomes
using all measures of inequality. However, as in Tabel 6.10, the share of land held by the top
decile of landholders only very minimally increases conflict in the aftermath of the Massacre
relative to before. Unlike Table 6.10, Gini2001 in Tabel 6.11 increases conflict outcomes
in the post-Massacre period relative to the pre-Massacre period. However, the estimated
effect sizes using the various measures of inequality are lower than in the baseline results.
For instance, the increase in deaths at the baseline was 12.3 fold in the post-Massacre period,

























Table 6.10: Estimates using various definitions of Inequality, δOLS×T
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A: Total Incidents Panel B: Total Killed
Baseline Gini2001 Top 10 Share Avg FarmSize Baseline Gini2001 Top 10 Share Avg FarmSize
Gini x T (δ̂2) 0.566*** 0.459*** 0.007*** 0.471*** 0.600*** 0.492*** 0.008*** 0.491***
(0.162) (0.157) (0.002) (0.071) (0.155) (0.151) (0.002) (0.068)
Gini (δ̂1) -0.128 -0.991* 0.004 0.100 -0.064 -0.890 0.005 0.046
(0.451) (0.557) (0.004) (0.097) (0.464) (0.558) (0.005) (0.094)
δ̂ = δ̂1 + δ̂2 0.446 -0.531 0.011 0.571 0.540 -0.398 0.013 0.537
Effect Size 1.562 0.588 1.011 1.770 1.716 0.672 1.013 1.711
R-squared 0.647 0.646 0.647 0.656 0.639 0.776 0.639 0.648
Panel C: Total Months of Violence Panel D: Total Days of Violence
Gini x T (δ̂2) 0.261** 0.190* 0.004** 0.229*** 0.504*** 0.415*** 0.007*** 0.409***
(0.109) (0.106) (0.001) (0.046) (0.142) (0.138) (0.002) (0.061)
Gini (δ̂1) -0.049 -0.666** 0.003 0.042 0.006 -0.840* 0.005 0.093
(0.256) (0.313) (0.002) (0.057) (0.372) (0.451) (0.004) (0.080)
δ̂ = δ̂1 + δ̂2 0.221 -0.47 0.007 0.271 0.51 -0.425 0.012 0.502
Effect Size 1.247 0.625 1.007 1.311 1.665 0.654 1.012 1.652
R-squared 0.670 0.670 0.670 0.676 0.681 0.680 0.681 0.690
N 1628 1628 1628 1628 1628 1628 1628 1628
Time Dummy x x x x x x x x
Control vars x x x x x x x x
Ecological Region FE x x x x x x x x
Standard errors in parenthesis; *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01
Notes: See Table 6.4. Gini2001 index measures the distribution of land holdings for each district from the 2001/02 Agricultural Census. Avg FarmSize
calculates the mean size of the farm in each district, and Top 10 Share calculates the share of total holdings of the richest 10 percent land owners.























Table 6.11: Estimates using various definitions of Inequality, δBA
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A: Total Incidents Panel B: Total Killed
Baseline Gini2001 Top 10 Share Avg FarmSize Baseline Gini2001 Top 10 Share Avg FarmSize
Gini x T (δ̂2) 5.938*** 5.291* 0.060** 1.363*** 6.473*** 5.746* 0.065*** 1.460***
(2.236) (2.958) (0.024) (0.441) (2.213) (3.013) (0.025) (0.421)
Gini (δ̂1) -3.896* -3.514 -0.030 -0.376 -3.968* -3.554 -0.030 -0.550
(2.090) (3.383) (0.019) (0.442) (2.155) (3.561) (0.020) (0.420)
δ̂ = δ̂1 + δ̂2 2.048 1.781 0.03 0.993 2.513 2.196 0.035 0.91
Effect Size 7.752 5.936 1.030 2.699 12.342 8.989 1.036 2.484
R-squared 0.770 0.766 0.767 0.775 0.781 0.776 0.778 0.785
Panel C: Total Months of Violence Panel D: Total Days of Violence
Gini x T (δ̂2) 3.519** 2.468 0.037** 0.730** 5.406*** 4.625* 0.053** 1.184***
(1.672) (2.127) (0.017) (0.340) (2.009) (2.768) (0.021) (0.398)
Gini (δ̂1) -1.976 -2.258 -0.014 -0.085 -2.882 -3.319 -0.019 -0.180
(1.532) (2.438) (0.013) (0.344) (1.874) (3.083) (0.017) (0.392)
δ̂ = δ̂1 + δ̂2 1.549 0.218 0.027 0.65 2.526 1.315 0.043 1.004
Effect Size 4.707 1.244 1.027 1.916 12.503 3.725 1.044 2.729
R-squared 0.735 0.731 0.734 0.738 0.773 0.769 0.771 0.778
N 148 148 148 148 148 148 148 148
Time Dummy x x x x x x x x
Control vars x x x x x x x x
Ecological Region FE x x x x x x x x
Standard errors in parenthesis; *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01
Notes: This table reports estimates for δBA from equation (6.4). The Baseline estimates are replicated from column (6) of Table 6.5. See also Table
6.10.
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Tables 6.12 and 6.13 present results using the DD and DL specifications. The groups in
Table 6.12 are classified in relation to the median inequality measure, and the groups in
Table 6.13 are those higher than the 75th percentile and those below the 25th percentile
of the corresponding inequality measure. In both tables, the estimates in columns (1)-(4)
are calculated using the DD regression presented in equation (6.5), while the estimates in
columns (5)-(8) are calculated using the DL2 regression presented in equation (6.7). The
previous set of specifications estimate the average change in conflict utilizing data from the
entire period after the Massacre, and the latter specifications estimate the effect using data
from only the first period following the Massacre. Gini1991 in columns (1) and (5) of Table
6.12 present baseline regression results from columns (2) and (6) of Table 6.6. Likewise, the
baseline results of columns (1) and (5) in Table 6.13 correspond to columns (2) and (6) of
Table 6.7. Panels A-C present results for the total incidents, total deaths, and total days of
conflict.
Whereas the estimated effect sizes in Table 6.12 using various measures of inequality are
comparable to the baseline results, the estimated effect sizes in Table 6.13 using the various
measures of inequality are larger than the baseline results. Only the estimates from the share
held by the top decile farm holders in Table 6.12 is not statistically significant. The rest
of the measures suggest an increase in deaths of between 1.6 and 2.9 fold (using the above
and below median groups) or between 1.6 and 3.6 fold (using the above p75 and below p25
groups) in the period immediately following the Massacre. On average, for the entire period
after the Massacre, the increase in deaths is between 6.6 and 7.1 folds or between 7.0 and 10.2
folds using the respective division for groups. Indeed, a comparison of a relatively unequal
group to more equal (as with the p75 versus p25 comparison) yields estimates that are larger























Table 6.12: Estimates using various definitions of Inequality, DD estimates using above and below median groups
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
DD DL2
Baseline Gini2001 Top 10 Share Avg FarmSize Baseline Gini2001 Top 10 Share Avg FarmSize
Panel A: Total Incidents
δ̂ 1.918*** 1.889*** 1.732*** 1.821*** 0.505*** 1.174*** 0.110 0.742***
(0.239) (0.205) (0.199) (0.204) (0.113) (0.113) (0.103) (0.132)
Effect Size 6.807 6.613 5.652 6.178 1.657 3.235 1.116 2.100
R-squared 0.971 0.978 0.979 0.978 0.05 0.220 0.003 0.077
Panel B: Total Killed
δ̂ 1.958*** 1.965*** 1.767*** 1.893*** 0.438*** 1.055*** 0.043 0.621***
(0.246) (0.234) (0.216) (0.230) (0.115) (0.122) (0.114) (0.148)
Effect Size 7.085 7.135 5.853 6.639 1.550 2.872 1.044 1.861
R-squared 0.969 0.973 0.975 0.972 0.037 0.165 0.000 0.044
Panel C: Number of Days with Conflict
δ̂ 1.435*** 1.422*** 1.412*** 1.356*** 0.150* 0.171* 0.096 0.149
(0.203) (0.207) (0.167) (0.193) (0.077) (0.084) (0.070) (0.094)
Effect Size 4.200 4.145 4.104 3.881 1.162 1.186 1.101 1.161
R-squared 0.952 0.951 0.967 0.956 0.010 0.011 0.005 0.007
N 44 44 44 44 21 21 21 21
Period FE x x x x
Standard errors in parenthesis; *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01
Notes: This table reports estimates for δ from equation (6.5) in columns (1)-(4) and equation (6.7) in columns (5)-(8). Districts are classified into
high-income (above median) and low-income (below median) groups. Columns (1) and (5) are baseline results from Columns (2) and (6) of Table 6.6
























Table 6.13: Estimates using various definitions of Inequality, DD estimates using 1st and 4th quartile groups
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
DD DL2
Baseline Gini2001 Top 10 Share Avg FarmSize Baseline Gini2001 Top 10 Share Avg FarmSize
Panel A: Total Incidents
δ̂ 1.881*** 2.191*** 2.117*** 2.362*** 0.505*** 0.737*** 0.701*** 1.347***
(0.236) (0.254) (0.259) (0.243) (0.113) (0.136) (0.172) (0.138)
Effect Size 6.560 8.944 8.306 10.612 1.657 2.090 2.016 3.846
R-squared 0.971 0.963 0.967 0.973 0.05 0.072 0.057 0.238
Panel B: Total Killed
δ̂ 1.943*** 2.180*** 2.198*** 2.322*** 0.438*** 0.483*** 0.641*** 1.275***
(0.248) (0.278) (0.249) (0.241) (0.115) (0.144) (0.161) (0.142)
Effect Size 6.980 8.846 9.007 10.196 1.550 1.621 1.898 3.579
R-squared 0.967 0.955 0.968 0.971 0.037 0.029 0.055 0.228
Panel C: Number of Days with Conflict
δ̂ 1.517*** 1.811*** 1.699*** 1.862*** 0.150* 0.386*** 0.255** 0.559***
(0.199) (0.229) (0.215) (0.226) (0.077) (0.093) (0.106) (0.089)
Effect Size 4.559 6.117 5.468 6.437 1.162 1.471 1.290 1.749
R-squared 0.963 0.948 0.960 0.960 0.010 0.043 0.021 0.014
N 42 43 43 43 18 21 18 19
Period FE x x x x
Standard errors in parenthesis; *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01
Notes: This table reports estimates for δ from equation (6.5) in columns (1)-(4) and equation (6.7) in columns (5)-(8). Districts are classified into
high-income (above 75th percentile) and low-income (below 25th percentile) groups. Columns (1) and (5) are baseline results from Columns (2) and (6)
of Table 6.7 respectively. See also Table 6.10.
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Table 6.14 presents results using the same specifications reported in Tables 6.12 and 6.13.
Here, instead of using various measures of inequality as the main explanatory variable, the
size of the sample is adjusted. It is possible that during the conflict there were episodes
of high-intensity conflict on particular days and low or no conflict on others. The outcome
of the conflict will certainly be influenced by these large outliers. For instance, so far the
regressions do not distinguish between two districts with 100 people killed in one day or 100
people killed in 100 days. It is more probable that the latter district had more underlying
motive for the sustained period of violence. The former could very well be an outlier in an
otherwise relatively peaceful district. Indeed, there were a few major clashed between the
military and the guerrillas with high casualties. One way to mitigate the influence of these
outliers is to restrict the number of outcomes per event; in other words, this would give more
weight to the events as opposed to the number of killed or injured to the events. To that end,
I have created three subsamples of the data, namely (a) those events with less than 25 deaths
per event, (b) those events with less than 50 deaths per event, and (c) those events with
less than 100 deaths per event. Thereby, the first sample excludes any event in which there
were more than 25 deaths and so on. Gini index from the 1991/92 census is the measure of
inequality for these regressions.
The specifications in Table 6.14 correspond to equation (6.5) in columns (1)-(4) and equation
(6.7) in columns (5)-(8). The baseline specification includes all incidents; columns (1) and (5)
replicate results from columns (2) and (6) of Table 6.6 respectively. Results for the intensity
of violence (that is TI and TK) are similar across the various samples. For instance, the
total number of deaths increases in the post-Massacre period by between 7.1 and 7.8 fold
with the various subsamples compared to 7.1 fold at the baseline. Similarly, the number
of deaths using DL2 methodology is 1.5 fold higher in the baseline sample compared with
between 1.3 and 1.4 fold higher in the various subsamples. The effect of the number of days
of conflict using the same methodology is not statistically significant in the subsamples. The
estimates for TD is not significant using any of the smaller samples. However, the direction
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of change is similar to the baseline. In addition, the estimates for the average number of days
of conflict in the overall period after the Massacre (between 4.2 and 4.3 fold) is comparable
to the baseline estimate (4.2 fold).
Table 6.14: Estimates using Low-intensity Conflict Outcomes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
DD DL2
Baseline <25 <50 <100 Baseline <25 <50 <100
Panel A: Total Incidents
δ̂ 1.918*** 2.017*** 1.947*** 1.927*** 0.505*** 0.388*** 0.313*** 0.426***
(0.239) (0.216) (0.224) (0.235) (0.113) (0.080) (0.096) (0.108)
Effect Size 6.807 7.516 7.008 6.869 1.657 1.474 1.368 1.531
R-squared 0.971 0.975 0.974 0.972 0.05 0.076 0.042 0.049
Panel B: Total Killed
δ̂ 1.958*** 2.061*** 1.986*** 1.965*** 0.438*** 0.383*** 0.264** 0.359***
(0.246) (0.220) (0.231) (0.243) (0.115) (0.077) (0.094) (0.110)
Effect Size 7.085 7.854 7.286 7.135 1.550 1.467 1.302 1.432
R-squared 0.969 0.973 0.972 0.969 0.037 0.081 0.036 0.038
Panel C: Number of Days with Conflict
δ̂ 1.435*** 1.464*** 1.461*** 1.431*** 0.150* 0.106 0.099 0.124
(0.203) (0.202) (0.202) (0.203) (0.077) (0.075) (0.076) (0.079)
Effect Size 4.200 4.323 4.310 4.183 1.162 1.112 1.104 1.132
R-squared 0.952 0.953 0.953 0.953 0.010 0.035 0.035 0.030
N 44 44 44 44 21 21 21 21
Period FE x x x x
Standard errors in parenthesis; *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01
Notes: This table reports estimates for δ from equation (6.5) in columns (1)-(4) and equation (6.7) in columns
(5)-(8). Districts are classified into high-income (above median) and low-income (below median) groups.
Columns (1) and (5) report baseline results from columns (2) and (6) of Table 6.6 respectively. Columns
(2)-(4) and columns (5)-(7) restrict the sample of outcomes to those with less than 25 incidents, less than 50
incidents, and less than 100 incidents for any given event. See also Table 6.6.
Finally, it is possible that most of the fighting was between individuals who did not reside in
the district. If indeed conflict was only between non-residents, this would cast doubt as to
whether grievance played a role in the conflict. So, Table 6.15 presents results using both the
full sample of data (baseline results) and a sample that contains individuals who were both
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residents and involved in the event that took place in their home district. About 60% of the
events are involving residents.
The results are presented using various specifications in the various panels for the number
of deaths (TK) and the number of days of conflict (TD). Results using total incidents are
very similar to results with TK. Almost all results are robust to the resident only sample.
Interestingly, the effect sizes using the resident only sample is larger than the baseline estimate.
For instance, total death employing the DD methodology (panel C) increases from 7.1 fold in
the aftermath of the Massacre at baseline to 9.7 fold using the sample involving only the
residents. Likewise, the total number of days employing the DL2 methodology (panel D)
increases from 1.2 fold after the Massacre at baseline to 1.3 fold using the resident sample.
6.5 Conclusion
The loss of legitimacy provided the space for grievances to come to the fore. In the period
after the Massacre, I find that conflict-related deaths on average increased by at least 3-fold
in unequal regions relative to more equal regions. This increase was instantaneous in the
aftermath of the Massacre. Conflict related deaths increased by at least 1.5-fold when using
only the first period after the Massacre. Further, I find that the frequency of conflict—
measured by the days of recorded conflict—increased by around 4 folds in the aftermath
of the Massacre. The results are robust to various measures and the use of subsamples.
Furthermore, I do not find any significant result linking regions with lower levels of income
to higher conflict.
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Table 6.15: Estimates using Outcome for Residents only Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
TK TD TK TD
Baseline Resident Baseline Resident Baseline Resident Baseline Resident
Panel A: OLS x T Panel B: BA
Gini x T 0.600*** 0.626*** 0.504*** 0.569*** 6.473*** 5.537** 5.406*** 4.908**
(0.155) (0.118) (0.142) (0.113) (2.213) (2.228) (2.009) (2.008)
Gini -0.064 0.471 0.006 0.404 -3.968* -1.721 -2.882 -1.714
(0.464) (0.410) (0.372) (0.354) (2.155) (2.284) (1.874) (2.039)
δ̂ 0.540 1.097 0.510 0.973 2.513 3.817 2.526 3.198
Effect Size 1.716 2.995 1.665 2.646 12.342 45.468 12.503 24.484
R-squared 0.639 0.613 0.681 0.631 0.781 0.777 0.773 0.767
N 1628 1606 1628 1606 148 146 148 146
Panel C: DD Panel D: DL2
δ̂ 1.958*** 2.275*** 1.435*** 1.898*** 0.438*** 0.161 0.150* 0.301***
(0.246) (0.295) (0.203) (0.257) (0.115) (0.099) (0.077) (0.099)
Effect Size 7.085 9.728 4.200 6.673 1.550 1.175 1.162 1.351
R-squared 0.969 0.955 0.952 0.942 0.037 0.008 0.010 0.036
N 44 44 44 44 21 21 21 21
Standard errors in parenthesis; *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01
Notes: Columns (1) and (3) of Panel A report baseline results for total deaths (TK) and total number of days
with conflict (TD) from columns (6) of Table 6.4. Likewise, columns (5) and (7) of Panel B report baseline
results from columns (6) of Table 6.5; columns (1) and (3) of Panel C report baseline results from column
(2) of Table 6.6; and, columns (5) and (6) of Panel D report baseline results from column (6) of Table 6.6.
"Resident" specifications duplicate the baseline specifications for a sample that only includes incidents with
the affected individuals also a resident of the district.
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Appendix
6.A Derivation of DL1 and DL2
In what follows, equations (6.6) and (6.7) is derived from equation (6.5). The standard DD
model is reproduced here:




+ γs + εjs.
For the two groups j = {H,L}, I first take the difference between the groups. That is





Substituting ∆(ln ys) for ln(yH,s) − ln(yL,s), βs for β(GroupH − GroupL), and δDL1 for
δDD
{
(GroupH −GroupL), we can rewrite the above expression as
∆(ln ys) = βs + δDL1 Ts + νs,
where νs = εH,s − εL,s. This is expression presented in equation (6.6).
Finally, taking the difference over two consecutive periods gives the following:
∆(ln ys)−∆(ln ys−1) = βs − βs−1 + δDL1(Ts − Ts−1) + νs − νs−1.
In the above expression, Ts = Ts−1∀s except s = 12. The last expression is equivalent to
equation (6.7). For regression equation DL3, we assume that βs = βs−1.
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6.B Tables
Table 6.B.1: Definition and Source of Regressors
Variables Definition Source
Gini1991 Gini index of ownership of farmland in 1991 CBS (1993)
Gini2001 Gini index of ownership of farmland in 2001 CBS (2003)
Top 10% Share Share of total farmland owned by the top decile of owners CBS (1993)
Avg FarmSize Average size of the farm CBS (1993)
Log GDPpc Log of GDP per capita by each district ICIMOD (1997)
Slopes Per cent of land inclined more than 30 degrees ICIMOD (1997)
Banks Banks per capita normalized by population distance ICIMOD (1997)
Roads Kilometers of Roads per 100 sq kilometers ICIMOD (1997)
Poffice Post Offices per capita normalized by population disatance ICIMOD (1997)
HDI Human development index rank ICIMOD (1997)
UPFn UPF spillover effect (as defined in the paper) Acharya (2009)
Log Population Log of population CBS (1993)
Nepsppc Percent of Nepali Speakers ICIMOD (1997)
CHHEpc Percent of Hill Brahmins and Chettris ethnic groups ICIMOD (1997)
Acronyms: HDI - Human Development Index; UPF - United Peoples Front; Nepsppc - percent of Nepali
speakers; CHHEpc - percent of Chettri and Hill Brahmins ethnic groups.
Notes: Gini1991 is the main regressor of interest. Gini2001, Top 10% Share, and Avg FarmSize are alternate
measures of inequality used in the robustness check section. The other variables are the list of control variables
used in the regression.
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Achham 356 330 58 115 Lalitpur 77 61 34 58
Arghakhanchi 316 299 49 120 Lamjung 207 189 55 123
Baglung 142 123 45 99 Mahottari 64 62 31 45
Baitadi 85 80 32 68 Makwanpur 185 175 50 114
Bajhang 88 82 37 69 Morang 218 192 49 141
Bajura 134 130 40 80 Mugu 46 44 26 36
Banke 490 358 72 295 Mustang 2 2 1 1
Bara 131 130 48 104 Myagdi 254 219 38 87
Bardiya 556 308 73 288 Nawalparasi 206 177 53 130
Bhaktapur 22 7 19 21 Nuwakot 183 180 47 121
Bhojpur 211 187 41 100 Okhaldhunga 128 108 52 83
Chitawan 245 220 52 144 Palpa 162 149 42 92
Dadeldhura 125 112 41 86 Panchthar 144 130 44 105
Dailekh 249 230 69 173 Parbat 51 47 28 42
Dang 636 550 80 314 Parsa 106 100 32 70
Darchula 74 70 29 54 Pyuthan 96 93 43 77
Dhading 177 158 50 131 Ramechhap 152 143 53 99
Dhankuta 69 66 30 47 Rasuwa 31 29 17 23
Dhanusa 203 194 56 136 Rautahat 203 196 50 146
Dolakha 153 148 46 79 Rolpa 811 774 107 408
Dolpa 69 66 27 37 Rukum 641 605 104 338
Doti 111 101 37 80 Rupandehi 179 159 50 129
Gorkha 265 251 67 159 Salyan 260 213 74 170
Gulmi 67 66 33 45 Sankhuwasabha 117 113 42 85
Humla 37 30 18 27 Saptari 90 78 41 77
Ilam 163 151 48 118 Sarlahi 196 186 56 128
Jajarkot 306 268 89 189 Sindhuli 253 241 63 122
Jhapa 130 117 45 95 Sindhupalchok 228 216 70 155
Jumla 321 285 63 161 Siraha 202 189 49 112
Kailali 662 616 77 406 Solukhumbu 173 162 42 87
Kalikot 520 423 87 305 Sunsari 100 78 39 79
Kanchanpur 220 186 51 149 Surkhet 326 240 73 234
Kapilbastu 269 244 47 156 Syangja 114 102 37 72
Kaski 147 112 50 107 Tanahu 103 87 44 73
Kathmandu 203 90 53 155 Taplejung 97 93 44 82
Kavrepalanchok 278 262 73 164 Terhathum 93 93 38 64
Khotang 127 118 37 78 Udayapur 127 117 42 87
Notes: Each entry reports the aggregate conflict outcomes (total incidents, total deaths, total Months of
violence, and total days of violence) for a each district aggregated over the entire civil war period. Total
Incidents includes deaths, disappearances, and injuries.
Source: Author’s calculations using Joshi and Pyakurel (2015).
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Table 6.B.3: Total Incidents per Period by District before the Massacre
District 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 Total
Achham 0 0 0 0 0 1 6 3 15 4 7 36
Arghakhanchi 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 2 1 0 6
Baglung 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 8 0 10
Baitadi 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
Bajhang 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Bajura 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 1 4
Banke 1 0 0 0 1 2 9 1 0 3 4 21
Bara 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 4 4 9
Bardiya 0 0 0 0 5 5 3 5 1 2 1 22
Bhaktapur 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Bhojpur 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 2 0 1 5
Chitawan 0 0 0 1 0 0 3 1 0 1 2 8
Dadeldhura 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Dailekh 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 10 2 43 60
Dang 0 0 0 1 6 10 16 2 5 5 11 56
Darchula 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
Dhading 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 0 12 0 0 16
Dhankuta 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 2
Dhanusha 0 1 0 1 1 3 2 1 0 2 2 13
Dolakha 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 3 1 2 9 19
Dolpa 0 0 0 1 0 5 3 5 1 16 0 31
Doti 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Gorakha 1 0 1 2 13 25 14 5 7 8 10 86
Gulmi 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 1 5
Humla 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Ilam 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 2 3
Jajarkot 4 2 2 9 29 52 42 16 40 8 5 209
Jhapa 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
Jumla 0 1 1 1 2 7 3 2 14 4 5 40
Kailali 0 0 0 0 0 5 2 2 12 7 11 39
Kalikot 0 0 1 1 8 10 17 17 37 36 22 149
Kanchanpur 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 4
Kapilvastu 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 0 3
Kaski 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 4 6
Kathmandu 0 0 0 0 1 1 8 1 2 0 0 13
Kavre 0 1 0 1 8 13 17 9 3 2 1 55
Khotang 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2
Lalitpur 0 0 0 0 0 6 5 1 0 0 0 12
Lamjung 0 0 0 0 0 6 3 1 8 11 0 29
Mahottari 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
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Table 6.B.3: Total Incidents per Period by District before the Massacre (continued)
District 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 Total
Makawanpur 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 0 1 1 5
Morang 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 3
Mugu 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Mustang 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Myagdi 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 3 0 4
Nawalparasi 0 0 0 0 0 1 7 1 0 2 1 12
Nuwakot 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 4 1 0 7
Okhaldhunga 1 0 2 0 1 0 0 3 1 5 7 20
Palpa 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 4 6
Panchathar 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 2
Parsa 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Parvat 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 2
Pyuthan 2 0 0 1 0 3 2 3 6 2 1 20
Ramechhap 1 0 5 1 0 2 0 0 0 2 2 13
Rasuwa 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1
Rautahat 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 3 6
Rolpa 22 29 14 19 16 44 65 32 29 8 13 291
Rukum 18 7 12 12 15 38 37 65 54 7 47 312
Rupandehi 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 2 5
Salyan 1 1 1 1 9 20 11 19 4 2 3 72
Sankhuwasabha 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 2
Saptari 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2
Sarlahi 0 0 0 0 0 3 4 0 2 0 3 12
Sindhuli 2 0 2 1 5 24 28 8 3 7 5 85
Sindhupalanchok 2 1 2 0 4 8 3 2 3 5 3 33
Siraha 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 3 1 0 2 8
Solukhumbu 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 2 2 1 6
Sunsari 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Surkhet 1 0 2 1 4 2 0 5 15 2 16 48
Syangja 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 3 4
Tanahu 0 0 0 0 4 2 6 0 1 2 1 16
Taplejung 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
Terhathum 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Udaypur 0 0 0 0 1 13 2 0 0 0 4 20
Total 56 45 46 57 140 320 333 222 307 190 279 1995
Notes: Each entry reports the pre-Massacre conflict incidents (deaths, disappearances, and injuries) by
district for each six-month period during the 1996-2006 Civil War in Nepal. Districts are the second-tier
administrative regions in Nepal. Data is available for 74 out of 75 districts.
Source: Author’s calculations using Joshi and Pyakurel (2015).
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Table 6.B.4: Total Incidents per Period by District after the Massacre
District 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 Total
Achham 1 220 13 10 29 21 8 5 8 5 0 320
Arghakhanchi 8 6 115 7 13 25 73 36 7 20 0 310
Baglung 13 39 18 4 10 17 14 8 5 4 0 132
Baitadi 8 16 12 0 19 1 5 9 8 5 1 84
Bajhang 3 23 5 9 16 5 15 5 2 4 1 88
Bajura 25 43 22 2 14 6 10 5 2 0 1 130
Banke 23 72 48 24 117 56 57 29 13 30 0 469
Bara 4 4 14 8 17 28 15 18 4 8 2 122
Bardiya 24 130 138 24 27 56 33 85 6 9 2 534
Bhaktapur 0 5 4 0 3 1 2 3 2 2 0 22
Bhojpur 2 10 12 11 10 72 11 41 4 33 0 206
Chitawan 3 32 27 4 27 39 19 68 1 17 0 237
Dadeldhura 10 29 27 7 18 15 10 7 1 1 0 125
Dailekh 6 22 19 5 24 15 41 24 18 14 1 189
Dang 73 164 91 32 90 42 30 26 16 13 3 580
Darchula 11 18 16 4 9 5 0 4 4 2 0 73
Dhading 3 19 24 4 26 46 19 11 3 6 0 161
Dhankuta 0 4 2 0 7 12 18 17 3 4 0 67
Dhanusha 6 4 5 4 34 46 42 22 14 10 3 190
Dolakha 3 9 28 2 28 38 16 9 1 0 0 134
Dolpa 2 10 11 3 0 2 0 5 0 5 0 38
Doti 4 29 9 8 18 18 14 8 3 0 0 111
Gorakha 23 54 39 1 13 18 17 4 7 3 0 179
Gulmi 13 10 1 9 0 9 4 4 3 8 1 62
Humla 0 7 10 4 8 2 3 0 3 0 0 37
Ilam 5 9 14 6 25 19 15 41 3 22 1 160
Jajarkot 7 23 10 12 4 13 6 11 6 3 2 97
Jhapa 3 2 20 4 16 20 17 16 5 25 1 129
Jumla 9 31 151 11 11 27 17 17 3 4 0 281
Kailali 39 82 108 29 94 48 85 111 13 9 5 623
Kalikot 29 118 29 18 14 21 20 17 99 5 1 371
Kanchanpur 4 61 46 20 15 23 12 18 10 7 0 216
Kapilvastu 2 9 7 7 25 42 38 73 19 43 1 266
Kaski 8 20 6 4 27 36 15 13 7 4 1 141
Kathmandu 9 25 13 7 52 26 35 6 5 11 1 190
Kavre 4 34 15 3 24 51 22 38 8 24 0 223
Khotang 0 17 16 8 35 19 4 13 7 4 2 125
Lalitpur 3 3 16 11 14 6 7 3 1 1 0 65
Lamjung 35 42 16 1 26 13 24 14 4 1 2 178
Mahottari 2 3 2 1 27 9 10 4 2 3 1 64
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Table 6.B.4: Total Incidents per Period by District after the Massacre (continued)
District 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 Total
Makawanpur 5 3 18 10 25 38 11 5 16 47 2 180
Morang 6 14 5 4 39 37 35 42 9 21 3 215
Mugu 3 10 18 1 2 0 5 1 3 2 0 45
Mustang 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
Myagdi 3 33 11 10 1 168 6 12 2 4 0 250
Nawalparashi 4 4 19 6 24 25 27 38 11 33 3 194
Nuwakot 14 24 39 4 30 27 19 11 2 6 0 176
Okhaldhunga 12 23 34 5 8 3 14 7 1 1 0 108
Palpa 4 21 10 3 10 9 12 9 18 60 0 156
Panchathar 2 19 17 16 34 22 20 4 3 4 1 142
Parsa 5 0 2 2 28 20 20 21 4 4 0 106
Parvat 2 14 5 1 3 6 6 10 1 1 0 49
Pyuthan 7 18 19 10 6 1 8 4 2 1 0 76
Ramechhap 5 11 35 5 31 20 15 10 5 1 1 139
Rasuwa 1 3 12 4 4 1 1 1 3 0 0 30
Rautahat 2 17 25 7 62 26 18 20 5 14 1 197
Rolpa 41 265 79 23 49 11 12 27 8 5 0 520
Rukum 13 110 46 16 14 14 8 90 9 9 0 329
Rupandehi 1 8 7 4 21 17 40 35 13 27 1 174
Salyan 33 89 24 7 7 7 11 5 3 1 1 188
Sankhuwasabha 1 36 14 8 16 17 10 8 3 2 0 115
Saptari 6 7 3 3 14 9 11 15 4 10 6 88
Sarlahi 4 17 15 3 49 20 17 20 8 30 1 184
Sindhuli 4 12 85 1 10 24 6 21 4 1 0 168
Sindhupalchowk 5 39 22 5 36 23 25 14 6 20 0 195
Siraha 5 10 34 7 27 13 29 63 4 2 0 194
Solukhumbu 67 6 15 9 22 14 20 10 1 3 0 167
Sunsari 7 13 8 3 23 15 17 8 0 6 0 100
Surkhet 10 75 38 19 29 35 27 30 6 8 1 278
Syangja 21 13 11 5 11 4 13 7 0 24 1 110
Tanahu 10 24 8 3 8 12 11 9 1 1 0 87
Taplejung 7 11 12 9 23 10 6 8 5 4 1 96
Terhathum 5 23 7 1 14 14 10 4 6 6 3 93
Udaypur 7 4 5 2 29 13 6 31 2 8 0 107
Total 749 2434 1881 546 1695 1643 1299 1448 498 735 59 12987
Notes: Each entry reports the post-Massacre conflict incidents (deaths, disappearances, and injuries) by
district for each six-month period during the 1996-2006 Civil War in Nepal. Districts are the second-tier
administrative regions in Nepal. Data is available for 74 out of 75 districts.
Source: Author’s calculations using Joshi and Pyakurel (2015).
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Table 6.B.5: Effect of Inequality on Conflict, DD estimates for the 2nd and 3rd quartile groups
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
DD DL1 DL2 DL3
Panel A: Total Incidents
δ̂ 1.517** 1.517*** 0.255 0.255 1.517*** 0.127 0.236
(0.620) (0.248) (0.579) (0.525) (0.248) (0.146) (0.630)
Effect Size 4.559 4.559 1.290 1.290 4.559 1.135 1.266
R-squared 0.523 0.962 0.983 0.652 0.002 0.007
Panel B: Total Killed
δ̂ 1.544** 1.544*** 0.356 0.356 1.544*** 0.214 0.310
(0.607) (0.256) (0.629) (0.551) (0.256) (0.163) (0.698)
Effect Size 4.683 4.683 1.428 1.428 4.683 1.239 1.363
R-squared 0.531 0.958 0.981 0.645 0.005 0.01
Panel C: Number of Days with Conflict
δ̂ 1.235** 1.235*** 0.282 0.282 1.235*** -0.020 0.070
(0.471) (0.210) (0.379) (0.341) (0.210) (0.098) (0.425)
Effect Size 3.438 3.438 1.326 1.326 3.438 0.980 1.073
R-squared 0.511 0.951 0.980 0.634 0.000 0.001
N 44 44 44 44 22 21 21
Period FE x x x
Control Variables x x
AR(5) x
Standard errors in parenthesis; *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01
Notes: This table reports estimates for δ from regression equation (6.5) in columns (1)-(4), and from equations
(6.6) and (6.7) in columns (5)-(7). Districts are classified into high-inequality (those in the 3rd quartile of the
distribution of Gini index) and low-inequality (those in the 2nd quartile of the distribution of Gini index)









1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21







1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21






1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21






1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21
Panel D: Total Days of Violence
Low Inequality High Inequality
Figure 6.C.1: Parallel Trends for above p75 and below p25 Gini Index Groups
Notes: Each panels shows trends between low and high-inequality groups by conflict outcomes. High-inequality
group is composed of districts that have a Gini index greater than the 75th percentile of Gini indices, and
low-inequality group is composed of districts that have a Gini index lower than the 25th percentile of Gini
indices. See also Figure 6.2.
Source: Author’s calculation using Joshi and Pyakurel (2015).
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Panel D: Total Days of Violence
Low Inequality High Inequality
Figure 6.C.2: Parallel Trends for above and below Median Gini Index Groups, without high
insurgency districts
Notes: Each panels shows trends between low and high-inequality groups by conflict outcomes. The high-
inequality group is composed of districts that have a Gini index greater than the median Gini index, and
the rest of the districts comprise the low-inequality group. The two most high insurgency districts in the
pre-Massacre period (Rukum and Rolpa) are no included in this sample. See also Figure 6.2.




In this dissertation, I have argued that conflict is a mode of institutional change. Changes
in the state’s institutions bring about conflict. The nature of conflict is dependent on the
nature of the institutions. Institutions that allow for small changes over time, or adaptive
institutions, can expect lower-intensity conflicts. On the other hand, institutions that do not
easily adapt can abruptly change. The consequent process of abrupt change can incorporate
high-intensity conflict.
The path of institutional change—that is a path from stability to instability or vice versa—
and the nature of conflict depends on (a) the origins of institutions, (b) the method of the
perpetuation of the institutions, and (c) the reason(s) for the breakdown of these institutions.
For the Kingdom of Nepal, the link from state institutions to conflict can be traced as follows:
formation of state under the Shah ruler –> formation of institutions with Shah kings as the
head of state –> formation of norms based on Hindu religious ideology which reinforced those
institutions and, among other things, created an unequal distribution of land –> the Royal
Massacre, which drastically reduced the legitimacy of the institutions –> mass social conflict.
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Conflicts, in general, require both a motive and an opportunity. While the abrupt change in
state capacity provided the opportunity for conflict, it is difficult to reason a conflict without
a motive. The main motive for Nepal’s civil conflict was the unequal distribution of resources,
in particular land, which is evident in the inefficient institutional structure and distribution
pattern. The historical distribution pattern and the institutional structure meant that there
was persistence of this inefficient allocation of land. This allocation provided the motive for
the conflict. The motive, that is the unequal distribution of land, was already evident from
the political debates through the latter half of the twentieth century. We now have evidence
that both rebel recruitment (Macours 2010) and conflict outcomes were positively related to
economic inequality.
Demographic and technological changes can alter the reward structures of societies. This
in turn may create the opportunity for conflict. For the conflict in Nepal, an opportunity
existed due to the Royal Massacre. The Massacre changed the relative price structures in
society and created the opportunity for mass political action. An escalation of conflict as that
took place after 2001, however, would likely not have happened given the lack of opportunity.
In other words, if institutions had persisted in the historical pattern, perhaps the insurgency
would have been limited to remote mountain villages in Nepal. Instead of escalating into
a full-fledged war, the insurgency would have withered away as had happened in case of a
similar insurgency in the 1960s. What did change, and drastically so, was the collapse of
legitimacy of the state. The Royal Massacre, where eleven members of the Royal family
including the King were killed, changed the course of history for the Kingdom of Nepal.
This one event, really an “accident”, destroyed the legitimacy of the foundation of the state.
Consequently, the state capacity was lowered and that provided the opportunity for mass
civil strife.
Using the Royal Massacre as the exogenous shock, I found that conflict-related deaths
increased by more than 200 percent in the first seven months after the Massacre compared
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to the pre-Massacre trends. Had this period not included a three-month-long cease-fire, we
perhaps would have a higher intensity and frequency of conflict. Indeed, in the five-and-half-
year period after the Massacre, annual conflict deaths jumped on average by more than 600
percent relative to the conflict deaths in a similar period before the Massacre. To account
for any secular time trends in this increase, I used the Indian Naxalite insurgency, a close
ideological companion to the Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist led conflict in Nepal, as the
counterfactual series. The findings are robust to various regression specifications and controls.
Furthermore, the outcomes of the conflict in the aftermath of the Massacre could also be linked
to the distribution of land. The increase in conflict in the overall period after the Massacre
was, on average, at least 3-fold greater in districts with higher inequality of distribution of
farmland compared to more equal districts. There was also an observable effect in the period
immediately following the Massacre. The period after the Massacre saw at least 1.5-fold
greater conflict outcomes in more unequal regions. The frequency of conflict, measured by the
number of days a conflict event took place, also jumped on average by 4 folds in the aftermath
of the Massacre. The regression used various geographic, economic, and political controls
that have been deemed important for studying civil conflict in the literature. The results
were robust to various regression specifications, alternate measures of inequality, and various
subsamples of the data. Additionally, I found that a district’s average level of economic
output explained little, if any, of the changes in conflict outcomes in the period after the
Massacre relative to before. This latter point provides further evidence that the dispersion
and not the stock of the district’s economic resource was important for this particular conflict.
7.2 Discussion
It is one thing to study the events in the past, yet another to predict the future. Predictions,
naturally so, will come with sizable errors. However, the policy requires guidance on the
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future path. Finally, in this section, I look at the aftermath of the civil conflict in Nepal with
a motive to generate further discourse with implications for policy. In doing so, I look at
what the data tells us and what we should expect from history.
Since Scheidel (2017), it has become natural to ask if the conflict reduced inequality when
studying to the two. If indeed the cause of the conflict was the disparities in the distribution
of land, then it is natural that the conflict should impact the distribution in the conflict’s
aftermath. Scheidel (2017) argues that in history four factors—which he labels the four
horsemen—have reduced inequality of wealth. These are mass warfare, transformative
revolutions, state failure, and lethal pandemics. These, Scheidel argues, are the only factors
that have reduced inequality in the history of humankind—at least since humans have settled
and farmed. He uses examples from across time and space as wide as the Qing dynasty in
China to the US in the twentieth century.1
Mass warfare has been particularly leveling for disparities in wealth. He argues that this
reduction is not because of the mass participation or consensus and compromises that one
would expect from war, but because of the destructive nature of war. For instance, Scheidel
cites the destruction of both infrastructure and human lives in World War II in Japan. He
notes that while the wealthiest percentile held roughly a fifth of the total income before
World War II, this share dropped to 6.4% in the aftermath of this great war. One important
reason was that most elites lost more than 90 percent of the value of their estates.
While the conflict was certainly a factor in Nepal, it was definitely not at the scale of the world
wars. The destruction in Nepal was also very limited with respect to what happened during
the great wars. Indeed, Macours (2010) explains that the economy in Nepal was consistently
performing well throughout the course of the conflict. A more comparable country-level
example comes from Finland. Scandinavian countries are today seen as the gold standard of
1In line with Scheidel’s argument, Deaton (2021) finds that the recent Covid-19 pandemic reduced global
inequality of incomes. He finds that the between country dispersion of income was reduced, perhaps due to
the lack of growth for the wealthy economies.
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social and economic equality. Meriläinen, Mitrunen, and Virkola (2020) argue that Finland,
one of the most equal countries in the world today, has not always been as equal. On the
contrary, Finland was highly unequal at the start of the 20th century. The authors argue that
the change to the current level of equality was the product of insurgency in the country in
1918. The authors document that not only did the unequal regions provide more insurgents
and recorded higher conflict outcomes during the conflict, but the regions with the most
conflict (and higher inequality) also had the most declines in inequality in the aftermath
of the conflict. This, they argue, was the product, among other things, of large-scale land
redistributive policy.
Given this history, and the nature of the cause for the civil conflict in Nepal, should we
expect the lowering of inequality in post-conflict Nepal?
A natural place to start is with the data. A look at the data suggests that indeed inequality
could have been lowered after the conflict. Figure 7.1 plots the correlation between the
Gini index of farmland ownership calculated using the 1991/92 Agricultural Census (CBS
1993) (the last data before the conflict) and 2011/12 Agricultural Census (CBS 2013) (the
first dataset available after the conclusion of the conflict).2 It is fair to say that the Gini
index of the distribution of farmland has declined over this time frame for a large number of
districts. In the figure, most of the points are below the 45-degree line (or the line of equality)
suggesting that the 1991 Gini indices for most districts were larger than the 2011 Gini index.
However, this is not universally true. There are a few districts with higher inequality in 2011
relative to 1991. Figure 7.1 also separates the data by geographical regions to identify any
regional trends. It is not clear from the figure if there are any distinct geographic trends.
Figure 7.2 recasts Figure 7.1 but this time separating the districts into the ecological regions—
that is mountains, hills, or Tarai (flatlands). Given the geography and climate, the land is
more productive in the plains than in the mountains. Hence, note that the distribution in
22011/12 census is also the last data available.


















Figure 7.1: Correlation between the 1991 and 2011 Gini index of Land Ownership, over
Geographic Regions
Notes: This figure shows the correlation between Gini index of farmland ownership in 1991/92 and 2011/12
Agricultural Census for 75 districts in Nepal. The distrits are divided into five geographic regions (from east
to west). The figure also adds the 45-degree line (or the line of equality).
Source: Author’s calculation using CBS (1993) and CBS (2013).
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the flatlands is also relatively less equal. While the groups here are more distinct between
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Figure 7.2: Correlation between the 1991 and 2011 Gini index of Land Ownership, over
Ecological Regions
Notes: This figure shows the correlation between Gini index of farmland ownership in 1991/92 and 2011/12
Agricultural Census for 75 districts in Nepal. The distrits are divided into three ecological regions—mountains,
hills, and Tarai (flatland). The figure also adds the 45-degree line (or the line of equality).
Source: Author’s calculation using CBS (1993) and CBS (2013).
Figure 7.3 shows the same correlation as the above two figures, but this time weighted by
each district’s share of overall conflict incidents. The larger bubbles indicate a higher share
of conflict. Here we want to see if the districts with higher conflict also had higher decreases
in the Gini index in 2011 relative to 1991. Again, we see no clear pattern. There are districts
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with a relatively small amount of conflict and higher decreases in the Gini index. At the
same time, Kalikot, one of the districts with the highest conflict has had an increase in the
Gini index. While there are outliers, on average, however, it is difficult to parse out the effect
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Figure 7.3: Correlation between the 1991 and 2011 Gini index of Land Ownership, weighted
by Conflict Outcome
Notes: This figure shows the correlation between Gini index of farmland ownership from the 1991/92 and
2011/12 Agricultural Census for 75 districts in Nepal. The size of the bubbles represents the relative share of
conflict incidents for each district in the 1996-2006 Civil War. The figure also adds the 45-degree line (or the
line of equality).
Source: Author’s calculation using CBS (1993), CBS (2013), and Joshi and Pyakurel (2015).
To more closely examine the effect of conflict on the Gini index in 2011, Figure 7.4 depicts
the percent change in the Gini index in 2011 relative to the index in 1991 for the ten districts
with the highest conflict incidents in the overall period of the Civil War. Whereas the above-
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mentioned district, Kalikot, does seem like an outlier in terms of the magnitude increase in
the Gini index in 2011, it certainly is not the only district with an increase in 2011 relative
to 1991. In this period, four of the top 10 districts with conflict have equal or higher Gini
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Figure 7.4: Change in Gini Index of the Top 10 Conflict Affected Districts
Notes: This figure compares the change (in percent) in the Gini index of farmland ownership from 1991 to
2011 for ten districts with the highest conflict incidents in the 1996-2006 Civil War in Nepal.
Source: Author’s calculation using CBS (1993), CBS (2013), and Joshi and Pyakurel (2015).
Perhaps a reason why the data do not directly show the effect of the conflict is that 2011 was
too early to see any structural changes. Indeed, elections for constituent assembly only took
place in 2008 and a new constitution was finalized in 2015. Understandably, any significant
policy changes could not be implemented before then. However, this did not restrict public
debates or premonitions by the political parties regarding land reform. The latter could
certainly have behavioral effects. One such behavior that has been identified in the literature
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is relative misreporting or under-reporting in surveys, especially at the top of the distribution
(see Burkhauser et al. 2012; Burkhauser et al. 2017; Yonzan et al. 2020).
To that end, Figure 7.5 charts the share of large farm holdings in each district. Large farm
holding is defined as holdings greater than 5 hector area (ha). The figure shows the percentage
points change in the share from 1991 to 2011. It is quite remarkable to see that in all but
1 district, there are fewer large holdings. The one district with an increased share is the
aforementioned district Kalikot, which also had a very large increase in the Gini index over
this period. In many districts where there were signifincant large farm holdings in 1991, large
farm holdings are non-existent in 2011. On average, 12.8% of the total farmland in 1991
comprised of large farm holdings, by 2011 this share has reduced to 3.8%.
One cause of this decline is that the large farms have been partitioned into smaller fragments.
However, it is unclear if the fragmentation was due to political fervor or some of the trends
in history. Historically, population growth has caused fragmentations as parents’ property
is divided up among the sons. The share of land held by landowners who owned 2 ha to 5
ha has also declined from an average 45.0% in 1991 to 40.8% in 2011. What is certain is
that an important reason for the general decrease in the Gini index of farmland ownership
in 2011 compared to that in 1991 is due to the drastic decline in the share of large farm
holders. It is uncertain, however, if this decrease is due to more egalitarian distribution, land
fragmentation, mismeasurement due to misreporting, or something else entirely. Given the
concerns of the Civil War, how it ended, and the political narrative after it, it would be really
surprising to see an increase in the reporting of large farm holdings.
Looking at the broader picture, Figure 7.6 reports inequality at the national level for South
Asian economies. The consumption Gini index in Nepal was 0.328 in 2010/11, which is not
much lower than the 0.352 at the onset of the Civil War. The Gini index rose to 0.438 in
2003/04 before eventually coming down to the 2010/11 level. However, this rise in the index
































































































































































Figure 7.5: Change in the Share of Large Farm holdings, 1991-2011
Notes: This figure shows the change (in percentage points) of the share of large farm holdings between 1991
and 2011. Large farm holdings are defined as holdings with farmland larger than 5 hector area.
Source: Author’s calculation using CBS (1993) and CBS (2013).
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in the index does little to explain the start of the conflict. Relative to its regional peers, the
consumption Gini index does not stand out.
Figure 7.6: Consumption Gini Index for South Asian Economies
Notes: This figure shows the trends in Gini index of consumption for countries in South Asia. Afghanistan is
excluded due to lack of data for this time period.
Source: World Development Indicators, World Bank (World Bank 2020).
Finally, Figure 7.7 shows the trends in the share of pretax income held by the top decile
of earners from the World Inequality Database. The concentration of income at the top of
the income distribution in Nepal was one of the highest in the region in the early 1990s.
By mid-2000s however, the share of income held by the top decile of earners in Nepal was
the lowest in the region. While this trend does suggest a lowering of inequality, there are a
few concerns. The data is derived using three surveys for the years 1995, 2003, and 2010.
I have already established the difficulties in conducting surveys during an ongoing conflict
and so there are larger uncertainties around the 2003 estimate. If we do ignore the 2003
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estimate, the 2010 estimate still suggests a lower inequality level relative to the peers and
also relative to the 1995 estimate. Whereas this could be taken as a positive social impact
of the conflict, again, I wonder how much of this decline is a measure of reality and how
much of it is a behavioral response to the political realities after the conflict. Either way, the
declines suggest an understanding of the political concerns.
Figure 7.7: Share of Pretax Income of the Top Decile Earners for South Asian Economies
Notes: This figure shows the trends in the share of pretax income held by the top 10% earners for countries
in South Asia. The share is calculated for individuals over 20 years of age. Maldives is excluded due to lack
of data for this time period.
Source: World Inequality Database, https://wid.world/.
At the time of writing, fifteen years have passed since the formal end of the Civil War in
Nepal. Much can change in fifteen years, however, is fifteen years is enough to see changes
to institutions that evolved over two-and-a-half centuries? Moreover, does war by itself
will change the social, economic, and political inequalities? Perhaps these changes need to
be directed as was the case in Finland where progressive land redistribution policies were
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implemented. Recall that institutions are shaped to mitigate uncertainties; what is important
to note is that they are shaped by the intentionalities of the players.
Concerning the French revolution of 1789, Tocqueville in The Old Regime and the French
Revolution writes “the chief permanent achievement of the French Revolution was the
suppression of those political institutions, commonly described as feudal, which for many
centuries had held unquestioned sway in most European countries. The Revolution set out to
replace them with a new social and political order, at once simple and more uniform, based
on the concept of the equality of all men.” The revolution in Nepal has brought an end to
the old institution of monarchy. This has drastically changed the socio-political institutional
setup of the state. However, Acemoglu and Robinson (2008) have argued that despite large
political shocks, economic institutions persist in the long-run. Since power can be derived de
jure or de facto, a change in the de jure power alone is not enough for long-term changes.
The authors argue that elites find a way, be it through lobbying or through social networks,
to increase their de facto power and capture the economic institutions.
In Capital and Ideology, Piketty argues that after the 2008 financial crisis, the time is ripe for
radical changes to Western societies. It is similarly a ripe time for Nepal. If the country is to
avoid the persistence of the old economic institutions, some of Piketty’s ideas for the West
could be considered for Nepal as well—namely, equalizing the access to opportunities through
equal investment in every young person’s education and sharing of profits between workers
and owners (be it in agriculture or new industries). The land was not only a resource of
production but one that provided opportunities in an agricultural society. Equalizing access
to opportunities should be a primary goal for the nation going forward. Then perhaps, a
more egalitarian distribution of social, political, and economic resources will increase the
incentives to invest in state capacities as well. If history is a guide, unless significant policy
changes addressing the causes of the conflict are implemented, it will be difficult not to go
back to the old ways and perhaps down the road of conflict again.
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